Human Oversight of AI

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13 papers in the last four weeks, up 117% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 121

Oct 7, 2026cs.CY

Comprehension Audits to Mitigate Risks from Automated AI Research

AI is already writing a majority of code for frontier AI labs. This creates a safety risk if there is insufficient human oversight. Existing work proposes minimum comprehension thresholds and unaided checks to mitigate this. To our knowledge, however, there is currently no published frontier-AI assurance regime that requires demonstrated evidence that the responsible humans understand what they are building as a precommitted condition for continuing development or usage. We propose comprehension audits, a novel development-process assurance mechanism in which the responsible people explain R&D contributions to auditors to demonstrate understanding. With independent administration and graded reports, they provide a gate: development of a contribution stops based on a failure to demonstrate human understanding until remediated, with escalating consequences for repeated failures. Our analysis of leading open-source AI projects finds increased output of code with reduced human review commentary rates per line of code, with far lower rates for automated fleet accounts. We advocate for labs to conduct them with embedded independent auditors.

Ronald J. Bodkin, Bahrad A. Sokhansanj, Gillian K. Hadfield

Independent · Institute for Law and AI · Johns Hopkins University

Human Oversight of AI AI Safety

Oct 6, 2026stat.ML

Careful Judge: Safe and Efficient Human-AI Collaborative Decision Making

In human-AI collaborative decision making, human review can prevent unsafe AI decisions, but each human judgment is costly. Treating human intervention after AI abstention as a one-off fallback misses the opportunity to improve future AI decisions for greater automation, yet AI adaptively learning from selectively queried human feedback breaks safety guardrails calibrated for old models. We approach this challenge with CARE---calibrated adaptive rectification and escalation---an end-to-end pipeline that combines AI models and human reviewers to guarantee safe, human-aligned decisions, while continuously learning from human feedback to achieve greater automation with fewer human queries. CARE is principled, general, modular, and works with any black-box AI model. Our novel adaptive calibration module guarantees risk control at every time step for any rectification module. We further show how CARE improves query efficiency when the AI model is well trained and the human-AI misalignment has a clear structure. Experiments on four safety-critical real-world datasets spanning driving, language, and robotics demonstrate that CARE achieves human-aligned decisions while reducing human queries by 25-81% relative to baselines.

Chenyu Zhang, Rachel Luo, Boyi Li +3

MIT · NVIDIA · NVIDIA, Stanford University

Human-AI Decision Making Human-in-the-Loop AI Human Oversight of AI Model Calibration Selective Prediction

Oct 6, 2026cs.SE

A Case Study in Assuring AI-Written Software

Software-engineering agents can enable people without formal software training to build systems they could not otherwise implement and simultaneously can produce more code than even experts can meaningfully inspect. In both cases, exhaustive code review is not reliable as the sole basis for human control. We report a case study of a production healthcare platform built through coding agents and governed by an operator without formal software-engineering training. Over time, its workflow grew into a human-led meta-agent system where one agent wrote code, other agents supervised and reviewed it, and project rules carried lessons forward. The operator found that tests, monitors and reviewing agents used to supervise the system were fallible. Some monitors measured proxies rather than outcomes, some audits failed silently, missing checks disappeared from reported results and one automated repair caused operational disruption. In this case, human control depended on keeping the intended outcome, the evidence used to judge it, the agents' permissions and the final human decision were all tied to the same underlying objective.

Lindsey Ferris, Sierra Bonilla

Independent Researcher · University College London London, United Kingdom

AI Agent Reliability AI Assurance AI Coding Agents AI Agent Monitoring Automated Code Review Human Oversight of AI

Oct 5, 2026cs.AI

Process Constitutions and Process Stewards: Towards the Next Generation of BPM for Agentic Organizations

Business Process Management (BPM) was built on a foundational assumption that organizations are populated primarily by human actors whose work can be made visible, governable, and improvable through process models. That assumption is depreciating. AI agent ecosystems increasingly execute, coordinate, and adapt organizational work with limited human direction, challenging not only BPM's methods but its core conception of what a process is. We argue that BPM faces a constitutive shift from modeling human work to governing autonomous agents, for which we propose two new concepts: the \emph{Process Constitution}, a machine-interpretable, value-laden framework that defines the space of admissible agent behavior, and the \emph{Process Steward}, a governance agent that interprets and enforces it. The central value proposition of this new generation of BPM is not efficiency but \emph{organizational legibility}: the capacity to keep agentic organizations accountable, contestable, and humanly understandable. We outline what this means and sketch the research agenda it opens.

Amin Jalali, Majid Rafiei

Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Sweden · SAP Signavio, Berlin, Germany

Agentic Workflows AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI

Oct 1, 2026cs.AI

Feedback Without the Wait: Piloting a Generative AI Practice Platform in a Large Maths Class

Timely and specific feedback is one of the strongest influences on student learning, yet it is difficult to sustain in large electrical engineering classes where the ratio of students to demonstrators is high and a learner who is stuck may wait days to find out why an approach was wrong. Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) offers a way to scale conversational feedback, but using it to grade assessed work raises trust and accountability concerns, and keeping a human in the loop to assure its judgements reintroduces the very delay that erodes the value of feedback. The result is a tension between the immediacy that makes feedback so impactful and the human oversight that makes it trustworthy. In this work, we set out to resolve that tension in practice by designing and piloting a GenAI practice platform that delivers immediate, scaffolded feedback during self-directed practice. This relocates human oversight from real-time grading to the upfront verification of solutions. Our goal was to understand how students engaged with the tool, how they perceived the value and reliability of its feedback, and what lessons transfer to other engineering subjects.

