Imperfect-Information Games

Overview

These games model settings such as poker, negotiation, and pursuit-evasion, where players must act using incomplete observations and beliefs about hidden cards, types, or intentions. Researchers develop equilibrium concepts and solvers such as counterfactual regret minimization, alongside Bayesian and Stackelberg methods for reasoning about beliefs, commitments, and incentives. Reinforcement learning, search, and opponent modeling produce agents for large games, while benchmarks and variance-reduced evaluation help compare their strength and robustness. A central challenge is scaling methods without losing strategic guarantees, especially when agents must adapt to opponents, exploit mistakes, or remain safe under uncertainty.

Latest papers

CardsList

96 papers7 papers in the last four weeks, down 30% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

  1. A Survey on Hypergame Theory: Modelling Misaligned Perceptions and Nested Beliefs for Multi-Agent Systems

    Jul 25, 2025Vince Trencsenyi, Agnieszka Mensfelt, Kostas StathisImperfect-Information GamesMulti-Agent Systems

  2. Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agents

    Jun 5, 2023Nika Haghtalab, Chara Podimata, Kunhe YangImperfect-Information GamesGame Theory

  3. Hierarchical Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization

    May 27, 2023Jiayu Chen, Xudong Wu, Zhekai Wang +1Imperfect-Information GamesHierarchical RL