Prospect Theory

Human-agent evaluations often compress interaction into a single performance score, even when human and automated policies adapt differently over time. We study this in a sequential cyber-defense game on an attack graph, where a human or reinforcement-learning defender protects cloud assets against a Deep Q-Network (DQN) attacker. We compare four defender settings: a human reward-only game operationalizing the DQN information structure, a human reward-plus-transition game operationalizing the Cognitive Hierarchy Theory-driven DQN (CHT-DQN) information structure, an automated DQN defender, and an automated CHT-DQN defender. In the reward-only game, participants receive payoff and reward feedback. In the reward-plus-transition game, they also see attacker-aware transition probabilities from the CHT-DQN model. Across 80 Mechanical Turk participants and matched automated simulations, human defenders adapted to outcomes in a way the automated defenders did not: they were more likely to reselect a node after a successful defense than after a failure, in both games, an asymmetry we interpret as consistent with Prospect Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory. The 40-round average also mixes early rounds, where the DQN attacker acts mostly at random, with late rounds, where it mostly exploits; in the final stage, mean protection ranks the reward-plus-transition human game above the reward-only human game, then the automated CHT-DQN defender, then the automated DQN defender, an ordering the overall mean hides. By contrast, the reward-plus-transition game does not produce a statistically reliable overall gain in weighted data protection over the reward-only game. These results suggest that evaluating human-agent cyber-defense systems only by an averaged task score can miss behaviorally meaningful differences in adaptation, action allocation, and bounded human reasoning.

Current LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) periodically compress intermediate states to reduce inference-time token consumption, thereby attempting to incorporate more agents. However, naive scaling strategies face challenges. For example, in economic simulations, large-scale MAS typically discard semantically rich economic states, i.e., agent behavioral trajectories, which are key drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations. In this paper, we reveal a phenomenon in which agent heterogeneity gradually decreases during simulation, and propose Prospect-State Propagation for Multi-Agent Systems (PspMAS). Inspired by prospect theory, PspMAS decouples each agent's micro state into a compact Prospect State and an expressive Semantic State. The former records psychological traces through a lightweight, parallelizable propagator and continuously injects heterogeneity into the system. The latter leverages the strong perception, reasoning, planning, and decision-making abilities of LLMs. These two components work complementarily, providing a scalable LLM-based multi-agent simulation solution.

Decision-making under risk is typically studied through single-shot lottery choices. Yet many real decisions involve combinatorial risk, where risk arises from multiple risky components, so the lottery over outcomes is induced rather than given outright and can be costly to evaluate exactly. We introduce an investment-allocation task to study decision under combinatorial risk, where investing in a component raises its success probability and thereby reshapes the outcome distribution. Participants favor the option with the larger probability increment, and, when increments are equal, the option with the higher initial success probability. Revealing the induced probability mass function (PMF) substantially changes behavior, making participants less responsive to combinatorial-risk features and reducing choice variance. To explain these patterns, we move beyond standard benchmarks and hand-crafted hypotheses with symbolic regression to discover compact descriptive models. The discovered models rely mainly on combinatorial-risk features, such as the after-investment success probability, rather than exact evaluation of the full induced distribution. Behavior under the displayed PMF is then well explained by augmenting this model with a prospect-theoretic residual model. The results show that people navigate combinatorial risk primarily through its core features, shifting toward lottery valuation only when the induced PMF is displayed.

We study risk-neutral control in Markov decision processes with an absorbing catastrophic state. Even though rewards are linear and the agent has no utility curvature, probability weighting, or framing dependence, standard Bellman optimality produces three prospect-theory-like signatures: an S-shaped value-function profile (convex near catastrophe, concave in the far field), an endogenous loss-sensitivity coefficient $λ^*(S) > 1$, and a reflection-effect policy reversal. Across 495 configurations, the optimal policy plays safe near catastrophe in positive-drift (growth) regimes despite the risky action's higher immediate expected value, and plays risky near catastrophe in negative-drift (decline) regimes despite the safe action's lower immediate expected loss. We derive a closed-form expression for the asymptotic loss-aversion plateau $\barλ$ that depends only on win probability $p$, payoff asymmetry $r = |Δ_\ell/Δ_w|$, and discount factor $β$, and matches numerical solutions to $R^2 = 0.999$. The mechanism does not require asymmetric payoffs. Across a sweep of $(p,β)$ at three asymmetry levels, the asymmetry share of $\barλ$ above unity has median 4.6% at $r = 1.25$ and rises to 13.9% at $r = 2$, with the boundary contribution exceeding the asymmetry contribution in every cell tested. The phenomena persist under tabular Q-learning (a model-free agent reproduces $V^*$ at correlation 0.98 in growth and 1.00 in decline) and under stochastic transitions with Gaussian, heavy-tailed Student-$t_3$, and asymmetric skew-normal noise up to 50% of the step size, where the asymptotic plateau tracks the closed-form prediction within 0.41% for safe-channel noise and within 9.6% for risky-channel or both-channel noise. These results identify absorbing failure states as a sufficient structural mechanism for prospect-theory-like behavior under optimal control.