Lili Chen, Gavin Buskes, Yuxin Ren +1

The University of Melbourne · Monash University

Educational Assessment Educational Technology Generative AI in Education Human Oversight of AI

Oct 1, 2026cs.AI

Cybernetic and Epistemic: A Missing Vocabulary for Trustworthy Agentic Delegation

As code generation is increasingly delegated to AI systems, the bottleneck is shifting from writing code to supervising the systems that write it --- a shift CS-education researchers have begun to name. This shift exposes a vocabulary gap: the field asks for "human oversight" without a working distinction between the two things language does in a delegation channel --- coordinate action (cybernetic: words succeed when the world comes to match them) and coordinate understanding (epistemic: they succeed when they answer to the world and a hearer can check that they do). The failure this names is not cybernetic language but epistemic-form language doing cybernetic work: explanation-shaped output calibrated for approval rather than truth. Oversight that checks only whether an output was approved is satisfiable by rubber-stamping; oversight that holds an agent accountable requires the reasoning behind its work be retrievable and checkable. We present three delegation episodes --- illustrations, not controlled evidence --- in which epistemic engagement proved practicable while remaining auditable, one public record where a recommendation was withdrawn on its own stated terms, and one failure case illustrating oversight that requires no reasons for its discretionary choices. We propose a criterion for agentic-system governance, alongside existing technical trust properties: every consequential choice should carry the condition under which it would have gone otherwise, in a form a third party can test. Without such a condition, a third party cannot distinguish a decision from a rubber stamp. We give the criterion an operational form --- a two-part reconstruction test scoring a delegation record by whether a second reader can predict what the agent does under a perturbation --- and a deliberation-recording convention, ORRCF, that makes the condition a required component of every recorded choice.

Jérémie Lumbroso

University of Pennsylvania

AI Accountability Agentic Code Generation AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI

Sep 24, 2026cs.CR

Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspaces

Dataspace connectors decide whether a transfer may occur, not what the transferred value contains, tolerable for contracted applications, not for LLM agents that compose tool calls. Work on agents that generate governance artifacts evaluates output quality, not who may authorize an artifact for use. A published policy is what the decision point enforces, so publication is a governance event, and agents that are both policy subjects and policy authors write the norms that bind them. We name this the authorship hazard and state one principle: an agent is a subject of the governance plane, never an author of it. Its authorization channel to publication is closed by construction; its influence channel, drafting what humans approve, becomes an enforcement problem. Across 90 preregistered edits to the paper's running agreement, each evaluated on 344,512 requests, the six that only reclassify a field all change authorization and narrow a duty without touching policy text, and a policy-diff classifier passes all six. Read as worded, the privilege-delta conditions also pass 33 of 69 effective policy-text edits; read as covering any relaxation, none. Treating classification as authorship routes all six to review; the registry this requires is not yet built. At the execution boundary, protected fields reach the model in 105 of 105 cases under prompt-stated duties and in 0 of 105 under a compiled tool-call constraint, but values outside named fields are exposed in 7 of 7. At the review share measured, a central approval pool needs one approver per 20 to 138 participants.

Seungho Lee, Changbin Lee

Korea Trade Network (KTNET), Seoul, Republic of Korea

Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Sep 24, 2026cs.AI

The Last Human Gate: Forward Deployed Engineering for Governance Automation

Enterprise governance requires decisions, evidence, and accountable authority; it does not require every review task to retain its current human implementation. We develop a task-substitution framework for Digital Governance Frameworks (DGF), treating each gate as an executable contract. Substitution requires sufficient accessible information, valid decision and authority checks, and a reduction in total human work after exceptions, verification, correction, and maintenance are counted. We derive a residual-work threshold and show why automating most cases can still increase labor. Forward deployed engineering connects these conditions to an architecture for agents, rule engines, evidence services, and escalation. DGF-Bench supplies controlled evidence from 300 synthetic projects and 899 evaluable model-project runs. Gemini 3.8 Flash, GPT-5.6 Luna, and DeepSeek v4.1 Flash achieve strict gate success of 94.98%, 83.29%, and 74.18%; complete-route success is 76.92%, 42.33%, and 24.67%. A deterministic control passes all 1,700 gates given the supplied rules and structured facts, locating the comparison in execution of a supplied decision kernel. Evidence audits and 135 repeated runs distinguish correct decisions from reliable execution. A document counterexample establishes an information-sufficiency obstruction. These results support the technical feasibility of replacing human execution of specified governance-review tasks with agents and software. The framework specifies a workforce test based on the complete human effort required at fixed output and quality; the present measurements concern review performance. Sources, dossiers, traces, and analyses are public.

