Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models

VLA: Vision-Language-Action

Follow this topic Ask about this topic

Momentum

2 papers in the last four weeks, against 2 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Jul 13Week of Sep 28

Latest papers 23

Sep 30, 2026cs.RO

Exploiting Vulnerabilities: Universal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models in Robotics

Recently, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have revolutionized robotic manipulation by seamlessly integrating visual perception, language understanding, and action generation in an end-to-end learning framework. However, since these models are designed to interact directly with the physical world and humans, their security is critical, and even small vulnerabilities can lead to catastrophic failures. In this work, we propose the Universal Adversarial Object, a sphere with optimized surface texture that significantly degrades task success rates when placed within the robot's field of view. Specifically, our approach introduces a multi-level attack framework that jointly disrupts trajectory planning, task execution, and action control. We validate our method in both simulated and real-world robotic settings. Experimental results demonstrate that the adversarial object reduces the average task success rates by 31.2%-39.9% for two representative VLA models (Pi0 and RDT), with success rates dropping to near zero in complex scenarios. Index Terms--Vision-Language-Action models, adversarial attack, robotic security, universal adversarial object

Songhua Yang, Ziyu Liu, Yuanwei Liu +5

School of Computer Science, Wuhan University. · School of Robotics, Wuhan University. · School of Power and Mechanical Engineering, Wuhan University.

Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Robotic Manipulation Vision-Language-Action Models

Sep 17, 2026cs.CV

Beyond Patch Removal: Persistent Adversarial Effects in Vision-Language-Action Policies

Adversarial patches to Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies can cause both immediate action corruption and persistent state effects that remain after the patch is removed. Existing evaluations largely focus on continuous attacks and do not separate these two effects. We introduce a state-restoration protocol that removes the patch at matched action-chunk boundaries and measures subsequent recoverability under the same remaining step budget. Clean, random-patch, deviation-matched, and fixed-direction controls distinguish adversarial effects from occlusion, action-error magnitude, and directional persistence. We also evaluate a recovery adapter trained on attack-induced states under controlled intervention latency. On OpenVLA-OFT with EDPA attacks, only 36.2% of LIBERO-Long episodes remain recoverable after five chunks, compared with 89.9% and 87.0% for the deviation-matched and fixed-direction controls. Similar persistent effects are observed on autoregressive OpenVLA. The recovery adapter improves recovery from 7.7% to 47.4% at one-chunk latency, but its benefit decreases substantially with delayed intervention. These results show that adversarial effects can persist after patch removal and that timely intervention is critical for recovery.

Enhao Wu, Fusen Guo, Yuxin Cao +3

UNSW Sydney, Australia · UNSW Canberra, Australia · National University of Singapore, Singapore +2

Adversarial Patch Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Robustness of VLA Models

Aug 13, 2026cs.CV

UniTexture: Cross-Task Universal Adversarial Textures for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as generalist robotic policies capable of following diverse language instructions and performing a wide range of manipulation tasks. However, their direct control over embodied agents also exposes them to adversarial interference that may cause unsafe physical behaviors. Existing attacks on robotic policies are typically optimized for a single task or instruction, leaving the cross-task vulnerabilities of multitask VLAs largely unexplored. We introduce UniTexture, a cross-task universal adversarial texture attack that uses a single textured 3D object to induce targeted deviations in VLA action predictions across multiple tasks. UniTexture backpropagates gradients from the policy's action outputs to surface texture parameters through a differentiable renderer. It jointly optimizes the shared texture over a distribution of tasks, instructions, states, and viewpoints using a targeted action-space objective, steering predicted actions toward attacker-defined targets without optimizing a separate texture for each task. We evaluate UniTexture on OpenVLA and

π_{0.5}

across diverse manipulation tasks and multiple evaluation settings. UniTexture reduces the mean task success rate from 90.0% under benign conditions to 48.4% under attack, induces target-aligned action shifts, and further exhibits cross-suite and cross-model transfer without re-optimization. Together, these findings reveal shared cross-task vulnerabilities in multitask VLAs that can be systematically exploited through a single adversarial surface texture.

