Occupational Exposure to AI

Automation is often justified as relief from dull, dirty, and dangerous work. I examine how these conditions relate to occupational AI exposure using 21 O*NET items across 754 US occupations. Higher exposure is associated with lower condition scores under a large language model (LLM) measure and AI Occupational Exposure (AIOE), with equal occupation weights and employment weights. Adjustment for physical demands, required education, training and experience, and wages reduces the composite association. The adjusted confidence intervals include zero for LLM exposure and remain below zero for AIOE. Separating repetition from restricted discretion also changes what the combined Dull score conveys. These comparisons show how item groupings and occupational characteristics shape the interpretation of exposure estimates. Occupational profiles offer a starting point for selecting contrasting research settings. Establishing desired automation or realized relief requires evidence about workers' preferences and specific interventions.

35.2% of task time in world employment is at least partly delegable to AI agents in 2026, and only 2.5% can be handed over in full. Existing measures score exposure to generative AI, mostly for the United States. We build the Agent Delegability Index (ADI): two language models rate all 18,796 O*NET 30.2 task statements on a frozen, preregistered rubric of delegation levels and barriers; tasks are mapped to 433 ISCO-08 unit groups and weighted by ILOSTAT employment in 146 countries. Four findings. First, delegable employment rises with income, from 22.5% in low-income to 48.7% in high-income countries, a slope of 7.23 percentage points per log point of GDP per capita. This delegation divide is compositional: the physical barrier dominates the jobs poorer countries employ most. Second, at the occupation level ADI tracks exposure closely (r = 0.93 with Eloundou et al. and 0.89 with Felten et al.), above the preregistered bound of 0.80; ADI adds delegation levels and barriers on top of exposure, for the world, not a new ranking of occupations. Third, full delegation is rare and peaks for tasks that take a human about twelve minutes (11.8 minutes). Fourth, the preregistered adoption gap is not supported: across 101 countries, delegability and observed AI usage correlate at r = 0.86, and the gap between them is not wider in middle-income countries (p = 0.27). Model agreement is kappa = 0.77; a blind human rating of 300 tasks agrees with the model consensus at kappa = 0.85, and an agentic panel with web search at kappa = 0.87. We release the index, the atlas, the prompts and an MCP server at https://github.com/Cespial/delegation-divide.

A growing body of literature measures the extent to which occupations are exposed to AI, yet existing measures capture where AI could perform tasks rather than whether workers have actually adopted it. We introduce a distinct tier of exposure, delegated exposure, which records whether a worker has committed a task to AI by embedding it into a structured workflow. We operationalize this concept through the Agentic Adoption Index (AAI), measuring how closely an occupation's tasks align with the agentic routines that practitioners have built and shared. Using semantic embeddings of roughly 888,000 agent skill specifications from public GitHub repositories, we compute their similarity to nearly 18,000 O*NET task statements and aggregate these scores to the occupational level. We present three main findings. First, the occupations where task delegation concentrates differ sharply from those identified as most vulnerable by pre-AI automation frameworks. Second, the AAI aligns more closely with measures of technical capability than with measures of current conversational LLM use. Third, for occupations requiring a bachelor's degree or less, the AAI increases alongside average wage levels; however, this relationship reverses for occupations requiring a master's degree or higher, where adoption declines among higher earners. These patterns replicate on an independently collected corpus of agent skills from the Manus Skills Marketplace. This lower adoption among highly educated, high-earning workers may reflect tasks that inherently resist advance specification or professional discretion over the pacing of workflow codification. Distinguishing these mechanisms will require longitudinal measurement.

A set of exposure scores calculated in 2023 has become a central empirical input to the future of work debate. Produced by Eloundou et al. (2023) and referred to here as the GPTs are GPTs scores, they define exposure as the share of occupational tasks a large language model can assist with. This work is a genuine methodological contribution, but as the scores travel from the time and place they were produced, the limitations the authors named do not always travel with them. Two gaps have widened as a result. The first is structural, between what static exposure scores measure and what policy questions actually require. Taking the diffusion of these scores as a case study, we show how their temporal, geographic, and ontological limitations compound in policy-facing analyses, and we survey five families of research responding to these limits: dynamic and benchmark-based measures, ensemble methods, task-framework extensions, worker-centered metrics, and adoption and usage data. The second gap is the one we argue needs more attention: the coordination between researchers and policymakers. The policy-relevant work which ask who is harmed, who benefits, how, and when, continues to reference the static GPTs are GPTs scores without engagement with the methodological updates that would let these questions be answered more reliably. We then ask what additional steps towards navigating uncertainty remain: ex-post frameworks and the deliberate, political work of reimagining what futures are worthy of building towards are. Closing the research-policy gap is a shared task: policymakers must widen their evidence base, engage workers as epistemic partners, and shift from prediction to preparedness; researchers must build data infrastructure, adopt participatory methods, and write with policymakers in mind. Better measurement matters, but it will not close the second gap alone.