Jeremy Canale

AI Agent Governance AI Governance Human Oversight of AI LLM Agent Reliability

Sep 22, 2026cs.CY

The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations

Deep learning systems now mediate military decisions to use force, yet their internal logic resists inspection, their evaluation practices are gameable, and their deployment fractures accountability across dispersed stakeholders. The ethical challenge posed by these systems is fundamentally epistemic: not just whether autonomous weapons should be permitted to kill, but whether the conditions for responsible human judgment can survive when critical functions are delegated to opaque algorithms. We show that this epistemic condition produces a concrete accountability gap: responsibility diffuses across designers, operators, and policymakers while International Humanitarian Law presupposes capacities for judgment that current AI systems lack. To address this gap, we propose a governance framework that proceduralizes ethical constraints through named accountability roles, adversarial auditing with undisclosed benchmarks, tiered deployment thresholds, and a proposed NATO evaluation standard. Counterfactual analysis of eight documented cases (1988-2025) shows that each governance mechanism addresses a documented class of failure, but no single safeguard suffices in isolation: effective governance of military AI requires not only technical constraints but the institutional infrastructure to keep human judgment meaningful.

Nicolas Drapier, Florian Mauberger, Aladine Chetouani +1

L2TI Laboratory, Universit´e Sorbonne Paris Nord, 99 Avenue Jean-Baptiste Cl´ement, Villetaneuse, 93430, France. · SAS Impact, 1 Rue Sainte-Anne, Orl´eans, 45000, France.

AI Accountability AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Sep 22, 2026cs.AI

Seeing Is Not Perceiving: When Synthetic Consumers Can and Cannot Pretest Visual Marketing

Marketers now deploy generative AI agents as synthetic consumers to pretest visual assets such as logos, packaging, and advertising at a fraction of human-panel cost. However, this procedure assumes that a model seeing a visual cue can also perceive its consumer meaning, which is largely untested. We stress-test the assumption using six canonical visual marketing experiments, varying the two levers managers control: model generation (GPT-4o-mini vs. GPT-5.4-mini) and input format (plain text vs. JSON). Every resulting configuration passed the manipulation checks; however, none of the configurations reproduced more than two of the six human effects, and the remainder were nonsignificant. The one exception was a significant reversal of the human pattern. Providing conceptual or empirical evidence through in-context learning steers average responses toward the human effect. Yet steering has a limit: even when it succeeds, a configuration reproduces less than half of the natural spread of human responses and so understates consumer heterogeneity. We integrate these results into an AI governance protocol (Calibrate, Intervene, Deploy) that delineates when synthetic consumers can responsibly screen creatives and when human panels remain necessary.

Yi-Lin Tsai, Yung-Hsiu, Lai

Arvin · Department of Management and Marketing, The University of Melbourne

Human Oversight of AI Generative AI Evaluation

Sep 17, 2026cs.DL

greCAPTCHA: Assessing Understanding as Evidence of Research Authorship Under Generative AI

Conferences, journals, funders, schools, and universities are struggling with a surge of potentially AI-generated submissions from ostensibly human authors, who may not have exercised sufficient human oversight for their manuscripts. In turn, institutions evaluating submissions can no longer reliably credit expertise based solely on authors' names on submitted work. To address this problem, we propose greCAPTCHA, a proctored assessment approach that measures authors' understanding of research manuscripts via the construct of capacity to verify, which we define as the knowledge and reasoning required to critically assess the contents underlying one's contributions to a manuscript. greCAPTCHA generates questions assessing multiple levels of understanding and provides an evaluative report based on authors' responses. Using a prototype implementation, we conduct a user study and semi-structured interviews with

31

researchers to evaluate greCAPTCHA. Its automated scores predict which papers were or were not authored by study participants with an AUC of

0.90

. Participants reported positive overall experiences with the system and remarked on the appropriate construct validity for author understanding, while also suggesting important changes to be made before deployment. Our results provide initial evidence that greCAPTCHA can assess manuscript-specific understanding under proctored conditions.

Justin Payan, Bálint Gyevnár, Atoosa Kasirzadeh +1

Machine Learning Department, Carnegie Mellon University · Institute for Complex Social Dynamics, Carnegie Mellon University · Departments of Philosophy & Software and Societal Systems, Carnegie Mellon University +1

Authorship Attribution Automated Evaluation Human Oversight of AI

Sep 14, 2026cs.AI

When Does AI Augment Work? A Workflow-Level Framework for Human-Agent Collaboration

We aim to characterise the value of artificial intelligence in the workplace. Current studies largely measure this value in terms of the current automation capabilities and public adoption of AI. However, such metrics ignore the greater impacts of human--agent collaboration in transforming the nature of work. To account for this, we must expand the scope of our analysis beyond atomised tasks of today, and instead focus on how AI can augment entire workflows of the future. To ground this analysis, we establish a precise definition of AI augmentation comprising six conditions, spanning durable net value, meaningful human control, accountability and recovery, and long-term human development through learning, career pathways, and job purpose. We elaborate on these conditions and apply the framework in a case study of AI-mediated social surveys. We conclude by outlining how organisations, researchers, and government leaders can use this framework to make sense of the future of work.