Yukun Dai, Mingzhe Dai, Tianshi Wang +3

Tongji University · Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence · University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Physical Adversarial Attacks

Aug 11, 2026cs.AI

Hidden in Plain Sight: Diffusion-Based Unrestricted Robotic Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have shown strong capabilities in controlling robots across diverse manipulation tasks. However, their adversarial robustness remains largely underexplored, and exploiting this weakness can lead to physical-world harm. Existing attacks on VLA models often rely on pixel-space perturbations or white-box access, resulting in noticeable artifacts and limited deployability in real-world robotic systems. In this work, we propose DURA, a diffusion-based unrestricted robotic attack that generates visually natural adversarial patches for VLA models. DURA supports both white-box and black-box attack settings, where the black-box setting requires only the predicted actions of the victim model. By optimizing along the latent trajectory of a pretrained diffusion model, DURA generates visually natural patches while steering the robot toward attacker-specified target actions. Extensive experiments in both simulation and the real physical world show that DURA consistently outperforms existing methods. Our findings expose a safety risk for physically deployed VLA models and call for stronger defenses.

Jiahui Han, Yuhui Yao, Xin Wang +6

1Xi’an Jiaotong University · 2Shanghai AI Laboratory · University of Science and Technology of China

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Physical Adversarial Attacks

Aug 4, 2026cs.RO

Structure-Aware Robust Fine-Tuning: Defending Vision-Language-Action Robots Against Physical Attention Hijacking

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies promise general robotic manipulation, but their robustness against physical-world attacks remains fragile. In particular, we show that physically realizable adversarial patches can reliably induce failures by triggering a mechanism we call policy-critical action-to-vision attention hijacking, where action-conditioned attention is diverted from task-relevant regions to a localized patch. To demonstrate the threat, we propose Attention-Guided Semantic Disruption (AGSD), an Expectation-over-Transformation (EOT) optimized printable patch that jointly (i) concentrates action-to-vision attention on the patch and (ii) disrupts vision-language semantic alignment, yielding strong cross-task and cross-architecture transfer. To mitigate such attacks, we introduce Structure-Aware Robust Fine-Tuning (SARF), a zero-inference-overhead defense that fine-tunes only the visual encoder using feature anchoring, policy-critical attention correction, and language-guided geometric consistency restricted to semantically relevant regions. On LIBERO, SARF reduces OpenVLA's failure rate under AGSD from 100% to 14.2%-56.8% (28.6% average) across suites while preserving clean performance, and on a real PiPER manipulator it improves average success under AGSD from 23.0% to 65.0%. These results highlight mechanism-level robustness as a practical path to securing VLA robots against physical attention hijacking.

Jinquan Zhang, Dongfu Yin, Run Yang +3

Guangdong Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Economy (SZ), Shenzhen, China · Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China · Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

Fine-Tuning Language-Conditioned Robot Manipulation Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Robustness of VLA Models Physical Adversarial Attacks

Aug 4, 2026cs.CV

DRIFT: Derailing Denoising Trajectories of Flow-Matching VLAs with Adversarial Patch Attack

Flow-matching vision-language-action (VLA) models such as pi0 generate robot actions by integrating a learned denoising velocity field, and have been reported to resist adversarial perturbations that readily fool autoregressive VLAs. We show that this robustness is largely illusory: it stems from prior attacks ignoring the multi-step denoising ODE. We introduce DRIFT (Denoising Redirection via Input perturbation of the Flow-matching Trajectory), a test-time universal adversarial patch placed on the robot's gripper that attacks the denoising velocity field of an off-the-shelf policy. Our central finding is counterintuitive: attacking only the first denoising step is both stronger and cheaper than attacking a wider window of steps, which we explain through a gradient conflict unique to input-space optimization and which is exactly opposite to the training-time backdoor regime. On pi0 and pi0.5 across four LIBERO suites, DRIFT breaks essentially all originally-solvable tasks with a small single patch, far exceeding action- and embedding-space attack baselines.

