Market

Autonomous AI agents now plan, decide, and act on behalf of users across healthcare, financial services, and workplace contexts, often without step-by-step human approval. Existing AI literacy frameworks were built for a world in which humans evaluate AI outputs and decide whether to act; they have no vocabulary for the user who has delegated decision-making authority to an agent whose actions may not be observable, reversible, or controllable. This paper names the resulting problem agentic literacy debt: the accumulating societal deficit that grows when agentic AI systems are deployed at scale without corresponding literacy infrastructure. The debt compounds through three reinforcing channels (normalization of opaque delegation, multi-agent ecosystem complexity, and institutional path dependence), and it is incurred by the organizations that deploy agents but paid by the users, patients, and citizens on whose behalf the agents act. Evidence from healthcare, financial fraud, and global equity contexts suggests the gap is already consequential. The problem is structural, not a temporary lag that curriculum reform will close. It demands a reframing of AI literacy as a governance capability, not an evaluative one.

We study how AI agents form expectations and trade in experimental asset markets. Using a simulated open-call auction populated by autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, we document three main findings. First, AI agents exhibit classic behavioral patterns: a pronounced disposition effect and recency-weighted extrapolative beliefs. Second, these individual-level patterns aggregate into equilibrium dynamics that replicate classic experimental findings (Smith et al., 1988), including the predictive power of excess demand for future prices and the positive relationship between disagreement and trading volume. Third, by analyzing the agents' reasoning text through a twenty-mechanism scoring framework, we show that targeted prompt interventions causally amplify or suppress specific behavioral mechanisms, significantly altering the magnitude of market bubbles.

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

High-fidelity, scalable market simulation is a key instrument for mechanism evaluation, stress testing, and counterfactual policy analysis. Yet existing simulators rarely achieve \emph{mechanism fidelity} beyond single-asset intraday settings, \emph{microstructure fidelity} against historical limit order books (LOB), and \emph{computational tractability} at market scale in a single system. This paper presents \textit{EvoMarket}, a discrete-event, multi-agent financial market simulator designed for intervention-oriented experiments in multi-asset and cross-day environments. EvoMarket couples a high-throughput execution core (optimized LOB data structures, hierarchical scheduling under propagation delays, and asynchronous per-asset matching) with explicit institutional mechanisms (market calendars, opening call auctions, price limits, and T+1 settlement). To avoid expensive black-box calibration, EvoMarket introduces an Oracle-guided in-run self-calibration mechanism that interprets microstructure discrepancy as missing order flow and synthesizes corrective orders at recording checkpoints. Experiments on China A-share order-flow and LOB data show close replay alignment over five trading days, fidelity gains from budgeted in-run calibration across depth levels, broad agent order-space coverage, and scalable performance under increasing input order rates and market breadth. We further demonstrate cross-asset linkage and event-study style intervention evaluation that produces structured dependence and interpretable event-time responses.

We present the first portfolio-level validation of MarketSenseAI, a deployed multi-agent LLM equity system. All signals are generated live at each observation date, eliminating look-ahead bias. The system routes four specialist agents (News, Fundamentals, Dynamics, and Macro) through a synthesis agent that issues a monthly equity thesis and recommendation for each stock in its coverage universe, and we ask two questions: do its buy recommendations add value over both passive benchmarks and random selection, and what does the internal agent structure reveal about the source of the edge? On the S&P 500 cohort (19 months) the strong-buy equal-weight portfolio earns +2.18%/month against a passive equal-weight benchmark of +1.15% (approximating RSP), a +25.2% compound excess, and ranks at the 99.7th percentile of 10,000 Monte Carlo portfolios (p=0.003). The S&P 100 cohort (35 months) delivers a +30.5% compound excess over EQWL with consistent direction but formal significance not reached, limited by the small average selection of ~10 stocks per month. Non-negative least-squares projection of thesis embeddings onto agent embeddings reveals an adaptive-integration mechanism. Agent contributions rotate with market regime (Fundamentals leads on S&P 500, Macro on S&P 100, Dynamics acts as an episodic momentum signal) and this agent rotation moves in lockstep with both the sector composition of strong-buy selections and identifiable macro-calendar events, three independent views of the same underlying adaptation. The recommendation's cross-sectional Information Coefficient is statistically significant on S&P 500 (ICIR=+0.489, p=0.024). These results suggest that multi-agent LLM equity systems can identify sources of alpha beyond what classical factor models capture, and that the buy signal functions as an effective universe-filter that can sit upstream of any portfolio-construction process.

