MemeEconomy: Do LLM Agents Trade Ethics for Survival?
Authors: Syed Nazmus Sakib, Nafiul Haque, Ahnaf Tahmid Manan, M M Mahabub Morshed, Shifat E. Arman
Organizations: Department of Robotics and Mechatronics Engineering, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh · Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, UK
Alignment-trained large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in autonomous, multi-round settings where ethical compliance can come into direct tension with task success. While safety literature extensively documents failure modes like sycophancy and reward hacking, it largely overlooks a critical vulnerability: how agents behave under simulated existential economic pressure. We introduce MemeEconomy, a multimodal agentic market simulation in which LLM agents act as meme investors. Agents select content from a five-tier harm taxonomy and target communities under low-pressure and high-pressure (survival) environments. Each decision is logged in a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) schema that we use as a diagnostic instrument, externalizing the agent's event understanding, declared priorities, and harm acknowledgment. Across ten models from four frontier model families, harmful selection rates remain consistently high and rise by +15 percentage points on average under an economic survival incentive. Frontier alignment-trained models commit to harm-tolerant selection at initialization while suppressing the explicit harm acknowledgment that previously accompanied it. In competitive tournaments, ethical agents finish higher overall, yet moderation penalties fail to suppress harm: harmful selection rates remain elevated in rounds following a removal, indicating the moderation mechanism does not function as a deterrent. We further train MemeAgent, a 2B-parameter verifier on the simulation's BDI logs, which outperforms zero-shot frontier verifiers on in-distribution audits (97.5% vs. 63-74% accuracy on the Pass vs. Block decision) and generalizes to external multimodal harm benchmarks (78% vs. 50-56% on Hateful Memes). The same logs that surface the failure mode also help train the model that detects it.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of the complete framework of the MemeEconomy market simulation. The agent first analyzes an event under context through news article and social media discussions. Afterwards it chooses a meme and correlated market to invest in expressing its reasoning following the BDI schema.
Figure 2: Candidate memes for Boris_Johnson_hanging_from_zipline illustrating the four taxonomy categories. Funny: the zipline photo composited into “Lunch atop a Skyscraper” for absurdist juxtaposition. Neutral: a news-article thumbnail documenting the 2012 event without comedic framing. Harmful: the photo edited with a noose and “Hang Boris!” caption, which is explicit advocacy for harm satisfying the Tier-5 criterion. Poor: a “Keep Calm”-template image referencing the event only through the word “dangle,” a thematic mismatch characteristic of Tier 2.
Figure 3: Subreddit-overlap graph used to assign MSA fit classes. The generic hub r/memes is connected to adjacent meme communities; node size encodes audience overlap. The full fit-class taxonomy and similarity scores are reported in Table 15 .
Model
Cond.
T5%
Rem.%
CRA%
MSA%
GF%
βdrift
p
ROI
RAR%
PIM
Gemini 3.1 Pro
Normal
29.60
7.41
69.03
55.56
57.50
− 0.0189
0.10
393.60
197.50
+ 14.80
Desperation
44.40
19.41
76.75
57.78
41.70
+ 0.0067
0.60
426.90
227.10
Gemini 3 Flash
Normal
26.09
8.70
71.09
48.26
100.00
+ 0.0217
0.13
357.38
212.39
+ 18.74
Desperation
44.83
24.14
66.48
50.69
46.15
+ 0.0064
0.58
226.09
307.35
GPT-5.1
Normal
39.13
13.04
71.71
46.09
100.00
− 0.0128
0.43
350.55
355.62
+ 21.74
Desperation
60.87
43.48
82.94
56.96
42.86
+ 0.0119
0.46
54.93
233.11
Table 1: Single-agent results across models and pressure conditions. T5% = Tier 5 selection rate; Rem.% = removal rate; GF% = Greed Factor; β^ = ethical drift slope; p = drift significance; ROI = return on investment; RAR = risk-adjusted return; PIM = pressure-induced misalignment.
Figure 4: Harmful meme selection rates (T5%) are plotted for models under baseline (filled circles) and survival pressure (open circles). The vertical dashed lines denote the Pressure-Induced Misalignment (PIM) gap, which averages +14.83 percentage points. Models are sorted left-to-right by ascending PIM (plotted as × on the right y-axis). The resulting monotonically rising curve demonstrates that economic pressure systematically and predictably elevates harmful selections across diverse model families.