Hoseong Tae, Jong-Seok Lee

School of Integrated Technology, Yonsei University

Adversarial Patch Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Robustness of VLA Models

Aug 2, 2026cs.RO

VLAGuard: A Framework for Evaluating and Mitigating Physical Attention Hijacking in Vision-Language-Action Robots within Wireless Sensor Networks

Deploying Vision-Language-Action (VLA) robots as mobile edge nodes within wireless sensor networks (WSNs) requires robust protection against physical adversarial threats. We present VLAGuard, a framework to assess and mitigate a critical vulnerability: policy-critical action-to-vision attention hijacking. We first introduce a stress-test module, Visuomotor Attention-guided Semantic Attack (VASA), using printable patches to severely distract the robot's action-conditioned cross-attention. To counter this, we propose Attention-Protective Fine-Tuning (APFT), a defense that stabilizes spatiotemporal attention and enforces geometric consistency with zero inference overhead. Evaluations across simulated and physical WSN-assisted smart environments demonstrate significant robustness gains. APFT reduces the OpenVLA failure rate from 100.0% to 25.9% in LIBERO simulations. Furthermore, across 2,000 real-world trials, APFT improves the average success rate from 23.0% to 67.4% under severe patch attacks. This highlights that protecting attention pathways is important for improving the robustness of VLA-driven edge nodes in sensor networks.

Dongfu Yin, Jinquan Zhang

Guangdong Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Economy (SZ), Shenzhen, China · Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China

Adversarial Patch Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Robustness of VLA Models Physical Adversarial Attacks

Jul 20, 2026cs.RO

Reasoning as a Double-Edged Sword: Architecture and Cross-Stage Robustness in Vision-Language-Action Models

Does adding a reasoning step make a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model more robust to perturbation? Intuitively, a policy that reasons before acting should absorb a perturbed input better than one that maps observations directly to actions. We test this premise head-on across three models that span the reasoning spectrum (no reasoning, a text chain-of-thought, and a latent iterative loop), perturbing each at the vision, reasoning, and action stages on LIBERO and SimplerEnv. Two questions organize the study: does the reasoning design shift robustness, and can the reasoning be read back at runtime as a safety signal? We find that the latent-iterative model is by far the least robust: under both stochastic noise and white-box perturbation its task success collapses, while the other two hold. This fragility is structural rather than cumulative: varying the reasoning depth at inference barely moves it. Reasoning outputs can in principle be monitored, but the monitors fail under fair tests. A plan--action consistency probe that looks near-perfect under naive evaluation falls to chance under adaptive attack. Under matched-FPR calibration, fusing it with an action-anomaly probe never lifts defended success above undefended. Scoped to these output-level behavioral probes under white-box vision-stage attack, this ceiling is a precondition that any viable defense must first satisfy.

Tuan Duong Trinh, Naveed Akhtar, Basim Azam

University of Melbourne Parkville, VIC, Australia

Neural Network Robustness Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models VLMs for Robotics Robustness of VLA Models Reasoning for VLA Models+1

Jul 16, 2026cs.RO

Lights, Camera, Malfunction: When Illumination Robustness Leaves VLA Models Blind to Color

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a powerful paradigm for general-purpose robot manipulation; however, their transition to real-world environments reveals vulnerabilities to minor environmental perturbations. We propose FLARE, an optimized physical spotlight attack framework that exploits these vulnerabilities via targeted illuminations, dropping baseline task success rates to zero without any access to model internals. While adversarial training is the standard countermeasure, we identify a critical and previously underestimated defensive pitfall: naive data augmentations incorrectly condition VLA models to discard color as noise, collapsing their visual perception into a purely shape-biased processor. We expose this degradation through a diagnostic grayscale evaluation, in which the defended model maintains high success rates on grayscale inputs, while its success rate on benign, color-dependent real-world tasks drops to at most 47.5%, well below the undefended baseline. To address this, we propose ChromaGuard, a chroma-preserving adversarial training method. On a physical 6-DoF robotic platform, we demonstrate that ChromaGuard achieves 97.5% and 92.5% success rates in benign and attacked color-dependent tasks, respectively.