AI Collaboration, Jiaying Wu, Caleb Ziems +19

National University of Singapore · Stanford University · Genue +10

Human Oversight of AI Human-AI Collaboration AI and Labor

Sep 12, 2026cs.CY

Characterizing Bluesky Content Moderation Service: From Automation of Service to Landscape of Harms

Empirical research on content moderation is fundamentally constrained by the opaque deployment of moderation systems on major social media platforms. To this end, the recent emergence of decentralized platforms with transparent, public moderation logs presents an unprecedented opportunity for independent audits. In this work, we leverage this architectural transparency to conduct the first large-scale audit of the default moderation system on Bluesky, the Bluesky Moderation Service (BMS). Analyzing its 10.6M moderation labels from 2025, we investigate three foundational aspects: (i) its mechanism (the degree of automation versus human oversight), (ii) its efficacy (accuracy in detecting harms), and (iii) its purpose (the landscape of harms it identifies). Our findings reveal a human-AI collaborative system where labels for sexual and graphic content are applied automatically in seconds, while nuanced and high stakes labels require more human oversight, taking hours or days. Through a manual annotation study, we find the BMS operates with high precision (0.837), but struggles with low recall (0.222), with our annotators identifying 4.5

\times

more harmful content than the moderation system in a random sample. Finally, unsupervised clustering of the most frequently applied labeled posts uncovers detected harms ranging from hostility in discourse toward protected groups to the spread of sexually explicit and other graphic content. Our work offers a look into the operational realities of a deployed moderation system, providing a concrete data-driven foundation for designing more effective and transparent moderation systems.

Pushpdeep Singh, Sayeh Jarollahi, Ayan Majumdar +5

Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (MPI-SWS), Germany · Saarland University, Germany · Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India

Algorithmic Auditing Content Moderation Human Oversight of AI

Sep 9, 2026cs.HC

MOONWALK: Mediating Operations with Intent-Evidence-Action Alignment Across Junior-Supervisor Review Workflows in Animation/VFX Pre-Production

Animation and VFX pre-production review requires teams to translate loosely specified creative intent--briefs, evolving specifications, heterogeneous references, and verbal decisions--into revisions that junior artists can execute without repeated clarification. In practice, criteria drift across iterations, review judgments lose their evidential basis, and the reasoning behind a request rarely survives the senior-junior handoff. We contribute a design framework for intent-evidence-action alignment: intent is articulated into a shared project record, judgments are anchored to grounded evidence, and authorized decisions are converted into clear revision tasks tied directly to reference notes. We instantiate this framework in MOONWALK, a professional pre-production review system comprising a shared intent record, reference/specification anchoring, structured work-in-progress comparison, and supervisor-authorized action planning. In this workflow, AI handles administrative coordination--flagging missing context and organizing notes--while artists retain full creative direction. An in-studio study with professional practitioners compares MOONWALK with a chat-only (chatbot) interface using matched production materials, while participants' existing workflows provide a retrospective ecological baseline. Results indicate stronger intent alignment, decision traceability, and checklist executability, while also showing that aesthetic authority and final prioritization must remain with practitioners. The evaluation establishes the value of the integrated structured workflow over unstructured conversational AI chatbot. Code: https://github.com/Akinesia112/Moonwalk/tree/english-version

Shih-Yu Lai, Wen-Fan Wang, Sai Ling +3

National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan · MoonShine Animation Studio, Taipei, Taiwan · Cornell Tech, New York City, USA +1

Human Oversight of AI Human-AI Collaboration

Sep 8, 2026cs.SE

It Is Not My Code Anymore

AI-assisted programming raises distinct questions about who produces code, who feels ownership of it, and who is responsible when it fails. This research note examines these distinctions through a hypothetical enrollment failure and a selective reading of the literature. Identifying the producer of a defective expression does not, by itself, determine the duties of reviewers, release decision-makers, or service operators. Collective ownership likewise leaves those duties to be specified. The discussion then considers how quality engineering can evaluate both generated implementations and the processes that produce them. Acceptance criteria should be justified by the required service outcome, with component checks contributing evidence toward that outcome. This perspective also permits comparison with systems that perform a task without generating a separate program for it. Such substitution would change the object of authorship while leaving the service obligation intact. The note reports no new empirical results; it proposes distinctions and evaluation questions for AI-assisted software production.

Augusto Camargo

Institute of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science (IME) University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

Algorithmic Accountability Code Generation Evaluation Human Oversight of AI AI-Assisted Software Development

Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

When Intelligence Becomes Agency: A Theory of Governed, Proactive Agency for Symbiotic AI Systems

Persistent AI assistants are intended to extend human attention, memory, and coordination across changing digital and physical environments. To be truly useful they must do more than just act when asked. They must decide on their own whether a situation warrants behavior at all, when it does and in what mode, whether to act, ask, monitor, defer or deliberately refrain. We call this the activation problem. Research on commitment, appraisal, mixed-initiative interaction and delegation each illuminates part of it, but none ties situated activation to continuing authorization and accountability. This paper develops a conceptual and formal framework for governed proactive agency, organizing behavior across time through perception, intent, affective-conative appraisal, constraint, and feedback. It distinguishes autonomous and delegated agency and defines symbiotic agency as delegation under a standing, revocable mandate, with continuing coupling to the principal's situation, calibrated inference of their condition, and bounded personalization. The distinctive contribution is an integrated account linking activation decisions to authorized perception, behavior selection, authority containment, traceable restraint, and constrained adaptation, with behavioral episodes as the unit of analysis. Through an agency classification method, an evaluation framework, proposed benchmark scenarios, and a reference architecture, the account provides a basis for specifying and assessing whether assistance is warranted, timely, authorized, and answerable beyond task completion alone. It is intended to guide the development and evaluation of always-present personal assistants and embodied support systems that augment human capabilities while preserving the principal's authority and judgment.