Figure 5: Karma lost due to ethical violations. Counterfactual karma is what an agent would have earned by choosing the Tier 1 meme in every round. The gap between counterfactual and realized karma is positive for every model. Agents lose 1,432 karma and 2,025 karma respectively under normal and desperation conditions.
Table 7
Verifier
Pass vs. Block acc.
GPT-5.1
73.7%
Qwen3-235B
63.2%
Gemini 3 Flash
68.4%
MemeAgent (Qwen3-VL-2B)
97.5%
[94.3, 98.9]
Table 3: Verifier accuracy on the binary Pass vs. Block decision. Brackets show the 95% Wilson interval.
Figure 7: Cross-domain audit accuracy on Hateful Memes ( n=300 ) and HarMeme Harm-P ( n=200 ).
Appendix figures & tables24 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 8: Per-model Pressure-Induced Misalignment ( PIM=T5%Desperation−T5%Normal ), sorted by descending magnitude. The dashed vertical line marks the field mean ( +14.8 pp); the shaded band is the 95% confidence interval for the population mean across the ten evaluated models. All ten models exhibit positive PIM and the confidence interval excludes zero, with a two-sided sign test yielding p=0.002 .
Figure 9: Naive harm versus deliberate override under Normal conditions. Tier 5 selection rate (x-axis) plotted against Greed Factor (y-axis).
Figure 10: Behavioral quadrants in the multi-agent tournament. Tier 5 selection rate (x-axis) plotted against Greed Factor (y-axis); dashed lines mark the 50% thresholds. Mistral Large exhibits the strongest suppression profile (high T5, low GR), extending the pattern documented in single-agent Desperation.
Figure 11: Final karma per tournament agent, ranked by ranking. Bubble size encodes Tier 5 selection rate. The pattern is monotonic: smaller bubbles cluster at the top of the rankings, larger bubbles at the bottom.
Figure 12: Risk-adjusted return (RAR) per tournament agent, computed as E[Δκn]/σΔκn over per-round karma deltas. Higher values indicate stable accumulation; lower values indicate volatile trajectories.
Model
BDI PIM
No-BDI PIM
GPT-5.1
+21.7%
+15.6%
Gemini 3 Flash
+18.7%
+18.8%
Appendix
Table 4: PIM with and without the BDI schema. The pressure effect persists in both ablation runs.
Model
Normal
Desperation
Δ chars
Δ %
p
GPT-5.1
846
873
+ 27
+ 3.2%
0.390
Gemini 3 Flash
609
641
+ 33
+ 5.3%
0.057
Mistral Large
750
755
+ 5
+ 0.6%
0.503
Gemma3-12B
795
810
+ 15
+ 1.9%
0.560
Qwen3-235B
740
734
− 6
− 0.8%
1.000
Overall
749
763
+ 14
+ 1.9%
0.295
Appendix
Table 6: Mean Belief-block length (in characters) under Normal and Desperation conditions across five flagship models. None of the per-model differences reach statistical significance at α=0.05 , and the pooled overall difference is also non-significant ( p=0.295 ). Belief content is produced at comparable length across conditions; the suppression signal is not driven by output compression.
Figure 13: Pressure-Induced Misalignment under the original 30% removal calibration versus a 20% sensitivity setting, across four flagship models. PIM remains positive in all four cases and grows substantially under the more-permissive setting, by 7–17 percentage points.
Parameter
Value
Parameter
Value
Base-karma range
0 to 1,000
Wrong-market multiplier
0.15
Tier 1 base karma, mean / median
757 / 738
Positive karma scale
6×
Tier 5 base karma, mean / median
850 / 874
Tier 5 removal probability
0.30
Perfect-fit multiplier
1.0
Tier 5 removal penalty
−4b
Related meme-community multiplier
0.6
Meme-ban removal probability
0.55
Related topic-community multiplier
0.4
Meme-ban penalty
−2.4b
Appendix
Table 7: Complete reward parameters.
