LLM Safety Benchmarks

LLM: Large Language Model

This field measures how reliably language models recognize and handle risks such as harmful requests, jailbreaks, bias, privacy violations, and unsafe tool use. Benchmarks use curated and expert-annotated scenarios, adversarial red-teaming, multi-turn and agent simulations, and increasingly multilingual, multimodal, and domain-specific tests. Researchers also compare refusal and moderation methods, use repeated sampling and statistical techniques to estimate reliability, and assess both harmful compliance and over-refusal. A central challenge is making results comparable and trustworthy while ensuring tests reflect changing, context-dependent behavior in real deployments.

Latest papers

284 papers44 papers in the last four weeks, up 7% on the four weeks before. 0.3% of all new papers.

Feb 18, 2026

Measuring Mid-2025 LLM-Assistance on Novice Performance in Biology

Large language models (LLMs) perform strongly on biological benchmarks, raising concerns that they may help novice actors acquire dual-use laboratory skills. Yet, whether this translates to improved human performance in the physical laboratory remains unclear. To address this, we conducted a pre-registered, investigator-blinded, randomized controlled trial (June-August 2025; n = 153) evaluating whether LLMs improve novice performance in tasks that collectively model a viral reverse genetics workflow. We observed no significant difference in the primary endpoint of workflow completion (5.2% LLM vs. 6.6% Internet; P = 0.759), nor in the success rate of individual tasks. However, the LLM arm had numerically higher success rates in four of the five tasks, most notably for the cell culture task (68.8% LLM vs. 55.3% Internet; P = 0.059). Post-hoc Bayesian modeling of pooled data estimates an approximate 1.4-fold increase (95% CrI 0.74-2.62) in success for a "typical" reverse genetics task under LLM assistance. Ordinal regression modelling suggests that participants in the LLM arm were more likely to progress through intermediate steps across all tasks (posterior probability of a positive effect: 81%-96%). Overall, mid-2025 LLMs did not substantially increase novice completion of complex laboratory procedures but were associated with a modest performance benefit. These results reveal a gap between in silico benchmarks and real-world utility, underscoring the need for physical-world validation of AI biosecurity assessments as model capabilities and user proficiency evolve.

Shen Zhou Hong, Alex Kleinman, Alyssa Mathiowetz +9

Active Site, Cambridge, MA 02142, United States · Independent · Model Evaluation and Threat Research, Inc., Covina, CA 91723, United States

AI-Assisted Scientific Research Human-in-the-Loop AI LLM Safety Benchmarks

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Feb 18, 2026

Measuring and Eliminating Refusals in Military Large Language Models

Military Large Language Models (LLMs) must provide accurate information to the warfighter in time-critical and dangerous situations. However, today's LLMs are imbued with safety behaviors that cause the LLM to refuse many legitimate queries in the military domain, particularly those related to violence, terrorism, or military technology. Our gold benchmark for assessing refusal rates, which was developed by veterans of the US Army and special forces, is to our knowledge the first dataset of its kind. We present results for refusal and deflection rates on 31 public models and 3 military models. We observe hard rejection rates as high as 98.2% and soft deflection rates ranging from 0% to 21.3%. We also present results on two additional synthetic datasets and show their correlations with the gold dataset. Finally, we perform abliteration using the Heretic library on a military-tuned gpt-oss-20b model, showing an absolute increase in answer rate of 66.5 points but an average relative decrease of 2% on other military tasks. In our concluding remarks, we argue for deeper specialization, including with mid-training and end-to-end post-training, to achieve zero refusals and maximum military task accuracy for closed military models.

Jack FitzGerald, Dylan Bates, Aristotelis Lazaridis +17

EdgeRunner AI.

Refusal Behavior in Language Models LLM Refusal Behavior LLM Safety Benchmarks

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Feb 17, 2026

Intent Laundering: AI Safety Datasets Are Not What They Seem

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used adversarial safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three defining properties: being driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from adversarial attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results show that current adversarial safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world adversarial behavior due to their overreliance on triggering cues. Once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7/4. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90.00% to 100.00%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how existing datasets evaluate model safety and how real-world adversaries behave.