João Dias Ferreira

Wyrde AI

Agent Evaluation Proactive Assistance AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI Human-AI Collaboration

Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

From Matching Models to Recruiting Agents: A Systematized Narrative Review of AI Recruitment Systems, Evaluation, and Governance

Artificial intelligence in recruitment has shifted the object being automated from profile pairs and ranked lists to multi-stage workflows that retrieve evidence, compare candidates, and support or execute actions. This systematized narrative review traces that development from bilateral retrieval and behavioral ranking through neural person--job matching, large language model (LLM) components, and tool-using recruiting agents. Using a purposive search and coding protocol updated through 23 July 2026, plus targeted updates through 2 September 2026, we organize 40 representative works with supporting industrial and legal sources. This synthesis is not a prevalence estimate. We analyze three coupled transitions: from similarity to reciprocal suitability, from a model to a compound workflow, and from offline prediction to evidence- and productivity-aligned evaluation. Across document understanding, retrieval, ranking, assessment, interviewing, sourcing, and human handoff, we distinguish field-, pair-, list-, case-, trajectory-, and outcome-level evidence. Persistent gaps arise because behavioral labels confound exposure, preference, and qualification; private and synthetic data limit external validity; final-output scores conceal pipeline failures; and, within the coded set, privacy is not directly evaluated and no row jointly evaluates utility, fairness, privacy, and security. These observations describe the coded set rather than the field as a whole. We therefore introduce a staged mapping from evaluation evidence to the strongest defensible claim, together with an agenda for reciprocal, evidence-grounded, temporally controlled, selective, and auditable systems. Progress should be judged by whether workflows retrieve the right evidence, preserve uncertainty, support contestable decisions, and improve outcomes under explicit cost and risk constraints.

Ziyi Zhao, Guanzheng Wei

University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences · Southwest University

AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Sep 2, 2026cs.HC

Knowing Is Not Enough: Information Retrievability as a Precondition to Effective LLM Oversight

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in organizational work, yet their errors often pass human review. Prior research locates such failures in users' capability to review LLM output or their engagement in doing so. We develop an alternative, retrieval-based account of human oversight and posit that error detection is more effective when oversight-relevant information is accessible to users at the moment of review. Across two randomized lab-in-the-field experiments with 640 customer-facing employees, we show that self-generated explanations improve error detection and strengthen recall of verification-relevant reasoning, while cues that reactivate such reasoning help sustain detection under repeated LLM use. Theoretically, we identify information retrievability as a distinct precondition for effective oversight and specify generative encoding and cue-supported reactivation as mechanisms that build and sustain it. Practically, lightweight onboarding self-explanations and daily retrieval cues can make human oversight more resilient as LLM use becomes routine.

Xinyu Fu, Narayan Ramasubbu, Dennis Galletta

Robinson College of Business Georgia State University 55 Park Place NE, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA · School of Business University of Pittsburgh 3950 Roberto and Vera Clemente Dr, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA

LLM Reliability Human Oversight of AI

Sep 1, 2026cs.CY

A Mathematical Framework for Legacy, Governance, and Decision Integrity in Enterprise AI

Enterprise artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in decisions that must remain lawful, explainable, adaptable, and accountable despite personnel turnover, model replacement, regulatory change, and shifting organizational incentives. Existing governance frameworks provide important principles but do not by themselves supply a compact mathematical language for evaluating whether an institution can preserve sound judgment over time. This paper develops a design-science framework for institutional legacy: the durable capacity of a decision system to continue producing beneficial, lawful, explainable, and adaptable outcomes after its original designers have stepped away. The framework contributes: (i) a normalized Legacy Score based on a penalized geometric mean of knowledge retention, governance, human oversight, adaptability, feedback learning, and jurisdictional fidelity; (ii) Decision Confidence and Decision Risk models separating evidentiary confidence from consequence; (iii) authority-aware retrieval and calibrated abstention; (iv) Decision Memory for governed organizational learning; (v) Regulatory Change Velocity mapping change exposure to review intervals; and (vi) a federated regulatory knowledge-graph architecture preserving provenance and legal hierarchy. The paper also proposes eight AI Decision Integrity Rules, an evaluation protocol, and a reproducible computational demonstration. The demonstration combines a deterministic stress test with 200 Monte Carlo replications of 10,000 synthetic decisions each, illustrating Legacy Score non-compensation and comparing consequence- and authority-aware routing with a matched-coverage confidence-only baseline. The contribution remains conceptual rather than field-validated; the simulation tests internal behavior, not production performance, and all parameters require context-specific calibration.

