Preference Elicitation

LLMs are increasingly used to make or support high-stakes decisions under uncertainty, where alignment depends not only on factual accuracy but on how models weigh tradeoffs between different outcomes. We present an empirical pipeline for estimating the implied preferences that an LLM's observed choices optimize: we elicit the model's probability distribution over unknowns along with the choice it would make for the decision task and then fit a discrete choice model to recover the cost function that best rationalizes the model's decisions. We show how this revealed-preference description allows rigorous evaluation of whether models behave in a consistently goal-directed way, whether they can verbalize a description of their objectives which matches their revealed decision policy, and whether prompting can reliably steer those policies to implement a user-specified cost function. We apply this evaluation across four medical diagnosis domains and multiple frontier and open-source models. We find that while many models have a nontrivial degree of internal coherence, they also have significant weaknesses in faithfully reporting or adopting preferences in response to user direction.

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage equilibrium analysis in strategic scenarios, one must first elicit numerical utilities consistent with player preferences, a delicate and time-consuming process. In this work, we forgo precise utilities and generalize the Nash equilibrium to a setting where we only assume a player is capable of providing an ordinal ranking of their actions within the context of other players' joint actions. The key technical challenge is to rethink the definition of a best-response. While the classical definition identifies actions maximizing expected payoff, we naturally look towards social choice theory for how to aggregate preferences to identify the most preferred actions. We define this generalized notion of a context-ordinal Nash equilibrium, establish its existence under mild conditions on aggregation methods, introduce notions of regularization, approximation, and regret, explore complexity for simple settings, and develop learning rules for computing such equilibria. In doing so, we provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its direct applicability to elicited preferences in human experiments.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to human preferences typically relies on aggregating pooled feedback into a single reward model. However, this standard approach assumes that all labelers share the same underlying preferences, ignoring the fact that real-world labelers are highly heterogeneous and usually anonymous. Consequently, relying solely on binary choice data fundamentally distorts the learned policy, making the true population-average preference unidentifiable. To overcome this critical limitation, we demonstrate that augmenting preference datasets with a simple, secondary signal -- the user's response time -- can restore the identifiability of the population's average preference. By modeling each decision as a Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM), we introduce a novel, consistent estimator of heterogeneous preferences that successfully corrects the distortions of standard choice-only labels. We prove that our estimator asymptotically converges to the true average preference even in extreme cases where each anonymous labeler contributes only a single choice. Empirically, across both synthetic and real-world datasets, our method consistently outperforms standard baselines that otherwise fail and plateau at a bias floor. Because response times are essentially free to record and require zero user tracking or identification, our results bring promises and open up new opportunities for future data-collection pipelines to improve the social benefit without requiring user-level identifiers or repeated elicitations.

Interactive multi-objective optimization systems face a budget allocation dilemma: one can spend resources on expensive objective evaluations or on eliciting decision-maker preferences that identify the relevant region of the Pareto set. Moreover, preference elicitation itself spans modalities with different information content and cognitive burden, ranging from cheap, noisy pairwise preference statements (PS) to richer but costlier indifference adjustments (IA). We study cost-aware optimization under an unknown scalarization and introduce QUIVER (Query-Informed Value Estimation for Regret), a surrogate-assisted evolutionary multi-objective optimizer that adaptively chooses between objective evaluations and heterogeneous preference queries. At each step, QUIVER selects the next action by maximizing the expected decision-quality improvement per unit total cost. Across DTLZ and WFG benchmarks under synthetic decision-maker models, QUIVER achieves the lowest final utility regret on challenging WFG problems (utility regret of 2.14 on WFG4, 2.82 on WFG9: a 25% improvement over baselines), outperforming all single-modality baselines. We analyze how the optimal mix of PS and IA adapts to problem difficulty: on easy problems (DTLZ2), QUIVER selects 80% PS queries; on hard problems (WFG9), it shifts to 35% IA queries. This adaptive modality selection demonstrates cost-aware preference learning in action.

We model the interaction between a user and an AI driven recommendation system. The user initiates the process by conveying preference information through a costly and noisy message. The AI assistant, acting as a Bayesian agent, interprets the user's message to form a posterior belief about their true preferences and make product recommendations. In particular, it determines how many recommendations to present so as to maximize the user's expected utility from their final choice, while accounting for the search cost induced by the size of the recommendation set. We use mutual information based cost functions to model the two distinct costs incurred by the user during the interaction: (i) a communication cost, which increases with the precision of their preference message, and (ii) a search cost, which increases with the size of the recommendation set provided by the AI assistant. We study products and preferences which live in d dimensional space, and ask how the user's expected payoff can be maximized. For large d, we characterize how optimal message precision and recommendation set size depend on the cost parameters, under two distinct distributions from which recommendations can be sampled from the product universe: (i) Bayes' posterior belief, and (ii) an optimized tilted distribution. Under the posterior sampling scheme (i), we identify a hybrid regime, in which an efficient interaction policy requires jointly optimizing the amount of information (in bits) conveyed by the user and the number of recommendations provided by the AI assistant. In the tilted sampling scheme (ii), our results show that the optimal interaction policy uses only one of communication and search, favoring whichever of them is less costly.