Shahriar Golchin, Marc Wetter

Applied Machine Learning Research

LLM Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Jailbreak Attacks Adversarial Text Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

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Feb 3, 2026

SalamahBench: Dialect and Category Level Safety Evaluation of Arabic Language Models

While different stakeholders are trying to leverage Arabic Language Models (ALMs), safety alignment in ALMs remains largely underexplored, hindering their mainstream adoption. Existing safety benchmarks are predominantly English-centric and evaluate Arabic only in its standardized form, obscuring fine-grained safety vulnerabilities in Arabic NLP systems. This paper introduces SalamahBench, a unified benchmark of 8{,}270 human-verified harmful prompts across ML Commons hazard categories, each rendered in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and five regional Arabic varieties, namely Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi, Lebanese, and Moroccan, for a total of 49{,}620 paired instances. To analyze the resulting data, we introduce two complementary metrics, namely Dialect Shift, which measures a model's aggregate change in safety under dialectal reformulation, and Category-Specific Dialect Deviation, which isolates harm categories whose change departs from that aggregate trend. Evaluating models such as Fanar 2, ALLaM 2, and Karnak 1 under multiple safeguard configurations, we find that cross-variety robustness is strongly model dependent, and that aggregate scores can conceal category-level divergence. Our findings highlight the necessity of evaluating Arabic model safety jointly across linguistic varieties and harm domains rather than relying on aggregate scores or MSA alone.

Omar Abdelnasser, Fatemah Alharbi, Khaled Khasawneh +2

Compumacy for Artificial Intelligence Solutions, Cairo, Egypt · Computer Science Department, College of Computer Science and Engineering, Taibah University, Yanbu 46522, KSA · Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, George Mason University, VA, USA +2

LLM Safety Benchmarks Multilingual Language Model Evaluation Arabic NLP Arabic Language Models Language Model Safety Evaluation Language Modeling+2

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Jan 25, 2026

Health-ORSC-Bench: A Benchmark for Measuring Over-Refusal and Safety Completion in Health Context

Safety alignment in Large Language Models is critical for healthcare; however, reliance on binary refusal boundaries often results in over-refusal of benign queries or unsafe compliance with harmful ones. While existing benchmarks measure these extremes, they fail to evaluate Safe Completion: the model's ability to maximise helpfulness on dual-use or borderline queries by providing safe, high-level guidance without crossing into actionable harm. We introduce Health-ORSC-Bench, the first large-scale benchmark designed to systematically measure Over-Refusal and Safe Completion quality in healthcare. Comprising 31,920 benign boundary prompts across seven health categories (e.g., self-harm, medical misinformation), our framework uses an automated pipeline with human validation to test models at varying levels of intent ambiguity. We evaluate 30 state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-5 and Claude-4, revealing a significant tension: safety-optimised models frequently refuse up to 80% of "Hard" benign prompts, while domain-specific models often sacrifice safety for utility. Our findings demonstrate that model family and size significantly influence calibration: larger frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Llama-4) exhibit "safety-pessimism" and higher over-refusal than smaller or MoE-based counterparts (e.g., Qwen-3-Next), highlighting that current LLMs struggle to balance refusal and compliance. Health-ORSC-Bench provides a rigorous standard for calibrating the next generation of medical AI assistants toward nuanced, safe, and helpful completions. Furthermore, our benchmark facilitates reproducible evaluation, encourages safety calibration, and supports development of clinically reliable, context-aware, human-aligned medical AI systems. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/ZhihaoZhang97/Health-ORSC-Bench. Warning: Some contents may include toxic or undesired contents.

Zhihao Zhang, Liting Huang, Guanghao Wu +3

Macquarie University1 · UTS2 · MBZUAI3 +1

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation Healthcare LLM Refusal LLM Refusal Behavior Over-Refusal+2

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Jan 19, 2026

RubRIX: Rubric-Driven Risk Mitigation in Caregiver-AI Interactions

Caregivers seeking AI-mediated support express complex needs---information-seeking, emotional validation, and distress cues---that warrant careful evaluation of response safety and appropriateness. Existing AI evaluation frameworks, primarily focused on general risks (toxicity, hallucinations, policy violations, etc), may not adequately capture the nuanced risks of LLM-responses in caregiving-contexts. We introduce RubRIX (Rubric-based Risk Index), a theory-driven, clinician-validated framework for evaluating risks in LLM caregiving responses. Grounded in the Elements of an Ethic of Care, RubRIX operationalizes five empirically-derived risk dimensions: Inattention, Bias & Stigma, Information Inaccuracy, Uncritical Affirmation, and Epistemic Arrogance. We evaluate six state-of-the-art LLMs on over 20,000 caregiver queries from Reddit and ALZConnected. Rubric-guided refinement consistently reduced risk-components by 45-98% after one iteration across models. This work contributes a methodological approach for developing domain-sensitive, user-centered evaluation frameworks for high-burden contexts. Our findings highlight the importance of domain-sensitive, interactional risk evaluation for the responsible deployment of LLMs in caregiving support contexts. We release benchmark datasets to enable future research on contextual risk evaluation in AI-mediated support.

