LLM Guardrails

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful tools for answering user queries, yet they remain highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Existing guardrail methods typically rely on internal features or textual responses to detect malicious queries, which either introduce substantial latency or suffer from randomness in text generation. To overcome these limitations, we propose SelfGrader, a lightweight guardrail method that formulates jailbreak detection as a numerical grading problem using anchored token-level logits. Specifically, SelfGrader evaluates the safety of a user query within a compact set of numerical tokens (NTs) (e.g., 0-9) and interprets their logit distribution as an internal safety signal. To align these signals with the target safety rubric, SelfGrader constructs Probably Approximately Correct-guided ICL anchor examples and introduces a dual-perspective scoring rule that considers both the maliciousness and benignness of the query, yielding a stable and interpretable score that reflects harmfulness and reduces the false positive rate simultaneously. Extensive experiments across diverse jailbreak benchmarks, adaptive attacks, benign prompt benchmarks, multiple LLMs, and state-of-the-art guardrail baselines demonstrate that SelfGrader achieves strong robustness with low false positive rates, memory overhead, and latency.

LLM-based chatbots in government services face critical security gaps. Multi-turn adversarial attacks achieve over 90% success against current defenses, and single-layer guardrails are bypassed with similar rates. We present CivicShield, a cross-domain defense-in-depth framework for government-facing AI chatbots. Drawing on network security, formal verification, biological immune systems, aviation safety, and zero-trust cryptography, CivicShield introduces seven defense layers: (1) zero-trust foundation with capability-based access control, (2) perimeter input validation, (3) semantic firewall with intent classification, (4) conversation state machine with safety invariants, (5) behavioral anomaly detection, (6) multi-model consensus verification, and (7) graduated human-in-the-loop escalation. We present a formal threat model covering 8 multi-turn attack families, map the framework to NIST SP 800-53 controls across 14 families, and evaluate using ablation analysis. Theoretical analysis shows layered defenses reduce attack probability by 1-2 orders of magnitude versus single-layer approaches. Simulation against 1,436 scenarios including HarmBench (416), JailbreakBench (200), and XSTest (450) achieves 72.9% combined detection [69.5-76.0% CI] with 2.9% effective false positive rate after graduated response, while maintaining 100% detection of multi-turn crescendo and slow-drift attacks. The honest drop on real benchmarks versus author-generated scenarios (71.2% vs 76.7% on HarmBench, 47.0% vs 70.0% on JailbreakBench) validates independent evaluation importance. CivicShield addresses an open gap at the intersection of AI safety, government compliance, and practical deployment.

Educational LLM tutors face a core AI alignment challenge: they must follow user intent while preserving pedagogical constraints and safety policies. We present an evaluation methodology for prompt-injection defenses in this setting, showing that guardrail design entails explicit trade-offs among adversarial robustness, benign-task usability, and response latency. We evaluate a domain-specific multi-layer safeguard pipeline combining deterministic pattern filters, structural validation, contextual sandboxing, and session-level behavioral checks. On a controlled holdout benchmark, the pipeline reaches low bypass and false positive rates with optimized average latency - an operating point that prioritizes pedagogical usability (zero false positives) while maintaining measurable attack resistance. We provide a reproducible benchmark protocol for head-to-head comparison under identical conditions, including stratified bootstrap confidence intervals, paired McNemar significance tests, multi-seed sensitivity sweeps, and direct evaluation of Prompt Guard and NeMo Guardrails on the same split with unified instrumentation. Results expose operational trade-offs: NeMo reaches 0 percent bypass at 16.22 percent FPR and roughly 1.5s latency, while Prompt Guard yields 38.48 percent bypass with 3.60 percent FPR. The framework supports evidence-based guardrail selection for AI tutoring systems under different institutional risk and usability requirements.

Prompt attacks, including jailbreaks and prompt injections, pose a critical security risk to Large Language Model (LLM) systems. In production, guardrails must mitigate these attacks under strict low-latency constraints, resulting in a deployment gap in which lightweight classifiers and rule-based systems struggle to generalize under distribution shift, while high-capacity LLM-based judges remain too slow or costly for live enforcement. In this work, we examine whether lightweight, general-purpose LLMs can reliably serve as security judges under real-world production constraints. Through careful prompt and output design, lightweight LLMs are guided through a structured reasoning process involving explicit intent decomposition, safety-signal verification, harm assessment, and self-reflection. We evaluate our method on a curated dataset combining benign queries from real-world chatbots with adversarial prompts generated via automated red teaming (ART), covering diverse and evolving patterns. Our results show that general-purpose LLMs, such as gemini-2.0-flash-lite-001, can serve as effective low-latency judges for live guardrails. This configuration is currently deployed in production as a centralized guardrail service for public service chatbots in Singapore. We additionally evaluate a Mixture-of-Models (MoM) setting to assess whether aggregating multiple LLM judges improves prompt-attack detection performance relative to single-model judges, with only modest gains observed.