Preference-based alignment methods, most prominently Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), use the judgments of human annotators to shape large language model behaviour. However, the normative role of these judgments is rarely made explicit. I distinguish three conceptual models of that role. The first is extension: annotators extend the system designers' own judgments about what outputs should be. The second is evidence: annotators provide independent evidence about some facts, whether moral, social or otherwise. The third is authority: annotators have some independent authority (as representatives of the broader population) to determine system outputs. I argue that these models have implications for how RLHF pipelines should solicit, validate and aggregate annotations. I survey landmark papers in the literature on RLHF and related methods to illustrate how they implicitly draw on these models, describe failure modes that come from unintentionally or intentionally conflating them, and offer normative criteria for choosing among them. My central recommendation is that RLHF pipeline designers should decompose annotation into separable dimensions and tailor each pipeline to the model most appropriate for that dimension, rather than seeking a single unified pipeline.

Crowdsourced pairwise evaluation has emerged as a scalable approach for assessing foundation models. However, applying it to Text to Speech(TTS) introduces high variance due to linguistic diversity and multidimensional nature of speech perception. We present a controlled multidimensional pairwise evaluation framework for multilingual TTS that combines linguistic control with perceptually grounded annotation. Using 5K+ native and code-mixed sentences across 10 Indic languages, we evaluate 7 state-of-the-art TTS systems and collect over 120K pairwise comparisons from over 1900 native raters. In addition to overall preference, raters provide judgments across 6 perceptual dimensions: intelligibility, expressiveness, voice quality, liveliness, noise, and hallucinations. Using Bradley-Terry modeling, we construct a multilingual leaderboard, interpret human preference using SHAP analysis and analyze leaderboard reliability alongside model strengths and trade-offs across perceptual dimensions.

Since software performance requirements are documented in natural language, quantifying them into mathematical forms is essential for software engineering. Yet, the vagueness in performance requirements and uncertainty of human cognition have caused highly uncertain ambiguity in the interpretations, rendering their automated quantification an unaddressed and challenging problem. In this paper, we formalize the problem and propose IRAP, an approach that quantifies performance requirements into mathematical functions via interactive retrieval-augmented preference elicitation. IRAP differs from the others in that it explicitly derives from problem-specific knowledge to retrieve and reason the preferences, which also guides the progressive interaction with stakeholders, while reducing the cognitive overhead. Experiment results against 10 state-of-the-art methods on four real-world datasets demonstrate the superiority of IRAP on all cases with up to 40x improvements under as few as five rounds of interactions.

Decision-making is a cognitively intensive task that requires synthesizing relevant information from multiple unstructured sources, weighing competing factors, and incorporating subjective user preferences. Existing methods, including large language models and traditional decision-support systems, fall short: they often overwhelm users with information or fail to capture nuanced preferences accurately. We present Decisive, an interactive decision-making framework that combines document-grounded reasoning with Bayesian preference inference. Our approach grounds decisions in an objective option-scoring matrix extracted from source documents, while actively learning a user's latent preference vector through targeted elicitation. Users answer pairwise tradeoff questions adaptively selected to maximize information gain over the final decision. This process converges efficiently, minimizing user effort while ensuring recommendations remain transparent and personalized. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms both general-purpose LLMs and existing decision-making frameworks achieving up to 20% improvement in decision accuracy over strong baselines across domains.

Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of options, this becomes a feasibility question: does there exist a lottery over options that clears all stakeholders' acceptability bars? We study a query model where the algorithm proposes lotteries and receives only binary accept/reject feedback. We give deterministic and randomized algorithms that either find a unanimously acceptable lottery or certify infeasibility; adaptivity can avoid eliciting many stakeholders' constraints, and randomization further reduces the expected elicitation cost relative to full elicitation. We complement these upper bounds with worst-case lower bounds (in particular, linear dependence on the number of stakeholders and logarithmic dependence on precision are unavoidable). Finally, we develop learning-augmented algorithms that exploit natural forms of advice (e.g., likely binding stakeholders or a promising lottery), improving query complexity when predictions are accurate while preserving worst-case guarantees.