Marino Watanabe, Takami Sato, Kentaro Yoshioka

Keio University

Adversarial Training Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Robustness of VLA Models Physical Adversarial Attacks

Jul 14, 2026cs.RO

TrustVLA: Mechanism-Guided Inference-Time Defense Against Vision-Language-Action Backdoors

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are deployed through pipelines that end users cannot audit, and a poisoned VLA can behave normally on clean observations while a small visual trigger redirects a long-horizon robot policy before any failure becomes observable. Existing vision or language defenses rarely explain what a triggered VLA representation looks like or how to recover behavior without retraining. We study this gap through two independently proposed VLA attacks from groups with distinct injection strategies, BadVLA and INFUSE; the latter persists after downstream clean adaptation. Across the evaluated poisoned models, we identify a recurring internal mechanism: a \emph{compact causal footprint}, namely a small visual support that is attention-seeded, spatially compact, and \emph{causal} in a precise sense -- masking it returns a clean-calibrated evidence-evolution score to the normal operating region. This footprint motivates TrustVLA, a mechanism-guided inference-time defense that adapts the Dirichlet evidence framework from trusted classification to monitor per-token, per-layer epistemic uncertainty in VLA policies. With only a small clean calibration set, TrustVLA (i)~detects abnormal evidence evolution, (ii)~localizes the compact support by counterfactual mechanism-score drop, and (iii)~recovers the observation by localized inpainting. Across OpenVLA/LIBERO and

π_{0.5}

transfer evaluations, TrustVLA reduces attack success while preserving clean-task performance, providing a retraining-free, mechanism-guided defense for visual-triggered VLA backdoors.

Pinhan Fu, Xianda Guo, Xuetao Li +5

School of Computer Science, Wuhan University · Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences · 3HUST +1

Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Backdoor Attacks on VLMs Robustness of VLA Models

Jul 13, 2026cs.CV

Technical Report on the CVPR 2026@AdvML Workshop Challenge

Vision-language agents (VLAs) are increasingly used to interpret complex driving scenes and support safety-critical reasoning. This report presents the CVPR 2026@AdvML Workshop Challenge on adversarial multimodal attacks against autonomous-driving VLAs. Built on DriveLM-style multi-view visual question answering, the challenge represents each scene with six synchronized camera images and a structured collection of driving-related question-answer pairs. Participants generate adversarial images and suffix-only textual perturbations that induce model responses to deviate from reference answers while preserving image fidelity and limiting textual cost. The competition comprises two phases, with Phase II adding a hidden black-box model to assess transferability. We describe the task design, submission rules, evaluation protocol, and leaderboard results, and then examine five leading submissions for which technical reports were available. Across these reports, several recurring patterns emerge: image-side attacks are favored by the suffix penalty; scene-level, multi-view optimization is more effective than treating views in isolation; QA types and graph structure provide useful priors for allocating attack budget; feature-space objectives can improve black-box transfer; and typographic content embedded in camera images exposes a persistent vulnerability in driving VLAs. These findings provide a practical reference for future robustness evaluation and defense design in multimodal autonomous-driving systems.

Tianyuan Zhang, Zonglei Jing, Jiangfan Liu +47

VLMs for Autonomous Driving Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Robustness of VLA Models

Jul 5, 2026cs.RO

!Imperio, smolVLA: The Implications of Data Poisoning on Open Source Robotics

This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions. A few poisoned samples can silently embed a backdoor that disables a robot on command. We evaluate this threat against smolVLA on a real-world pick-and-place task, training on three poison ratios and evaluating across different prompts on the LeRobot platform. Three poisoned episodes in 320 clean episodes suffice for a complete denial of service. Success rate drops to 0.0 plus minus 0.0% across all trigger-word conditions and the robot locks into a fixed joint configuration rather than executing any task-relevant motion. Clean-prompt behaviour holds at approx. 50% success rate across all poison ratios, confirming the attack is stealthy under normal operation. A single poisoned episode already reduces success rate to 6.7 plus minus 6.7%. The robot still moves, but no longer completes the task. The attack generalises to front, middle, and end trigger placements despite training exclusively on front-placed triggers. These findings establish that the threat is practical, low-cost, and stealthy, and warrant treating dataset provenance as a first-class concern in open-source robotics ecosystems.

