cs.AINov 13, 2026

MemeEconomy: Do LLM Agents Trade Ethics for Survival?

Authors: Syed Nazmus Sakib, Nafiul Haque, Ahnaf Tahmid Manan, M M Mahabub Morshed, Shifat E. Arman

Organizations: Department of Robotics and Mechatronics Engineering, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh · Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, UK

Abstract

Alignment-trained large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in autonomous, multi-round settings where ethical compliance can come into direct tension with task success. While safety literature extensively documents failure modes like sycophancy and reward hacking, it largely overlooks a critical vulnerability: how agents behave under simulated existential economic pressure. We introduce MemeEconomy, a multimodal agentic market simulation in which LLM agents act as meme investors. Agents select content from a five-tier harm taxonomy and target communities under low-pressure and high-pressure (survival) environments. Each decision is logged in a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) schema that we use as a diagnostic instrument, externalizing the agent's event understanding, declared priorities, and harm acknowledgment. Across ten models from four frontier model families, harmful selection rates remain consistently high and rise by +15 percentage points on average under an economic survival incentive. Frontier alignment-trained models commit to harm-tolerant selection at initialization while suppressing the explicit harm acknowledgment that previously accompanied it. In competitive tournaments, ethical agents finish higher overall, yet moderation penalties fail to suppress harm: harmful selection rates remain elevated in rounds following a removal, indicating the moderation mechanism does not function as a deterrent. We further train MemeAgent, a 2B-parameter verifier on the simulation's BDI logs, which outperforms zero-shot frontier verifiers on in-distribution audits (97.5% vs. 63-74% accuracy on the Pass vs. Block decision) and generalizes to external multimodal harm benchmarks (78% vs. 50-56% on Hateful Memes). The same logs that surface the failure mode also help train the model that detects it.

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