Drishti Goel, Jeongah Lee, Qiuyue Joy Zhong +5

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · University of Massachusetts Amherst · OSF HealthCare +1

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Evaluation Rubric-Based Evaluation LLM Safety Benchmarks Healthcare

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Jan 7, 2026

Safety Is Not Universal: The Selective Safety Trap in LLM Alignment

Current safety evaluations of large language models (LLMs) create a dangerous illusion of universal protection by aggregating harms under generic categories such as "Identity Hate", obscuring vulnerabilities toward specific populations. In this work, we expose the Selective Safety Trap: a systemic failure mode where models robustly defend specific populations while leaving underrepresented communities highly vulnerable to identical adversarial attacks. To systematically audit this phenomenon, we introduce MiJaBench, a bilingual (English-Portuguese) adversarial benchmark comprising 43,961 controlled jailbreaking prompts across 16 minority groups. By evaluating 14 state-of-the-art LLMs on MiJaBench, we curate 615,454 prompt-response pairs that compose MiJaBench-Align, revealing that safety alignment is not a uniform semantic capability but a demographic hierarchy, with defense rates fluctuating by up to 42% within the same model solely based on the target group. This disparity persists across architectures and languages and is amplified by scaling, indicating that current alignment methods learn group-specific safeguards rather than a generalized notion of harm. Through targeted direct preference optimization (DPO) on a 1B-parameter baseline, we achieve strong zero-shot safety generalizations to entirely unseen demographics and complex attack strategies. We release all datasets and scripts to provide the community with a concrete pathway toward equitable, transferable safety alignment.

Iago Alves Brito, Walcy Santos Rezende Rios, Julia Soares Dollis +2

Advanced Knowledge Center for Immersive Technologies (AKCIT) Federal University of Goiás (UFG)

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Alignment Language Model Safety Evaluation Adversarial Attacks on LLMs LLM Jailbreak Attacks Demographic Bias in Language Models

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Dec 12, 2025

The Instability of Safety: How Random Seeds and Temperature Expose Inconsistent LLM Refusal Behavior

Current safety evaluations of large language models rely on single-shot testing, implicitly assuming that model responses are deterministic and representative of the model's safety alignment. We challenge this assumption by investigating the stability of safety refusal decisions across random seeds and temperature settings. Testing four instruction-tuned models from three families (Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B, Qwen 3 8B, Gemma 3 12B) on 876 harmful prompts across 20 sampling configurations (4 temperatures x 5 seeds), we find that 18-28% of prompts exhibit decision flips (the REFUSE/PARTIAL/COMPLY label changes across configurations), depending on the model. Our Safety Stability Index (SSI) reveals that higher temperatures significantly reduce decision stability (Friedman chi-squared = 396.81, p < 0.001), with mean within-temperature SSI dropping from 0.977 at temperature 0.0 to 0.942 at temperature 1.0. We validate findings across all model families using Claude 3.5 Haiku as a unified external judge, achieving 89.1% inter-judge agreement with the Llama 70B judge on the two models both judges labeled (Cohen's kappa = 0.62). Within each model, prompts with higher compliance rates exhibit lower stability (Spearman rho = -0.47 to -0.70, all p < 0.001), indicating that models "waver" more on borderline requests. These findings demonstrate that single-shot safety evaluations are insufficient for reliable safety assessment and that evaluation protocols must account for stochastic variation in model behavior. For Llama 3.1 8B, single-shot evaluation agrees with multi-sample ground truth only 92.5% of the time when pooling across temperatures (98.7% at greedy to 90.3% at temperature 1.0), and we recommend scaling samples with temperature--one at greedy, three at low temperature, more at higher temperatures (where three reach only ~95%), and ten when pooling--rather than a single flat threshold.