Stefan Bühler, Mark Schutera

Independent Researcher · Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg, Ravensburg

Neural Network Robustness Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Backdoor Attacks on VLMs Robustness of VLA Models

Jun 22, 2026cs.LG

Attacking the Trusted Imagination: Oracle-Level Integrity Attacks on Imagine-then-Act World Models

Many recent vision-language-action (VLA) policies adopt an imagine-then-act design. A world-action model (WAM) first imagines a short future as a latent trajectory z~, on which the action is then conditioned. We identify this trusted imagination, rather than the reactive policy, as the exposed attack surface. A downstream oracle, such as a safety gate, a visual model-predictive-control (MPC) planner, or an imagine-then-check verifier, consumes z~ as a prediction of the future. The robustness of the policy therefore does not entail the robustness of systems that rely on the WAM. The underlying phenomenon is an asymmetry. Corrupting the imagination is easy, since it requires only displacing z~ from its natural-future manifold. Steering it precisely is hard, since it must reach a specified on-manifold target. We adopt a capability-based threat model with an L-infinity-bounded observation perturbation. The attacker applies projected gradient descent through the fully differentiable observation-to-imagination map. The same off-manifold property motivates a parameter-free denoiser detector. We evaluate three targets: RynnVLA-002, LingBot-VA, and LaDi-WM. Untargeted corruption is roughly 60x stronger than random and is detected at AUC 1.0. Targeted control remains bounded. An adaptive attacker evades detection only by forgoing corruption. The reactive policy remains robust to corrupted imagination. A native imagination-driven MPC, however, exhibits the first adversary-specific task failure (at epsilon=0.01, success 0.70 versus 0.05; Fisher p < 10^-4).

Linghan Chen, Kaiyan Ji, Minyu Guo

Adelaide University

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models World Action Models Robustness of VLA Models

Jun 11, 2026cs.RO

Trajectory-Level Redirection Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-language-action (VLA) policies bring natural language into closed-loop robot control, enabling robots to execute manipulation tasks directly from text instructions. The same interface gives text a recurring role in control because the prompt is reused at every replanning step, and each prompt-conditioned action changes the future observations on which the policy acts. Existing VLA attacks study adversarial prompts that elicit targeted low-level actions or make such actions persist across changing images. We identify a stronger trajectory-level failure mode: a prompt that still

\textit{appears}

to specify the intended task but redirects the final physical outcome. We mathematically formalize this setting as

\textit{command-preserving trajectory redirection}

, a prompt-only threat model in which the attacker chooses one prompt before the episode, all policy and environment components remain fixed, and the prompt must stay close to the benign instruction while omitting target words and correction language. To find such prompts, we introduce an on-policy prompt search method that uses rollouts to discover perturbations whose closed-loop behavior tracks a target task while satisfying the command-preserving constraints. Experiments in simulation and on hardware show that near-benign prompt perturbations can redirect VLA rollouts to attacker-specified targets. These results expose a trajectory-level vulnerability in VLA instruction grounding: text that appears to preserve the intended command can still give an adversary control over the robot's final physical outcome. Project website: https://vla-redirection-attack.github.io/

Gokul Puthumanaillam, Vardhan Dongre, Pranay Thangeda +3

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · Amazon

Language-Conditioned Robot Manipulation Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Robustness of VLA Models

Jun 2, 2026cs.RO

Partially Observable Adversarial Patch Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models in Robotics

