Learning in a Small/Big World

As artificial agents become increasingly capable, what internal structure is necessary for an agent to act competently under uncertainty? Classical results show that optimal control can be implemented using belief states or world models, but not that such representations are required. We prove quantitative "selection theorems" showing that strong task performance (low average-case regret) forces world models, belief-like memory and -- under task mixtures -- persistent regime-tracking variables resembling functional primitives of emotion, along with informational modularity under block-structured tasks. Our results cover stochastic policies, partial observability, and evaluation under task distributions, without assuming optimality, determinism, or access to an explicit model. Technically, we reduce predictive modeling to binary "betting" decisions and show that regret bounds limit probability mass on suboptimal bets, enforcing the predictive distinctions needed to separate high-margin outcomes. In fully observed settings, this yields approximate recovery of the interventional transition kernel; under partial observability, it implies necessity of predictive state and belief-like memory, addressing an open question in prior world-model recovery work.

"Dreaming" enables agents to learn from imagined experiences, enabling more robust and sample-efficient learning of world models. In this work, we consider innovations to the state-of-the-art Dreamer model using probabilistic methods that enable: (1) the parallel exploration of many latent states; and (2) maintaining distinct hypotheses for mutually exclusive futures while retaining the desirable gradient properties of continuous latents. Evaluating on the MPE SimpleTag domain, our method outperforms standard Dreamer with a 4.5% score improvement and 28% lower variance in episode returns. We also discuss limitations and directions for future work, including how optimal hyperparameters (e.g. particle count K) scale with environmental complexity, and methods to capture epistemic uncertainty in world models.

Machine learning is usually evaluated after an evidence interface has been fixed. A dataset, sensor suite, query language, action set, or experimental protocol determines which observations can be obtained, and learning is judged by what it extracts from them. We study a complementary capability. A learner's state can determine which evidence-generating experiments it can reliably realise under bounded resources, even when primitive affordances remain fixed. We call this learner-relative experiment family its effective epistemic reach, and use Wide Learning for task-relevant learning-induced changes in that family.We formalise effective reach relative to learner state, deployment budget, reliability threshold, and evaluation distribution. In a controlled construction, two hidden worlds have exactly the same public observation law. An informative diagnostic exists in a fixed five-primitive substrate. Before calibration, one address attempt realises it with probability at most $2^{-10} = 1/1024$, below a pre-specified 0.95 threshold; after calibration, held-out realisation is 1. Public-channel total variation is 0, whereas the realised diagnostic has total variation 1, and sealed binary risk moves from approximately 1/2 to 0. The construction establishes that learning can change effective epistemic reach even when primitive affordances and deployment resources are held fixed. It opens a complementary evaluation question for learning systems: not only what they infer from available evidence, but what informative evidence experience teaches them to bring within reach.