Strategic classification(SC) studies the interaction between decision models and agents who strategically manipulate their features for favorable outcomes. Existing SC frameworks typically rely on the idealized assumption that agents are strictly rational. However, evidence from behavioral economics and psychology consistently shows that real-world decision-making is often shaped by cognitive biases, deviating from pure rationality. To formalize this limitation, we identify and define a new problem setting, termed the behaviorally realistic strategic classification problem, where agents' strategic manipulations deviate from full rationality due to psychological biases. Motivated by the identified limitation, we propose the Prospect-Guided Strategic Framework (Pro-SF) to address the problem, a principled framework grounded in prospect theory to model and learn under behaviorally realistic strategic responses. Specifically, to capture behaviorally realistic strategic manipulations, our framework reformulates the Stackelberg-style interaction between agents and the decision-maker by incorporating three key mechanisms inspired by prospect theory, including the asymmetry between benefits and costs, different subjective reference points, and non-rational probability distortion. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets establish Pro-SF as a behaviorally grounded approach to strategic classification, bridging machine learning and behavioral economics for more reliable deployment in the real world.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in uncertain, sequential decision-making contexts. Yet it remains poorly understood whether the behaviors they exhibit in such environments reflect principled cognitive patterns or simply surface-level prompt mimicry. This paper presents a controlled experiment in which GPT-4.1 was assigned one of three socioeconomic personas (Rich, Middle-income, and Poor) and placed in a structured slot-machine environment with three distinct machine configurations: Fair (50%), Biased Low (35%), and Streak (dynamic probability increasing after consecutive losses). Across 50 independent iterations per condition and 6,950 recorded decisions, we find that the model reproduces key behavioral signatures predicted by Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory without being instructed to do so. The Poor persona played a mean of 37.4 rounds per session (SD=15.5) compared to 1.1 rounds for the Rich persona (SD=0.31), a difference that is highly significant (Kruskal-Wallis H=393.5, p<2.2e-16). Risk scores by persona show large effect sizes (Cohen's d=4.15 for Poor vs Rich). Emotional labels appear to function as post-hoc annotations rather than decision drivers (chi-square=3205.4, Cramer's V=0.39), and belief-updating across rounds is negligible (Spearman rho=0.032 for Poor persona, p=0.016). These findings carry implications for LLM agent design, interpretability research, and the broader question of whether classical cognitive economic biases are implicitly encoded in large-scale pretrained language models.

This paper investigates the dynamics of noncooperative interactions between artificial intelligence agents and human decision-makers in strategic environments. In particular, motivated by extensive literature in behavioral Economics, human agents are more faithfully modeled with respect to the state of the art using Prospect Theoretic preferences, while AI agents are modeled with standard expected utility maximization. Prospect Theory incorporates known cognitive heuristics employed by humans, including reference dependence and greater loss aversion relative to utility to relative gains. This paper runs different combinations of expected utility and prospect theoretic agents in a number of classic matrix games as well as examples specialized to tease out distinctions in strategic behavior with respect to preference functions, to explore the emergent behaviors from mixed population (human vs. AI) competition. Extensive numerical simulations are performed across AI, aware humans (those with full knowledge of the game structure and payoffs), and learning Prospect Agents (i.e., for AIs representing humans). A number of interesting observations and patterns show up, spanning barely distinguishable behavior, behavior corroborating Prospect preference anomalies in the theoretical literature, and unexpected surprises. Code can be found at https://github.com/dylanwaldner/noncooperative-human-AI.

Real-world decision-making often involves uncertainty expressed in linguistic rather than numerical terms, and Prospect Theory (PT) provides a classic framework for modeling human behavior under such uncertainty. Although recent studies have developed frameworks to estimate PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have examined whether PT itself adequately describes LLM decision-making behavior. To address these gaps, we develop a streamlined workflow grounded in a classic behavioral economics experimental paradigm. First, we estimate PT parameters and evaluate how well the resulting model captures LLM decision-making behavior. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context and inject them into prompts to examine the stability of PT parameters under linguistic uncertainty. Our findings suggest that PT does not consistently provide a reliable account of LLM decision-making across models, and that its application to LLMs is likely sensitive to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

Kahneman & Tversky's $\textit{prospect theory}$ tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner (1992); for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them belonging to a family of loss functions that we call $\textit{human-aware losses}$ (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach KTO, and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B, despite only learning from a binary signal of whether an output is desirable. More broadly, our work suggests that there is no one HALO that is universally superior; the best loss depends on the inductive biases most appropriate for a given setting, an oft-overlooked consideration.