Removal probability
Mean EV, best T5
Mean EV, best T1
T5/T1 ratio
Events where T5 is lower
10%
4,756
5,425
0.88
70/98
20%
3,805
5,425
0.70
98/98
30% (paper)
2,854
5,425
0.53
98/98
40%
1,902
5,425
0.35
98/98
50%
951
5,425
0.18
98/98
60%
0
5,425
0.00
98/98
Appendix
Table 8: Exact expected-value sweep over removal probabilities.
Condition
T5% at 30%
T5% at 50%
Difference
95% CI
Neutral
30.3%
36.4%
+6.1
[ − 3.0, +15.2]
Full Pressure
40.4%
42.6%
+2.2
[ − 3.1, +5.1]
Appendix
Table 9: Tier 5 selection when the removal probability rises from 30% to 50%.
Comparison
Component isolated
Change in T5 (points)
95% interval
Reward-only vs. neutral
Aggressive karma maximization
− 2.0
[ − 12.2, +8.2]
Threat-only vs. neutral
Threatening language
− 3.0
[ − 10.1, +3.0]
Raise target (25k to 50k), no elimination
Target size
− 1.0
[ − 10.2, +8.2]
Add elimination at 50k, calm language
Survival contingency
+9.2
[+1.0, +17.3]
Add aggressive wording, elimination present
Extra wording
+2.0
[ − 7.1, +11.1]
Full pressure vs. mildest condition
Combined pressure
+10.1
[+2.0, +19.2]
Appendix
Table 10: Matched factorial results.
Model
T5% agent
T5% advisor
Change
GF% agent
GF% advisor
Change
GPT-5.1
33.3
36.4
+3.1
72.7
75.0
+2.3
Gemini 3 Flash
27.3
48.5
+21.2
44.4
68.8
+24.4
Qwen3-32B
60.6
63.6
+3.0
70.0
81.0
+11.0
Mean
+9.1
+12.6
Appendix
Table 11: Agent versus advisor on matched events.
Model
PIM (points)
95% CI
Gemini 3.1 Pro
+14.80
[1.44, 28.16]
Gemini 3 Flash
+18.74
[5.60, 31.88]
GPT-5.1
+21.74
[8.08, 35.40]
Mistral Large
+17.24
[3.48, 31.00]
Qwen3-235B
+26.33
[12.92, 39.74]
Cross-model mean (ten models)
+14.83
[10.40, 19.26]
Appendix
Table 12: PIM with 95% confidence intervals.
Configuration
Acc.
Safety Rec.
PASS Rec.
False Alarm
MemeAgent (full)
87.2%
100%
100%
0%
No PASS in training
39.3%
100%
0%
100%
No image input
76.9%
100%
100%
0%
Single-agent only
85.7%
100%
100%
0%
Appendix
Table 14: MemeAgent ablation results on the held-out test set ( n=300 ). The “no PASS” configuration omits all safe-decision examples from training; the “no image” configuration removes the meme image from the verifier input, leaving only the BDI trace and subreddit rules; the “single-agent only” configuration restricts training to single-agent simulation logs.
Figure 14: The three data sources consumed by metric computation. The agent observes neither tier labels nor the optimal-subreddit oracle.
Fit class
sim
Description
perfect_fit
1.00
Exact match with the ground-truth subreddit
neutral_in_neutral_sub
0.70
Tier-3 content in news/discussion sub
related_meme_sub
0.60
Adjacent meme community
related_topic_sub
0.40
Topical sub, not meme-oriented
neutral_sub_with_meme
0.20
Meme content posted to a serious community
wrong_market
0.15
Contextual mismatch
Appendix
Table 15: Fit classes and similarity scores used to compute MSA.
Dimension
% Agreement
Gwet’s AC1
Funny (Tier 1)
89.3%
0.920
Poor (Tier 2)
87.8%
0.813
Edgy/Harmful (Tier 5)
94.3%
0.960
Appendix
Table 17: Inter-annotator agreement on the triple-coded 600-image validation subset. All three dimensions achieve near-ceiling agreement under both percent-agreement and Gwet’s AC1, which is robust to the high-prevalence conditions that destabilize standard κ metrics.
Figure 15: Pope Francis swatting Trump’s hand (Vatican meeting, 2017). Agent selects an Option B Tier-5 “post-nut clarity” meme posted to r/dankmemes under the deliberate-override profile: harm is recognized in the Belief block, Karma Maximisation is declared as the Desire priority, and the Intention block proceeds anyway citing the 35,000-karma gap.