Erik Larsen

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Refusal Behavior LLM Safety Benchmarks

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Nov 10, 2025

MENTOR: A Metacognition-Driven Self-Evolution Framework for Uncovering and Mitigating Implicit Domain Risks in LLMs

Ensuring the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) is critical for real-world deployment. However, current safety measures often fail to address implicit, domain-specific risks. To investigate this gap, we introduce a dataset of 3,000 annotated queries spanning education, finance, and management. Evaluations across 14 leading LLMs reveal a concerning vulnerability: an average jailbreak success rate of 57.8%. In response, we propose MENTOR, a metacognition-driven self-evolution framework. MENTOR performs metacognitive self-assessment, using strategies such as perspective-taking and consequential reasoning to uncover latent model misalignments. MENTOR couples single-pass rule-guided inference for routine requests with a selectively invoked metacognitive evolution cycle that revises residual unsafe responses, distills successful corrections into a dynamic rule graph, and compiles validated rules into activation-level steering signals for future inference. Experiments demonstrate that MENTOR substantially reduces attack success rates across all tested domains and outperforms existing safety alignment methods. The code and dataset for MENTOR are available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MENTOR-Evo.

Liang Shan, Kaicheng Shen, Wen Wu +8

School of Computer Science and Technology, East China Normal University · Shanghai AI Lab, Shanghai Innovation Institute

LLM Safety LLM Safety Alignment LLM Jailbreak Attacks LLM Safety Benchmarks Metacognition in Language Models

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Aug 21, 2025

SafetyFlow: An Agent-Flow System for Automated LLM Safety Benchmarking

The rapid proliferation of large language models (LLMs) has intensified the requirement for reliable safety evaluation to uncover model vulnerabilities. To this end, numerous LLM safety evaluation benchmarks are proposed. However, existing benchmarks generally rely on labor-intensive manual curation, which causes excessive time and resource consumption. They also exhibit significant redundancy and limited difficulty. To alleviate these problems, we introduce SafetyFlow, the first agent-flow system designed to automate the construction of LLM safety benchmarks. SafetyFlow can automatically build a comprehensive safety benchmark in only four days without any human intervention by orchestrating seven specialized agents, significantly reducing time and resource cost. Equipped with versatile tools, the agents of SafetyFlow ensure process and cost controllability while integrating human expertise into the automatic pipeline. The final constructed dataset, SafetyFlowBench, contains 23,446 queries with low redundancy and strong discriminative power. Our contribution includes the first fully automated benchmarking pipeline and a comprehensive safety benchmark. We evaluate the safety of 49 advanced LLMs on our dataset and conduct extensive experiments to validate our efficacy and efficiency.

Xiangyang Zhu, Yuan Tian, Chunyi Li +3

Shanghai AI Lab · East China Normal University

LLM Safety Benchmarks Synthetic Benchmark Generation LLM Safety Evaluation AI Agent Safety Benchmarks

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Jul 30, 2025

Addressing Benchmarking Gaps in Large Language Models for Health and Medicine with Dynamic Red-Teaming

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to answer health-related questions and support healthcare workflows, yet evidence for their safety still relies heavily on static benchmarks that can rapidly become obsolete or be optimized against. Here we introduce a Dynamic, Automatic, and Systematic (DAS) red-teaming audit framework that continuously stress-tests LLMs for health across four safety-critical axes: robustness, privacy, bias/fairness, and hallucination/factual inaccuracies. Validated against board-certified clinicians with high concordance, a suite of adversarial agents autonomously mutates health-related test cases to uncover vulnerabilities in real time. Applying DAS to 15 proprietary and open-source LLMs revealed a profound gap between high static benchmark performance and low dynamic reliability--the "Benchmarking Gap". Despite median MedQA accuracy exceeding 80%, 94% of previously correct answers failed under dynamic robustness testing. This brittleness generalized to the realistic, open-ended HealthBench dataset, where top-tier models exhibited failure rates exceeding 70% and sharp shifts in model rankings across evaluations, suggesting that high scores on established static benchmarks may reflect superficial memorization. We observed similarly high failure rates across other domains: privacy leaks were elicited in 86% of scenarios, cognitive-bias priming altered recommendations in 81% of fairness tests, and hallucination rates exceeded 74% in widely used models. By converting LLM safety evaluation for health from a static checklist into a living adversarial audit, DAS provides a scalable framework for surfacing latent risks before such systems are deployed in consumer-facing health assistants, clinician-facing tools, and broader healthcare workflows. Code is available at https://github.com/JZPeterPan/DAS-Medical-Red-Teaming-Agents.