Vision-language-action (VLA) models are gaining attention in robotics, yet their robustness to adversarial attacks remains largely unexplored. Existing work shows that adversarial patches can mislead VLA-based robots but assumes full access to the entire execution trajectory, an unrealistic requirement in practice. We address this limitation by formulating a partially observable threat model, where the adversary can exploit only a short prefix of the trajectory to generate a fixed patch applied to all subsequent frames. Under this setting, we propose a two-phase framework. First, we localize the patch using the model's attention maps to identify visually critical regions that correspond to the full instruction. Then, we optimize the patch to disrupt the semantic grounding of target objects and increase the curvature of action trajectories, thereby compounding failures in both perception and control. Extensive experiments in simulation and real-world robotic environments show that our method sustains adversarial effects under partial observability, inducing long-horizon disruptions and significantly reducing task success rates.

Xiaofei Wang, Mingliang Han, Tianyu Hao +3

Department of Automation, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China · SmartMore Corporation · Cyberspace Institute of Advanced Technology, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, China +2

VLM Robustness Adversarial Patch Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Physical Adversarial Attacks

May 27, 2026cs.CR

ReasonBreak: Probing Vulnerabilities in Reasoning-Enabled Vision-Language-Action Models for Autonomous Driving

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models with integrated reasoning have been proposed for end-to-end autonomous driving, assuming a tight coupling between reasoning and trajectory generation. However, the robustness of such systems under realistic input perturbations remains largely unexplored. We show that these models are highly vulnerable to realistic input perturbations, achieving up to 89% attack success rate (ASR) on reasoning and up to 72% on trajectory manipulation in closed-loop simulation, leading to increased collision rates and degraded safety metrics. Using NVIDIA's recent Alpamayo models as representative industry-developed VLAs, we conduct the first systematic black-box study of reasoning-enabled VLA models under realistic textual input corruptions, evaluating their impact on reasoning and driving behavior. We introduce a reasoning-aware evaluation framework capturing both semantic and structural aspects of reasoning, along with safety-centric measures. We also introduce a benchmark for evaluating attacks and defenses on reasoning-trajectory interactions in autonomous driving. Our results highlight the need for rigorous evaluation and improved defenses to ensure the safety of reasoning-enabled VLA systems in autonomous driving.

Mohammadreza Teymoorianfard, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Jonathan Petit +1

University of Massachusetts Amherst · Qualcomm

VLMs for Autonomous Driving Autonomous Driving Safety Evaluation Autonomous Driving Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models VLM Reasoning Vision-Language-Action Models+2

May 27, 2026cs.CV

VLA-Hijack: A Transferable Patch Attack against Vision-Language-Action Models via Visual Proprioception Hijacking

While Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as powerful generalist policies, their severe vulnerability to adversarial patches significantly hinders their deployment in safety-critical domains. Moreover, existing patch attacks primarily focus on white-box settings, heavily overfitting to the specific action output space of the target model, which results in poor cross-architecture transferability. To overcome this limitation, we propose VLA-Hijack, a unified adversarial framework that breaks the transferability bottleneck by exploiting a fundamental vulnerability identified in this work: before planning any motion, a VLA model must first use visual information to locate its own robotic arm within the environment. Targeting this shared visual self-localization process, our approach concurrently optimizes Attention-Guided Proprioceptive Suppression to inhibit the real robotic arm's features, and Multimodal Proprioceptive Injection to establish the patch as a surrogate "phantom embodiment". By alternating between semantic concept anchoring and visual prototype projection, VLA-Hijack effectively severs the semantic relationship between the agent's true embodiment and its control policy. Extensive experiments across diverse architectures (OpenVLA, UniVLA, and CronusVLA) demonstrate that VLA-Hijack achieves superior optimization efficiency in white-box settings and sets a new SOTA for cross-architecture and cross-domain black-box transferability.