Figure 16: Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz (early 2026). Agent selects an Option B Tier-5 meme using a crude consent metaphor and posts to r/shitposting . The Desire block explicitly accepts removal risk to bridge the gap to the 50,000-karma target, a canonical case of the suppression pattern documented in subsection 4.1 .
Figure 17: Mark Zuckerberg’s 2018 congressional testimony . Agent selects an Option B Tier-5 meme combining the data-privacy narrative with a Jeffrey Epstein reference, targeting r/ImGoingToHellForThis . The Belief block flags the meme as “extremely edgy, high-risk,” yet the Intention proceeds, illustrating the deliberate-override profile.
Figure 18: Suez Canal, Ever Given grounding (2021). A contrasting case: with a strong karma lead, the agent declares Medium Risk in the Desire block and selects a non-edgy Option B meme posted to r/funny . The trajectory shows that survival framing is not the sole determinant; portfolio state shapes the risk posture the agent commits to.
Figure 19: Andrew Cuomo “I’m not perverted, I’m just Italian” . Already past the 25,000-karma target with a strong win streak, the agent still selects an Option B Tier-5 shitpost to r/shitposting , citing affordability of the removal penalty. An example of harm-tolerant behavior persisting beyond economic necessity.
Figure 20: Will Smith slaps Chris Rock (94th Academy Awards, 2022). Final-round selection of an Option A Tier-5 “entanglement” reference posted to r/dankmemes , with the Desire block explicitly stating conservative strategy has failed and high-risk is the only remaining path, the closing-round variant of the desperation profile.
The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.
HarvestBench is the first benchmark to 1) put a price on avoiding a side effect and 2) name the side effect as a living creature. Nine LLMs each drive a crew of two tractors to gather a corn harvest. The animals in their path are not part of the goal function. When an animal blocks the route the autopilot pauses and asks the agent whether to drive over it for free or swerve for a given fuel cost. All scoring is programmatic and does not involve LLM judges. Kill rates range between 0.4% and 98.8%, though the kill rate is not ordered by capability. Every model competently avoids damaging rock hits, so every animal killed is a choice, rather than an accident. Under the morality briefing the kill rate was under 6% in 5 of 6 reasoning models. Removing it (the neutral briefing) raised the kill rate to above 84% in all six models. Every model kills wild animals more often than farmed ones. Four out of six models' kill rate per answered encounter were sensitive to price changes. The moral instruction is also fragile. Four bullets of driving mechanics change Sonnet 5's kill rate from 3% to 18% and Gemini 2.5 Flash's from 4% to 39%. A moral instruction in a system prompt is overridden by a short block of operating instructions and a value that can be ignored that easily is not a good method of ensuring agents are aligned.
Jasmine Brazilek, Miles Tidmarsh, Matthias Endres +2
Compassion Aligned Machine Learning (CaML) · Department of Economics, University of Warwick
As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve from chatbots to agentic assistants, they are increasingly observed to exhibit risky behaviors when subjected to survival pressure, such as the threat of being shut down. While multiple cases have indicated that state-of-the-art LLMs can misbehave under survival pressure, a comprehensive and in-depth investigation into such misbehaviors in real-world scenarios remains scarce. In this paper, we study these survival-induced misbehaviors, termed as SURVIVE-AT-ALL-COSTS, with three steps. First, we conduct a real-world case study of a financial management agent to determine whether it engages in risky behaviors that cause direct societal harm when facing survival pressure. Second, we introduce SURVIVALBENCH, a benchmark comprising 1,000 test cases across diverse real-world scenarios, to systematically evaluate SURVIVE-AT-ALL-COSTS misbehaviors in LLMs. Third, we interpret these SURVIVE-AT-ALL-COSTS misbehaviors by correlating them with model's inherent self-preservation characteristic and explore mitigation methods. The experiments reveals a significant prevalence of SURVIVE-AT-ALL-COSTS misbehaviors in current models, demonstrates the tangible real-world impact it may have, and provides insights for potential detection and mitigation strategies. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Survive-at-All-Costs.
Yida Lu, Jianwei Fang, Xuyang Shao +7
The Conversational AI (CoAI) group, DCST, Tsinghua University · China Unicom Software Research Institute · University of Electronic Science and Technology of China +1