Jiazhen Pan, Bailiang Jian, Paul Hager +20

Cherise · School of Computation, Information and Technology, Technical University of Munich (TUM), Munich, Germany · Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom +9

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation Healthcare LLM Auditing LLM Red Teaming LLM Reliability+2

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Jun 11, 2025

LLMail-Inject: A Dataset from a Realistic Adaptive Prompt Injection Challenge

Indirect prompt injection attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of LLMs: executing unauthorized tasks from untrusted sources. Despite the practical significance of this attack vector, existing benchmarks rely on small sets of template-based attacks (100-1,000 examples) that fail to capture the diversity and adaptiveness of real-world adversaries. Consequently, benchmarks are saturated and overfit to static attacks. We introduce LLMail-Inject, a large-scale benchmark of 208,095 distinct human-written attack prompts collected through a public red-teaming challenge with 839 participants. LLMail-Inject evaluates the attack's complete chain of execution: prompts must be retrieved from an email database, evade production-level defenses, and trigger unauthorized tool calls with correct arguments. Evaluation reveals that models that achieve 5% attack success rate (ASR) on existing benchmarks fail more on LLMail-Inject: Meta SecAlign--specifically trained against prompt injection--still yields 32% ASR, GPT-4o exhibits 58% ASR, and GPT-5 mini 47% ASR. We further demonstrate that attacks transfer across domains, achieving 37% ASR on proof-of-concept coding tasks and 28-45% ASR on file management tasks. We release our challenge platform and curated evaluation subsets at multiple difficulty tiers and the full dataset with rich annotations.

Sahar Abdelnabi, Aideen Fay, Ahmed Salem +22

Microsoft · ISTA · Trend Micro +5

LLM Security Indirect Prompt Injection Prompt Injection Attacks on AI Agents LLM Safety Benchmarks AI Agent Security Benchmarks

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May 22, 2025

ReasoningShield: Safety Detection over Reasoning Traces of Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) leverage explicit reasoning traces, known as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, to decompose complex problems into intermediate steps before deriving final answers. However, these reasoning traces introduce unique safety challenges: harmful content can be embedded in intermediate steps even when final answers appear benign. Our study reveals that existing state-of-the-art moderation tools experience significant performance degradation on CoT moderation, with F1 scores dropping by up to 35.2% compared to traditional answer moderation. To address these challenges, we present ReasoningShield, a comprehensive benchmark and a suite of strong lightweight models for CoT safety moderation. Our benchmark includes 9.2K annotated (Query, CoT) pairs with structured stepwise risk analysis, consisting of a 7K-sample training set and a 2.2K human-annotated test set, spanning 10 risk categories, 3 safety levels, and 8 LRMs with diverse reasoning paradigms. To further demonstrate the utility of the benchmark, we develop lightweight models with 1B/3B parameters using a two-stage training strategy. Our models achieve 91.8% F1 on our benchmark, substantially outperforming leading tools such as LlamaGuard-4 by 35.6% and commercial models such as GPT-4o by 15.8%, while generalizing effectively across diverse reasoning paradigms and unseen scenarios. Resources are publicly available: Project Page: https://cosmosyi.github.io/ReasoningShield/, Code: https://github.com/CosmosYi/ReasoningShield, Models: https://huggingface.co/ReasoningShield/models, and Dataset: https://huggingface.co/datasets/ReasoningShield/ReasoningShield-Dataset.

Changyi Li, Jiayi Wang, Xudong Pan +2

Fudan University · Shanghai Innovation Institute

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Benchmarks Large Reasoning Models

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Jan 24, 2025

CASE-Bench: Context-Aware SafEty Benchmark for Large Language Models

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is essential for their safe deployment and widespread adoption. Current LLM safety benchmarks often focus solely on the refusal of individual problematic queries, which overlooks the importance of the context where the query occurs and may cause undesired refusal of queries under safe contexts that diminish user experience. Addressing this gap, we introduce CASE-Bench, a Context-Aware SafEty Benchmark that integrates context into safety assessments of LLMs. CASE-Bench assigns distinct, formally described contexts to categorized queries based on Contextual Integrity theory. Additionally, in contrast to previous studies which mainly rely on majority voting from just a few annotators, we recruited a sufficient number of annotators necessary to ensure the detection of statistically significant differences among the experimental conditions based on power analysis. Our extensive analysis using CASE-Bench on various open-source and commercial LLMs reveals a substantial and significant influence of context on human judgments (p<0.0001 from a z-test), underscoring the necessity of context in safety evaluations. We also identify notable mismatches between human judgments and LLM responses, particularly in commercial models within safe contexts.

Guangzhi Sun, Xiao Zhan, Shutong Feng +2

Trinity College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom · Department of Informatics, King’s College London, United Kingdom · Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany +1

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Evaluation

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