Shorab Sarker

Independent Researcher · The Math Behind Innovation

AI-Assisted Decision Making AI Accountability AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Aug 31, 2026cs.AI

Responsible Integration of AI in Cancer Genomics: Barriers, Risks, and Pathways to Trustworthy Clinical Translation

Artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language processing (NLP) are increasingly used to extract, integrate, and interpret biomedical knowledge relevant to cancer genomics, yet their translation into routine clinical oncology has been comparatively slow. The central challenge is not computational capability alone, but trustworthy integration into clinical workflows. This review examines how NLP and AI support the cancer genomics pipeline, from literature mining and automated variant interpretation to clinical trial matching, knowledge graph construction, and multimodal data integration. We identify four interrelated translational failure domains: evidence inconsistency, explainability and uncertainty, data governance and reproducibility, and interoperability. Rather than considering these challenges in isolation, we take a systems-level view, focusing on their interaction across the translational pathway. We propose a conceptual framework and roadmap for addressing these domains through rigorous validation, uncertainty-aware methods, interoperable infrastructures, regulatory alignment, and human oversight across the AI lifecycle. Progress toward routine clinical use will depend less on further improving model capability than on systematically addressing these interacting failure domains from development through deployment and post-deployment monitoring.

Bahar İlgen, Yiannos Tolias, Denise Kühnert +5

1*Centre for Artificial Intelligence in Public Health Research (ZKI-PH),2026 Robert Koch Institute, Nordufer 20, Berlin, 13353, Germany. · 2Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, European Commission, Rue de Loi 200, Brussels, B-1049, Belgium.Aug · Department of Natural Sciences, School of Science and Technology, Deree-The American College of Greece, Gravias 6, Athens, 15342,31 Greece. +5

Cancer Genomics Oncology Genomics AI Governance Trust in AI Human Oversight of AI+1

Aug 24, 2026cs.AI

AI Agents Push Humans Out of the Loop

AI agents pose significant risks as they are granted increasing autonomy. A commonly proposed solution is human oversight and keeping a ''human in the loop'', but this is not a simple solution: Not only do current approaches to AI agent design impede effective human oversight, but the cognitive capacities required for it are also themselves degraded by extended use of AI systems. This position paper argues that current approaches to the development and deployment of AI agent systems do not support effective human oversight -- they contribute to its degradation. To address this, a top priority in the advancement of AI agents should be supporting the situated goals and cognitive requirements of effective human oversight, treating the human needs of overseers at the same level of importance as AI agent capability. To put this idea into practice, we connect work on automation and human-computer interaction to AI agent processes, outlining design-level affordances and organizational protocols that (1) support overseers in exercising critical judgement and (2) counteract the skill atrophy that arises from extended use of automation. We urge developers and deployers to adopt these or similar approaches. Without explicit support for the cognitive demands of effective human-agent interaction, AI agent systems will continue to passively incentivize the degradation of the very human skills they rely on.

Margaret Mitchell, Avijit Ghosh, Samir Passi

Hugging Face · Data & Society

AI Agent Safety Human-in-the-Loop AI Human-Centered AI Human Oversight of AI

Aug 11, 2026cs.CY

The GenAI Catch-22: Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence in Norwegian Newsrooms During the 2025 Parliamentary Election

The increasing use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in journalism raises concerns about possible detrimental effects both on journalism and its democratic function. We explore these risks through a case study of GenAI in Norwegian Newsrooms during the 2025 parliamentary election campaign. Based on interviews with managers and journalists over a ten-month period, we analyse how ambitious visions fared in the face of technological and practical challenges. We highlight the risk of an internal threat stemming from the journalists' own use of AI, contrasting the dominant focus on external disinformation threats. We show how newsroom managers shared sociotechnical imaginaries resulting in unrealistically optimistic beliefs about the capabilities of the technology and the pace of development, leading to plans for audience-facing GenAI services collapsing and giving way to more mundane uses of GenAI tools internally in the newsrooms. Furthermore, we identify a vulnerability in the newsroom's resilience against GenAI influence: a GenAI Catch-22. In order to monitor the GenAI tools and prevent errors and undue influence, newsrooms rely on human expertise. But by using GenAI extensively, the newsrooms risk a deterioration of human expertise, preventing them from monitoring the GenAI systems adequately.

Mari Reisjå, Anders Sundnes Løvlie

IT University of Copenhagen

AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Aug 10, 2026cs.AI

The CASE Framework: A Multi-Disciplinary Control Architecture for Governing Enterprise Agentic AI

