cs.CYNov 13, 2026

Algorithmic Opacity as a Principal-Agent Problem

Authors: Ignacio Cofone, Katherine J. Strandburg

Organizations: Professor of Law and Regulation of AI, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law and Institute for Ethics in AI. · Pauline Newman Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Information Law Institute, NYU School of Law.

Abstract

Concerns about gaming and trade secrecy, frequently invoked to justify algorithmic opacity, can also mask self-serving strategic behavior by decision-makers, who may prioritize private benefits over social welfare. We develop a principal-agent test for when algorithmic decision-making should trigger disclosure obligations even when concerns about gaming or trade secrecy exist. The test, which is anchored in decision quality, relies on two diagnostics that can be disclosed without enabling gaming or revealing trade secrets: the error profile (false positive and false negative rates, overall and for each group) and the distribution of decision outcomes across groups. These diagnostics make visible whether decision-makers align design and implementation with the public interest or instead use opacity to obscure bias, inefficiency, or strategic shirking. Strong disparities across social groups, and asymmetries in the distribution of decision errors across outcome types, should trigger rebuttable presumptions favoring further disclosure. Where ground-truth error rates are unavailable, outcome distributions across groups can support the same presumption, and a decision-maker's inability to produce an error profile is itself diagnostic. The test thus treats fairness metrics as triggers for further disclosure and extends to generative and agentic systems through analogous metrics. The framework informs differentiated disclosure regimes (staged, partial, mediated, or audience-segmented). Once such regimes are considered, the domain of justifiable algorithmic opacity is significantly narrower than commonly assumed: when gaming or trade secrecy risks are legitimate, actionable disclosures (such as training data characteristics and key system design parameters) ordinarily can be mandated without compromising innovation or enabling gaming, even for technically inscrutable algorithms.

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