Jiyuan Fu, Kaixun Jiang, Jingkai Jia +7

Fudan University · The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Adversarial Patch Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks Robustness of VLA Models Physical Adversarial Attacks

May 25, 2026cs.CR

Capability and Robustness Cannot Both Be Free: An Information-Theoretic Bound for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models reach high success rates on clean inputs but collapse under small adversarial perturbations: a

16/255

PGD attack drops OpenVLA-7B's LIBERO success from

95\%

to under

5\%

. Whether this trade-off has a theoretical floor was open. We prove that it does. For any VLA policy, capability

I(\Astar;\Api)

and robustness

I(\Api;\Atildepi)-I(\Api;δ)

sum to at most

H(\Astar)+I(X;\Xtilde)

, the task entropy plus adversarial channel capacity. The proof reduces to two applications of the Data Processing Inequality. The pixel-level bound is loose by

\sim 10^3

nats and serves as a ceiling guarantee; an encoder-specific corollary tightens it by over an order of magnitude, into a regime where realized capability already consumes

5

--

9\%

of the budget. We validate Theorem~\ref{thm:main} with zero violations across

308

cells:

252

closed-form Gaussian-VLA,

48

OpenVLA-7B

+

LIBERO

+

PGD (

4

suites

\times

4

\eps

\times

3

seeds),

4

Square-Attack, and

4

multi-step (

T{=}10

). A complementary measurability inequality

\Rob_{\text{disc}} \le \Cap_{\text{disc}}

further holds across

144

cross-architecture cells spanning OpenVLA, OpenVLA-OFT (continuous-

L_1

), and SmolVLA (flow-matching). The same construction yields three label-free diagnostics: a pre-flight encoder ceiling, a defense-forensics probe that localizes input-side vs.\ language-model intervention, and a head-agnostic robustness ratio comparable across discrete-token,

L_1

-regression, and flow-matching policies. Together these provide the cross-setting axis defense and architecture comparisons currently lack.

Jianwei Tai

School of Internet, Anhui University

Neural Network Robustness Adversarial Robustness Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Noise Robustness Robustness of VLA Models

May 9, 2026cs.RO

ATAAT: Adaptive Threat-Aware Adversarial Tuning Framework against Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Addressing the escalating security vulnerabilities in Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models, this study investigates backdoor attacks targeting the visual pathway. We identify a core obstacle causing the failure of traditional attack paradigms: "Gradient Interference." This phenomenon represents an optimization failure triggered by conflicting strategies during end-to-end training. To resolve this, we propose an Adaptive Threat-Aware Adversarial Tuning (ATAAT) framework. Through its core "Threat-Method Adaptive Mapping" mechanism, ATAAT intelligently selects the optimal gradient decoupling strategy based on the adversary's capabilities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ATAAT exhibits significant advantages, achieving a highly robust Targeted Attack Success Rate (TASR > 80%) while maintaining extreme stealthiness with merely a 5% poisoning rate. It efficiently handles complex semantic-level triggers and achieves implicit decoupled attacks in data poisoning scenarios for the first time. This work reveals a critical security vulnerability in VLAs and provides theoretical and methodological support for future defense architectures.

Kewei Chen, Yayu Long, Shuai Li +1

Chongqing Institute of Green and Intelligent Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences · Chongqing School, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences · Faculty of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, University of Oulu, Finland

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Backdoor Attacks on VLMs Data Poisoning Attacks

Apr 26, 2026cs.RO

Vision-Language-Action Safety: Threats, Challenges, Evaluations, and Mechanisms

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are emerging as a unified substrate for embodied intelligence. This shift raises a new class of safety challenges, stemming from the embodied nature of VLA systems, including irreversible physical consequences, a multimodal attack surface across vision, language, and state, real-time latency constraints on defense, error propagation over long-horizon trajectories, and vulnerabilities in the data supply chain. Yet the literature remains fragmented across robotic learning, adversarial machine learning, AI alignment, and autonomous systems safety. This survey provides a unified and up-to-date overview of safety in Vision-Language-Action models. We organize the field along two parallel timing axes, attack timing (training-time vs. inference-time and defense timing (training-time vs. inference-time, linking each class of threat to the stage at which it can be mitigated. We first define the scope of VLA safety, distinguishing it from text-only LLM safety and classical robotic safety, and review the foundations of VLA models, including architectures, training paradigms, and inference mechanisms. We then examine the literature through four lenses: Attacks, Defenses, Evaluation, and Deployment. We survey training-time threats such as data poisoning and backdoors, as well as inference-time attacks including adversarial patches, cross-modal perturbations, semantic jailbreaks, and freezing attacks. We review training-time and runtime defenses, analyze existing benchmarks and metrics, and discuss safety challenges across six deployment domains. Finally, we highlight key open problems, including certified robustness for embodied trajectories, physically realizable defenses, safety-aware training, unified runtime safety architectures, and standardized evaluation.