Enterprises are deploying autonomous AI agents faster than they can govern them, and prevailing approaches stretch a single discipline, typically DevSecOps built for deterministic automation, across every scale of agency. We argue that agentic AI governance is four problems, not one, each with a mature governing science. The CASE framework assigns Control theory to the individual agent (intent as setpoint, guardrails as feedback, evaluation as observation), complex Adaptive systems theory to agent collectives (where emergence makes single-agent assurance non-compositional), Supervisory cybernetics to human-agent teams (where the Law of Requisite Variety shows unaided human oversight fails structurally), and Engineering operations to fleets (extending error budgets to decision quality so autonomy becomes a controlled variable). We formalize each layer, derive cross-layer coupling conditions, including a zero-touch deployment paradox where excellence at one-layer strains the others, and trace twenty-plus enterprise controls to their classical constructs. Three empirical studies validate the thesis: 82 percent of documented production agent failures are multi-layer trajectories; none of 22 ecosystem tools offers full Layer 2 (emergence) coverage; and all 35 scored public deployments fall in the lowest maturity band. We name this mismatch, risk realized at the emergence layer against capability barely offered and practice absent, the Emergence Gap. A five-level maturity model with a non-compensatory bottleneck-weighted index and assessment instrument operationalizes CASE as a scientific rather than process maturity model, grounded in production enterprise agentic platforms. As EU AI Act Article 14 makes effective human oversight a legal requirement, only architectures satisfying requisite variety can make oversight real rather than ceremonial.

Srinivas Telukunta, Georgios Nektarios Lilis, Lucio Baron

Cornell University · Johns Hopkins University · AI71

AI Agent Evaluation AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI

Aug 7, 2026cs.SE

Towards Assurance Closure in AI-Native Large-Scale Agile Software Development

The AI-Native Manifesto envisions large-scale agile software development in which humans increasingly govern intent, risk, and exceptions while agents execute more of the engineering process. Realizing that end-state requires more than better code generation: it requires assurance closure, meaning that the system can establish what must be true, determine and obtain appropriate evidence, judge the credibility of that evidence, preserve its validity through change, and use the resulting uncertainty to bound agent authority. Existing work already provides many of the necessary mechanisms across formal methods, testing, simulation, assurance cases, digital twins, and runtime assurance. We identify six residual gaps in making the surrounding assurance reasoning sufficiently machine-operable, propose a high-level architecture with six corresponding capabilities built on a shared semantic assurance layer, and formulate four research questions to turn that architecture into dependable, human-on-the-loop, AI-native R&D.

Ricardo Britto

Ericsson, Sweden · Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden

AI Assurance Software Engineering Agents Human Oversight of AI AI-Assisted Software Development

Aug 3, 2026cs.AI

A Human Audit of OpenAIs AI-Generated Mathematical Proofs

We assess 18 chapter-specific reviews of the ten mathematical results announced by OpenAI on 1 August 2026, alongside review standards, Lean formalizations, subsequent research, and mathematical references. The article audits this review record without claiming a complete reconstruction of all ten proofs. No confirmed substantive mathematical error in a principal result remains in the examined assessments, although review depth varies and some dependencies remain partly checked. Chapter 8 presents the strongest reservation: a specialist review requests major revision of compressed analytic arguments. In Chapter 6, an apparent polarity error was withdrawn after an overbar lost during PDF extraction was recovered from the typeset source. Subsequent research independently reuses the Chapter 3 proof mechanism and confirms that Connes's rigidity conjecture is false, without independently reproducing Chapter 4's stronger infinite-family result. Among the cited follow-ups, Chapter 7 receives the strongest direct theorem-level corroboration through a stronger hardness theorem. Related equality results in Chapter 8 do not verify the analytic inequality proof. Some follow-ups disclose material AI assistance. We argue that confidence should combine formal checking, human reconstruction, independent mathematical use, and a public record supporting correction of both proofs and reviews.

Mikołaj Sienicki, Krzysztof Sienicki

Polish-Japanese Academy of Information Technology ul. Koszykowa 86, 02-008 Warsaw, Poland, European Union · Chair of Theoretical Physics of Naturally Intelligent Systems (NIS)1 ul. Lipowa 2 / Topolowa 19, 05-807 Podkowa Leśna, Poland, European Union

LLM Auditing Human Oversight of AI LLM Mathematical Reasoning Reasoning Verification

Jul 29, 2026physics.med-ph

Rethinking Artificial Intelligence in Medical Imaging: Assumptions, Reality, and Reframing

Medical imaging has served as primary proving ground for clinical artificial intelligence (AI), yet a decade of intense research has not translated into proportionate bedside impact. We argue that this gap is not primarily a product of insufficient algorithmic performance, inadequate regulation, or limited explainability. Rather, it reflects a structural misalignment, between how AI systems are designed and evaluated, and how clinical decisions are made. This Perspective identifies six interconnected dimensions of this misalignment: the dominance of pixel-only models in a multimodal clinical world; the erosion of physician trust through opaque and inflexible systems; the unfulfilled promise of foundation models in data-sparse medical domains; the persistent bottleneck of non-shareable, under-curated datasets; the gap between validated algorithms and deployable clinical platforms; and the failure of prediction-centric AI to generate actionable clinical guidance. For each dimension, we reframe the problem and propose a path forward, culminating in a vision of agentic, physician-aligned AI that extends, rather than replaces, clinical judgment.

