Human Oversight of AI

Existing AI disclosure mandates in scholarship require that AI assistance be reported but leave transparency philosophically unspecified: they fix the duty without explaining what the duty serves. We argue that ethical inquiry is essentially contested at two independent levels -- about what it is, and about what it demands of the inquirer -- defeating output-only evaluation and welfare-economic dismissal of the transparency question, and, by extension, reproducibility framings imported from the empirical sciences. The transparency duty is grounded instead in agent-integrity: the legibility, before a community of inquiry, of the identity-constituting commitments that the author's mode of philosophising expresses. Because the standards for evaluating such work are not communally settled, the achievable goal for transparency is not evaluation against agreed criteria but tracking -- accumulating the evidentiary record that lets each tradition assess the work on its own terms and makes future normative judgments possible. We develop a documentation-adequacy framework that operationalises Meaningful Human Control through five transparency elements -- declaration, navigation, documentation account, process documentation, and development records -- demonstrated by the paper itself, whose full documentation record is archived at a persistent identifier. The framework is a first iteration subject to revision, not a settled standard.

Human feedback is critical for aligning AI systems to human values. As AI capabilities improve and AI is used to tackle more challenging tasks, verifying quality and safety becomes increasingly challenging. This paper explores how we can leverage AI to improve the quality of human oversight. We focus on an important safety problem that is already challenging for humans: fact-verification of AI outputs. We find that combining AI ratings and human ratings based on AI rater confidence is better than relying on either alone. Giving humans an AI fact-verification assistant further improves their accuracy, but the type of assistance matters. Displaying AI explanation, confidence, and labels leads to over-reliance, but just showing search results and evidence fosters more appropriate trust. These results have implications for Amplified Oversight -- the challenge of combining humans and AI to supervise AI systems even as they surpass human expert performance.

Despite AI's promise, little is known about how mission-driven organizations (MDOs) adopt AI. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 experts and leaders within environmental, humanitarian, and development organizations across the Global North and South. We find that MDOs adopt AI selectively, with uses in content creation and data analysis, while maintaining human oversight for mission-critical applications. In case of conflicts between the organization's values and efficiency, participants consider sustainability, neutrality, and community trust as constraints that could limit or prevent AI adoption. Individual adoption of AI is not translated into organizational practice due to fragmented data infrastructure, lack of in-house expertise, inertia, ethical challenges, and dependency on vendors. Participants expected AI use in MDOs to involve institutional control over infrastructure, support for missions, and human-centered human-AI collaboration. We contribute an analysis on how MDOs manage AI adoption, identify barriers to responsible deployment, and provide recommendations for designing mission-aligned AI systems.

We study how algorithmic review changes the initial decisions that a system is designed to correct. Using Hawk-Eye data from professional tennis, we compare umpire decisions with and without review against a common accuracy benchmark. Under review, initial errors were 8.6 percentage points higher just outside the line and lower for comparably close balls inside. We find no evidence that average initial accuracy deteriorated. Within matches, reversals were followed by larger adjustments than upheld calls, consistent with adaptation to correction. Overall, correction offsets worse initial decisions for incorrect in calls and reinforces better initial decisions for incorrect out calls. Whether review lowers organizational costs depends jointly on these changes and the costs of remedying corrected errors. A conditional illustration shows how utilization spreads fixed review costs across calls.