Scientific Reasoning in Language Models

Scientific discovery is an inherently creative and uncertain process, requiring reasoning beyond the recall of known knowledge. While many benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate large language model (LLM) performance on deep research tasks via multi-hop retrieval, their innovative reasoning abilities essential for true scientific discovery remain largely untested. We introduce a benchmark framework for evaluating model performance in scientific discovery and reasoning, building up from a raw problem to the classical null hypothesis test. In our framework, models initially receive only the topic and research question from a recent paper, with technical details progressively revealed. At each stage of information disclosure, the model is tasked with generating hypotheses that address the research question, which is compared with the conclusions from the original paper and evaluated via automated semantic similarity of constituent atomic claims. This progressive evaluation of semantic divergence from ground-truth conclusions enables assessment of a model's innovativeness (under minimal information) to grounded reasoning capabilities (under full experimental details), both critical for using LLMs for scientific discovery purposes. Our framework provides a foundation for systematically evaluating scientific reasoning and discovery capabilities in LLMs, crucial for advancing the development of next-generation AI scientist/co-scientist systems. Specifically, here we evaluate GPT-5, GPT-5.4, Gemini 2.5 pro, and Gemini 3.1 pro preview across 45 papers spanning bioactive materials, mechanical materials, and nanomaterials. We find that GPT-5.4 and Gemini 3.1 pro outperform their previous generation counterparts as expected, and GPT-5.4 in particular maintains 0.7 F1 score alignment with ground truth conclusions even under minimal context.

Scientific reasoning rarely stops at what is directly observable; it often requires uncovering hidden structure from data. From estimating reaction constants in chemistry to inferring demand elasticities in economics, this latent structure recovery is what distinguishes scientific reasoning from curve fitting. Large language models (LLMs) can often recall and apply relevant scientific formulas, but we show that this ability is surprisingly easy to suppress. We show that adding in-context examples makes models rely less on pretrained domain knowledge, even when those examples are generated by the very same formula. Rather than reinforcing knowledge-driven derivation, examples shift computation toward empirical pattern fitting. We document this knowledge displacement on 60 latent structure recovery tasks across five scientific domains, 6,000 trials, and four models. This displacement is consistent across domains, but its accuracy consequences depend on how the displaced strategy compares to the one that replaces it: the same shift can lower accuracy, leave it unchanged, or appear to improve it. In all cases, however, the model shifts away from knowledge-driven reasoning. For practitioners deploying LLMs on scientific tasks, the message is cautionary: in-context examples may displace, rather than reinforce, the knowledge they are intended to support.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

Scientific feasibility assessment asks whether a claim is consistent with established knowledge and whether experimental evidence could support or refute it. We frame feasibility assessment as a diagnostic reasoning task in which, given a hypothesis, a model predicts feasible or infeasible and justifies its decision. We evaluate large language models (LLMs) under controlled knowledge conditions (hypothesis-only, with experiments, with outcomes, or both) and probe robustness by progressively removing portions of the experimental and/or outcome context. Across multiple LLMs and two datasets, providing outcome evidence is generally more reliable than providing experiment descriptions. Outcomes tend to improve accuracy beyond what internal knowledge alone provides, whereas experimental text can be brittle and may degrade performance when the context is incomplete. These findings clarify when experimental evidence benefits LLM-based feasibility assessment and when it introduces fragility.