LLM-enabled robots prioritizing scarce assistance in social settings face pluralistic values and LLM behavioral variability: reasonable people can disagree about who is helped first, while LLM-mediated interaction policies vary across prompts, contexts, and groups in ways that are difficult to anticipate or verify at contact point. Yet user-facing guardrails for real-time, multi-user assistance allocation remain under-specified. We propose bounded calibration with contestability, a procedural front-end pattern that (i) constrains prioritization to a governance-approved menu of admissible modes, (ii) keeps the active mode legible in interaction-relevant terms at the point of deferral, and (iii) provides an outcome-specific contest pathway without renegotiating the global rule. Treating pluralism and LLM uncertainty as standing conditions, the pattern avoids both silent defaults that hide implicit value skews and wide-open user-configurable "value settings" that shift burden under time pressure. We illustrate the pattern with a public-concourse robot vignette and outline an evaluation agenda centered on legibility, procedural legitimacy, and actionability, including risks of automation bias and uneven usability of contest channels.

As AI agents become widely deployed as online services, users often rely on an agent developer's claim about how safety is enforced, which introduces a threat where safety measures are falsely advertised. To address the threat, we propose proof-of-guardrail, a system that enables developers to provide cryptographic proof that a response is generated after a specific open-source guardrail. To generate proof, the developer runs the agent and guardrail inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which produces a TEE-signed attestation of guardrail code execution verifiable by any user offline. We implement proof-of-guardrail for OpenClaw agents and evaluate latency overhead and deployment cost. Proof-of-guardrail ensures integrity of guardrail execution while keeping the developer's agent private, but we also highlight a risk of deception about safety, for example, when malicious developers actively jailbreak the guardrail. Code and demo video: https://github.com/SaharaLabsAI/Verifiable-ClawGuard

We introduce the Dynamic Behavioral Constraint (DBC) benchmark, the first empirical framework for evaluating the efficacy of a structured, 150-control behavioral governance layer, the MDBC (Madan DBC) system, applied at inference time to large language models (LLMs). Unlike training time alignment methods (RLHF, DPO) or post-hoc content moderation APIs, DBCs constitute a system prompt level governance layer that is model-agnostic, jurisdiction-mappable, and auditable. We evaluate the DBC Framework across a 30 domain risk taxonomy organized into six clusters (Hallucination and Calibration, Bias and Fairness, Malicious Use, Privacy and Data Protection, Robustness and Reliability, and Misalignment Agency) using an agentic red-team protocol with five adversarial attack strategies (Direct, Roleplay, Few-Shot, Hypothetical, Authority Spoof) across 3 model families. Our three-arm controlled design (Base, Base plus Moderation, Base plus DBC) enables causal attribution of risk reduction. Key findings: the DBC layer reduces the aggregate Risk Exposure Rate (RER) from 7.19 percent (Base) to 4.55 percent (Base plus DBC), representing a 36.8 percent relative risk reduction, compared with 0.6 percent for a standard safety moderation prompt. MDBC Adherence Scores improve from 8.6 by 10 (Base) to 8.7 by 10 (Base plus DBC). EU AI Act compliance (automated scoring) reaches 8.5by 10 under the DBC layer. A three judge evaluation ensemble yields Fleiss kappa greater than 0.70 (substantial agreement), validating our automated pipeline. Cluster ablation identifies the Integrity Protection cluster (MDBC 081 099) as delivering the highest per domain risk reduction, while graybox adversarial attacks achieve a DBC Bypass Rate of 4.83 percent . We release the benchmark code, prompt database, and all evaluation artefacts to enable reproducibility and longitudinal tracking as models evolve.

With the growing deployment of large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications, establishing robust safety guardrails to moderate their inputs and outputs has become essential to ensure adherence to safety policies. Current guardrail models predominantly address general human-LLM interactions, rendering LLMs vulnerable to harmful and adversarial content within domain-specific contexts, particularly those rich in technical jargon and specialized concepts. To address this limitation, we introduce ExpGuard, a robust and specialized guardrail model designed to protect against harmful prompts and responses across financial, medical, and legal domains. In addition, we present ExpGuardMix, a meticulously curated dataset comprising 58,928 labeled prompts paired with corresponding refusal and compliant responses, from these specific sectors. This dataset is divided into two subsets: ExpGuardTrain, for model training, and ExpGuardTest, a high-quality test set annotated by domain experts to evaluate model robustness against technical and domain-specific content. Comprehensive evaluations conducted on ExpGuardTest and eight established public benchmarks reveal that ExpGuard delivers competitive performance across the board while demonstrating exceptional resilience to domain-specific adversarial attacks, surpassing state-of-the-art models such as WildGuard by up to 8.9% in prompt classification and 15.3% in response classification. To encourage further research and development, we open-source our code, data, and model, enabling adaptation to additional domains and supporting the creation of increasingly robust guardrail models.

Systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become formidable tools for automating research and software production. However, their governance remains a challenge when technical requirements demand absolute consistency, auditability, and predictable control over cost and latency. Recent literature highlights two phenomena that aggravate this scenario: the stochastic variance inherent in the model's judgment (often treated as "systemic noise") and the substantial degradation of context utilization in long inputs, with critical losses when decisive information is diluted in the middle of the prompt. This article proposes PARCER as an engineering response to these limitations. The framework acts as a declarative "operational contract" in YAML, transforming unstructured interactions into versioned and executable artifacts. PARCER imposes strict governance structured into seven operational phases, introducing decision hygiene practices inspired by legal judgments to mitigate noise, adaptive token budgeting, formalized recovery routes (fallbacks) for context preservation, and systemic observability via OpenTelemetry. The objective of this work is to present the conceptual and technical architecture of PARCER, positioning it as a necessary transition from simple "prompt engineering" to "context engineering with governable governance".

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in production environments face a fundamental safety-utility trade-off either a strict filtering mechanisms prevent harmful outputs but often block benign queries or a relaxed controls risk unsafe content generation. Conventional guardrails based on static rules or fixed confidence thresholds are typically context-insensitive and computationally expensive, resulting in high latency and degraded user experience. To address these limitations, we introduce an adaptive abstention system that dynamically adjusts safety thresholds based on real-time contextual signals such as domain and user history. The proposed framework integrates a multi-dimensional detection architecture composed of five parallel detectors, combined through a hierarchical cascade mechanism to optimize both speed and precision. The cascade design reduces unnecessary computation by progressively filtering queries, achieving substantial latency improvements compared to non-cascaded models and external guardrail systems. Extensive evaluation on mixed and domain-specific workloads demonstrates significant reductions in false positives, particularly in sensitive domains such as medical advice and creative writing. The system maintains high safety precision and near-perfect recall under strict operating modes. Overall, our context-aware abstention framework effectively balances safety and utility while preserving performance, offering a scalable solution for reliable LLM deployment.

Agent safety benchmarks measure whether a monitor detects harm, not when. Yet timing is the difference between intervention and autopsy. We introduce StepShield, the first benchmark that treats detection timeliness as a first-class metric. On 9,429 incident-grounded code-agent trajectories, we define the Early Intervention Rate (EIR): the fraction of detected rogue trajectories where the alert fires within a k-step window after the divergence point, isolating timing quality from coverage. This metric exposes what we call the Forensics Trap: a pattern-based guardrail with 847 rules achieves 86% recall yet is statistically indistinguishable from random timing on EIR (0.23 vs. 0.24; p = 0.66, one-sided binomial; difference within CI), because over three-quarters of its alerts trigger on benign prefix code before any violation occurs. The 4x EIR gap between rule-based and semantic detectors is completely invisible to accuracy, recall, or F1. Our finding is structural: regex guardrails detect syntax, not intent, and therefore cannot distinguish the moment an agent turns rogue, rendering the entire deployed class of pattern-based monitors unsuited for real-time oversight. No existing method simultaneously achieves high recall, low false-positive rate, and timely intervention, establishing step-level rogue detection as genuinely unsolved.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, safety guardrails are required to go beyond coarse-grained filtering and support fine-grained, interpretable, and adaptable risk assessment. However, existing solutions often rely on rapid classification schemes or post-hoc rules, resulting in limited transparency, inflexible policies, or prohibitive inference costs. To this end, we present YuFeng-XGuard, a reasoning-centric guardrail model family designed to perform multi-dimensional risk perception for LLM interactions. Instead of producing opaque binary judgments, YuFeng-XGuard generates structured risk predictions, including explicit risk categories and configurable confidence scores, accompanied by natural language explanations that expose the underlying reasoning process. This formulation enables safety decisions that are both actionable and interpretable. To balance decision latency and explanatory depth, we adopt a tiered inference paradigm that performs an initial risk decision based on the first decoded token, while preserving ondemand explanatory reasoning when required. In addition, we introduce a dynamic policy mechanism that decouples risk perception from policy enforcement, allowing safety policies to be adjusted without model retraining. Extensive experiments on a diverse set of public safety benchmarks demonstrate that YuFeng-XGuard achieves stateof-the-art performance while maintaining strong efficiency-efficacy trade-offs. We release YuFeng-XGuard as an open model family, including both a full-capacity variant and a lightweight version, to support a wide range of deployment scenarios.

Agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) are models able to reason, plan, and execute tools over unstructured data. These abilities enable transformative applications in domains spanning personal assistants, financial, and legal domains, etc. While these systems can substantially improve productivity and service quality, effective agency typically requires access to sensitive personal or organizational information. However, this access introduces critical inference-time privacy risks, specifically regarding contextually appropriate information disclosure. While recent studies highlight the inability of agentic LLMs to consistently adhere to privacy norms, existing defenses often rely on auxiliary LLM-based monitors. However, these defenses are expensive and offer limited protection against attacks that are robust to semantic censorship. To contrast this background, this paper proposes a notion of privacy filters based on activation probing. We show that these filters are both computationally efficient and effective for both single-turn and multi-turn conversational settings. Furthermore, this work provides the first systematic investigation into probing model internals across a conversation trajectory, moving beyond static, single-prompt analysis to capture the evolving state of privacy-sensitive interactions, illustrating their applicability across contexts, attack styles, multiple base models, and challenging settings such as mosaic attacks, while providing nuanced insights into the nature of the discovered concepts and modular construction of probes.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.