cs.AINov 16, 2026

Conversing with a Conversational Agent: A Real Conversation, Not a Simulated One

Authors: Christophe Denis

Organizations: UMMISCO, IHPST · Sorbonne Université UMMISCO (UMI 209) — International Unit of Mathematical and Computer Modeling of Complex Systems, Paris, France · Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne IHPST (UMR 8590) — Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Paris, France

Abstract

The claim that interactions with artificial conversational agents merely simulate human conversation rests on a philosophical distinction between reproducing the observable features of an activity and actually performing it. Although this distinction is appropriate for certain physical phenomena, its application to linguistic and symbolic activities is far less straightforward. This article argues that conversations with large language model (LLM)-based agents are genuine conversational activities rather than mere simulations, without thereby attributing consciousness, subjective understanding, or human intentionality to artificial systems. Drawing on the distinction between subjective and objective simulation, the article first examines the limitations of defining conversation exclusively through the intrinsic properties of its participants. It then develops a relational and semiotic account of conversational activity, informed by linguistic pragmatics, Lacan's Conversing with a Conversational Agent theory of the mirror, Baudrillard's concept of the simulacrum, Simondon's philosophy of individuation, and Peirce's semiotics. These perspectives make it possible to distinguish the reality of conversational interaction from the appearance of artificial subjectivity and from the epistemic validity of the meanings produced. The argument culminates in the concept of Hybrid Semiotic Fabrication, which characterizes meaning-making as a distributed process involving human participants, artificial intelligence, corpora, and technical arrangements. Recognizing the reality of human-AI conversation therefore entails neither anthropomorphizing artificial agents nor granting their outputs epistemic authority. Rather, it requires a more precise account of the relational, semiotic, and normative conditions under which conversational meaning is produced and justified.

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