Converting betting odds into accurate outcome probabilities is a fundamental challenge in order to use betting odds as a benchmark for sports forecasting and market efficiency analysis. In this study, we propose two methods to overcome the limitations of existing conversion methods. Firstly, we propose an odds-only method to convert betting odds to probabilities without using historical data for model fitting. While existing odds-only methods, such as Multiplicative, Shin, and Power exist, they do not adjust for biases or relationships we found in our betting odds dataset, which consists of 90014 football matches across five different bookmakers. To overcome these limitations, our proposed Odds-Only-Equal-Profitability-Confidence (OO-EPC) method aligns with the bookmakers' pricing objectives of having equal confidence in profitability for each outcome. We provide empirical evidence from our betting odds dataset that, for the majority of bookmakers, our proposed OO-EPC method outperforms the existing odds-only methods. Beyond controlled experiments, we applied the OO-EPC method under real-world uncertainty by using it for six iterations of an annual basketball outcome forecasting competition. Secondly, we propose a generalised linear model that utilises historical data for model fitting and then converts betting odds to probabilities. Existing generalised linear models attempt to capture relationships that the Efficient Market Hypothesis already captures. To overcome this shortcoming, our proposed Favourite-Longshot-Bias-Adjusted Generalised Linear Model (FL-GLM) fits just one parameter to capture the favourite-longshot bias, providing a more interpretable alternative. We provide empirical evidence from historical football matches where, for all bookmakers, our proposed FL-GLM outperforms the existing multinomial and logistic generalised linear models.

Asset retrieval (finding similar assets in a financial universe) is central to quantitative investment decision-making. Existing approaches define similarity through historical price patterns or sector classifications, but such backward-looking criteria provide no guarantee about future behavior. We argue that effective asset retrieval should be future-aligned: the retrieved assets should be those most likely to exhibit correlated future returns. To this end, we propose Future-Aligned Soft Contrastive Learning (FASCL), a representation learning framework whose soft contrastive loss uses pairwise future return correlations as continuous supervision targets. We further introduce an evaluation protocol designed to directly assess whether retrieved assets share similar future trajectories. Experiments on 5,631 US-listed securities against 14 baselines show that FASCL attains the best future return correlation at every retrieval depth and the best rank information coefficient at every depth and horizon, leads on trend consistency in 13 of 16 cells, and gives the highest gross Sharpe ratio in a spread trading backtest at every basket size. Code is available at https://github.com/HyeongminLEE/fascl .

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential, but their decisions can be sensitive to noisy and non-stationary market information. We propose ContestTrade, a multi-agent trading system with an internal competitive mechanism inspired by institutional investment workflows. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) a Data Team that processes and condenses massive market data into diversified textual factors optimized for constrained LLM context windows, and (2) a Research Team that produces parallelized multipath trading decisions via tool-augmented deep research. The core design is a "Quantify-Predict-Allocate" contest mechanism within each team: agent outputs are scored only after market outcomes become observable, future utility is predicted from historical scores, and resources are allocated to agents with positive predicted utility. In a post-2024 A-share backtest, ContestTrade achieves higher backtested return and risk-adjusted performance than the evaluated baselines. We further describe the temporal protocol, implementation choices, and limitations to clarify the scope of these results.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently been leveraged for asset pricing tasks and stock trading applications, enabling AI agents to generate investment decisions from unstructured financial data. However, most evaluations of LLM timing-based investing strategies are conducted on narrow timeframes and limited stock universes, overstating effectiveness due to survivorship and data-snooping biases. We critically assess their generalizability and robustness by proposing FINSABER, a backtesting framework evaluating timing-based strategies across longer periods and a larger universe of symbols. Systematic backtests over two decades and 100+ symbols reveal that previously reported LLM advantages deteriorate significantly under broader cross-section and over a longer-term evaluation. Our market regime analysis further demonstrates that LLM strategies are overly conservative in bull markets, underperforming passive benchmarks, and overly aggressive in bear markets, incurring heavy losses. These findings highlight the need to develop LLM strategies that are able to prioritise trend detection and regime-aware risk controls over mere scaling of framework complexity.