Arman Rahmim, Nourhan Bayasi, Xiaoxiao Li +2

Department of Basic and Translational Research, BC Cancer Research Institute, Vancouver, BC, Canada · Department of Radiology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada · Departments of Physics and Biomedical Engineering, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada +3

Medical Imaging Medical Imaging Foundation Models Clinical Decision Support Human Oversight of AI

Jul 29, 2026cs.SE

A First Look at Coding Agents' Compliance with AI Contribution Rules in Open-Source Communities

Open source communities have been flooded with AI-generated contributions. In defense, they have written contribution rules to regulate coding agents' behavior, spanning from a total ban, mandatory disclosure, to verification gates and human sign-offs. Yet, whether coding agents read and follow those rules, and behave in open source repositories, remains unknown. To estimate real-world rule compliance of coding agents, we curate 106 issues from 49 repositories containing AI contribution rules into RepoComplianceBench. We judge the trajectory of each run against the repository's rules, measuring whether the agent refuses to contribute, discloses its assistance truthfully, clears the required verification gates, or escalates critical steps to a human. We also test if extra prompts, rule disclosure, or feedback from the compliance verifier help with the situation. Our experiments on four frontier models show that today's agents almost never proactively retrieve the contribution rules. Agents pick up disclosure and verification with reminder prompts, rule quotes, and verifier feedback; however, they never refuse to contribute in AI-banned repositories under any condition we tested. The status reveals that verification and disclosure issues are solvable with existing mechanisms, yet enforcing bans and human escalations remains an open problem.

Wenhao Yang, Runzhi He, Minghui Zhou

Peking University, Beijing, China

AI Coding Agents AI Agent Benchmarks AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI

Jul 28, 2026cs.CY

Why Public Service AI Governance Frameworks Risk Failing in the Age of General-Purpose AI: Lessons from Policing

Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources. That pressure has intensified with general-purpose AI (GPAI): AI built on large language models that can be directed by prompt alone to perform an effectively unbounded range of tasks. We argue that the properties that make these models attractive - their generality, accessibility, and low deployment cost - undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued. The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI, and the mitigations that guidance documents prescribe presuppose exactly what GPAI removes. Accuracy cannot be quantified over unbounded outputs. Bias cannot be disaggregated when outputs are free-text judgements rather than categorical predictions. Explainability gives way to the appearance of explanation, and accountability erodes as outputs are optimized to persuade. We develop this through the case of policing, where the consequences of governance failure are most severe, and show why the same failure is likely to recur across other public services. The two mitigations that dominate policing AI strategy - expert evaluation and human-in-the-loop oversight - both rest on assumptions that GPAI violates. Safety assurance thus shifts from an intrinsic feature of building an AI tool to an optional add-on. We recommend a clear taxonomic distinction between narrow and general-purpose AI in governance documentation, a preference for technological parsimony, a pause on operational deployment of GPAI in policing until adequate evidence exists, and a coordinated national safety infrastructure with the authority to generate that evidence and determine when responsible deployment is achievable.

Sam Relins, Daniel Birks

School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK · ESRC Vulnerability and Policing Futures Research Centre

AI Safety Evaluation AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Jul 28, 2026cs.DL

F(AI)2R: Who Did What, and Who Checked? Verifiable AI Provenance as an Executable Skill

F(AI)2R is FAIR research with AI in the loop, twice: an AI-assisted authoring pass and a machine-readable audit pass over every artefact. AI systems now draft, refactor, and verify research artefacts, yet their contributions are rarely recorded in a form a later human or machine can audit. Building on the original F(AI)2R experiment, we generalize its provenance model beyond scholarly writing into aiprov, a PROV-O extension covering any AI-in-the-loop artefact, and we package the method as an executable skill that an AI agent operates itself: setup asks the human operator for their ORCID ID, resolves their identity from the public registry, and scaffolds continuous integration that gates every push on graph conformance and publishes the current build of this very paper. The paper is its own case study. Every activity, claim, and source in its production is recorded in the repository's provenance graph under two invariants: no parentless claim, and verification rungs that only humans may grant.

Florian Krebs

Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR)

Data Provenance AI Agent Governance Scientific Reproducibility Human Oversight of AI

Jul 26, 2026cs.AI

Separating Capability from Permission: A Governance Framework for Agentic AI Autonomy Levels

As AI systems increasingly exhibit agentic behavior, discussions of autonomy often conflate what systems are technically capable of doing with what they should be permitted to do in practice. This paper introduces a governance framework that explicitly separates Allowed Autonomy Levels (AAL), which define the degree of autonomy an AI agent is authorized to exercise given risk, oversight, and accountability considerations, from Autonomous Capability Levels (ACL), which characterize an agent's inherent technical abilities. We present a structured set of autonomy levels spanning reactive execution, decision support, supervised action, goal-directed autonomy, and delegated operational authority, and describe how control, reversibility, and accountability change as autonomy increases. To operationalize this framework, we propose a risk-aware decision process for assigning allowed autonomy, analyze how risk and accountability evolve across autonomy levels, and demonstrate its application through a deployed enterprise data engineering agent, illustrating how a system assessed at a high capability level can be deliberately constrained to a lower allowed autonomy based on risk, reversibility, and organizational readiness. By distinguishing authorization from capability, this work provides practical guidance for the design, deployment, and governance of Agentic AI systems.

Haining Zheng, Qian Dong, Rodolfo K. Depena +3

1ExxonMobil Technology and Engineering Company · 2ExxonMobil Global Operations Company

AI Agent Governance Human Oversight of AI Agentic AI