Frontier AI's labor-market effects matter to workers, firms, and policymakers, but current evidence generally comes from a handful of high-income economies. The capabilities of frontier AI are jagged across work tasks and national economies diverge in how they allocate human labor. We introduce a national AI exposure metric that combines occupation-level exposure scores and international employment data for 141 countries. We find that high income countries are substantially more exposed than low income countries and that Europe and Central Asia are 50 percent more exposed than Sub-Saharan Africa. We also find a gender gap: women are more exposed than men in 91 percent of countries, driven by their concentration in white-collar and sales occupations. The exceptions are countries where women's employment remains concentrated in agriculture and household enterprises. We validate our national AI exposure estimates by showing they predict national AI adoption statistics published by Anthropic, Microsoft, and OpenAI. Beyond direct exposure, we identify a new mechanism for indirect exposure due to cross-country income dependencies. Some nations such as Tajikistan depend heavily on foreign workers remitting money back to their home countries: Tajikistan's direct exposure to frontier AI is below-average but because 37 percent of Tajikistan GDP is Russian remittance and Russia is very exposed, Tajikistan's remittance-accounted exposure becomes above-average. Our research shows that national variation in exposure is large enough that policy responses calibrated to U.S. or European labor markets will not generalize.

This paper presents an empirical analysis of AbbVie Intelligence's measurable impact on employee work activities across 192 distinct occupations in 2024 and 2025. Drawing on 598,744 de-identified AI conversations classified according to the O*NET Intermediate Work Activity (IWA) taxonomy, we compute occupation-level AI Applicability Scores that quantify the extent to which AI tools can meaningfully assist or automate real work at scale. Three convergent analyses are conducted: (1) longitudinal year-over-year trends from 2024 to 2025, (2) a quasi-experimental pre-post evaluation of the AbbVie Intelligence version 3 platform release in August 2025, and (3) a pre-post evaluation of the AbbVie AI Learning Summit held in November 22025. Results demonstrate statistically significant improvements across all three dimensions. Mean AI Applicability Scores rose substantially from 2024 to 2025; the platform release product a +10.0% gain (p<0.001); and the AI Learning Summit produced a +6.68% gain (p<0.001). These findings establish that both technological platform enhancements and structured enterprise AI eduction programs independently and substantially expand the reach of AI across the AbbVie workforce.

Conversation logs from AI platforms are increasingly used to measure occupational exposure to artificial intelligence, but the users observed in these logs are not the workforce. We show that platform-derived exposure scores combine task-level AI applicability with the occupational composition of the platform's user base. Holding the empirical design fixed, changing only the platform input changes the post-ChatGPT employment coefficient by a factor of 1.9, and consumer and enterprise channels within the same vendor disagree in sign. We formalize the resulting non-classical measurement error, decompose it into between- and within-occupation selection, and construct workforce-reweighted partial-identification bounds. Reweighting to Bureau of Labor Statistics employment shares attenuates estimates by 42 to 93 percent. The bias captures augmentation among observed users more directly than substitution in the workforce.

This paper establishes the theoretical and practical foundations for using Large Language Models (LLMs) as measurement instruments for latent economic variables -- specifically variables that describe the cognitive content of occupational tasks at a level of granularity not achievable with existing survey instruments. I formalize four conditions under which LLM-generated scores constitute valid instruments: semantic exogeneity, construct relevance, monotonicity, and model invariance. I then apply this framework to the Augmented Human Capital Index (AHC_o), constructed from 18,796 O*NET task statements scored by Claude Haiku 4.5, and validated against six existing AI exposure indices. The index shows strong convergent validity (r = 0.85 with Eloundou GPT-gamma, r = 0.79 with Felten AIOE) and discriminant validity. Principal component analysis confirms that AI-related occupational measures span two distinct dimensions -- augmentation and substitution. Inter-rater reliability across two LLM models (n = 3,666 paired scores) yields Pearson r = 0.76 and Krippendorff's alpha = 0.71. Prompt sensitivity analysis across four alternative framings shows that task-level rankings are robust. Obviously Related Instrumental Variables (ORIV) estimation recovers coefficients 25% larger than OLS, consistent with classical measurement error attenuation. The methodology generalizes beyond labor economics to any domain where semantic content must be quantified at scale.