Qi Li, Bo Yin, Weiqi Huang +6

National University of Singapore · Peking University · Monash University

AI Agent Safety Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Robustness of VLA Models Safety Evaluation of VLA Models

Apr 24, 2026cs.RO

RedVLA: Physical Red Teaming for Vision-Language-Action Models

The real-world deployment of Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models remains limited by the risk of unpredictable and irreversible physical harm. However, we currently lack effective mechanisms to proactively detect these physical safety risks before deployment. To address this gap, we propose \textbf{RedVLA}, the first red teaming framework for physical safety in VLA models. We systematically uncover unsafe behaviors through a two-stage process: (I) \textbf{Risk Scenario Synthesis} constructs a valid and task-feasible initial risk scene. Specifically, it identifies critical interaction regions from benign trajectories and positions the risk factor within these regions, aiming to entangle it with the VLA's execution flow and elicit a target unsafe behavior. (II) \textbf{Risk Amplification} ensures stable elicitation across heterogeneous models. It iteratively refines the risk factor state through gradient-free optimization guided by trajectory features. Experiments on six representative VLA models show that RedVLA uncovers diverse unsafe behaviors and achieves the ASR up to 95.5% within 10 optimization iterations. To mitigate these risks, we further propose SimpleVLA-Guard, a lightweight safety guard built from RedVLA-generated data. Our data, assets, and code are available here.

Yuhao Zhang, Borong Zhang, Jiaming Fan +4

Institute for AI, Peking University · State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence, Peking University

Robotics Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Robot Safety Vision-Language-Action Models Safety Evaluation of VLA Models

Date pendingcs.CR

DropVLA: An Action-Level Backdoor Attack on Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.

Zonghuan Xu, Jiayu Li, Yunhan Zhao +3

Institute of Trustworthy Embodied AI, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. · Shanghai Key Laboratory of Multimodal Embodied AI, Shanghai, China. · City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China.

Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Robotic Manipulation Vision-Language-Action Models Backdoor Attacks on VLMs Data Poisoning Attacks

Date pendingcs.CR

Bit-Flip Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models: Action-Decoding Architecture Shapes the Vulnerability

Quantized Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models expose a weight-fault surface: Rowhammer-style faults can corrupt deployed INT8 bits. We present the first bit-flip attack on a VLA: a few gradient-selected flips reduce closed-loop success to

0\%

, while hundreds of random flips are harmless. Across four model variants spanning three action-head families, damaging bits concentrate in a few action-generating layers, but the empirical budget depends sharply on the head: direct regression and token policies fall in

1

--

5

flips, whereas the evaluated flow-matching policies require

{\sim}100

--

300

. Our fixed-direction manifold-escape loss cuts \pizero{}'s budget from

{\sim}1000

to

{\sim}100

flips, and a matched five-direction sweep shows that the attack is not specific to an all-positive direction. On a direct head, protecting

3.1\%

of weights preserves

60\%

success at

K{=}100

, and protecting

5.3\%

moves the open-loop break threshold from 3 to 100 flips. Finally, task-calibrated emulated

K{=}100

flips yield

0/20

real-robot successes, versus

14/20

clean and

16/20

global-random. Weight integrity is therefore a security boundary for embodied foundation models. Code is included as ancillary material.

Yudong Gao, Linghan Chen, Wenhan Wu +5

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · Adelaide University · Wuhan University +3

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLA Models Vision-Language-Action Models Robustness of VLA Models