cs.MASep 12, 2025

Towards using Large Language Models for Risk Negotiation and Consensus-building in One Health contexts

Authors: Alexandra Fetsch, Iurii Savvateev, Racem Ben Romdhane, Martin Wiedmann, Artemiy Dimov, Maciej Durkalec, Josef Teichmann, Jakob Zinsstag, 

Organizations: Chair of Food Microbiology, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany · Study Centre Supply Chain Modelling and Artificial Intelligence, German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, Berlin, Germany · Department of Food Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, USA · Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, Allschwil, Switzerland · 

Abstract

Risk negotiation under the One Health framework requires balancing competing stakeholder interests across human, animal, and environmental health domains - a process constrained by information complexity and time pressure. This study presents and evaluates a multi-step pipeline that integrates large language model-based agents into a human-supervised negotiation process, specifically targeting risk assessment, valuation, and negotiation steps. Agent descriptions were generated from stakeholder-provided materials using retrieval-augmented generation methods. During preliminary multi-agent discussions, agents accessed domain-specific computational models and web-based sources before human participants refined proposed issues and options. A simulated negotiation game then produced distributions of candidate deals, characterised using Nash bargaining solution criteria and Pareto optimality metrics. The developed approach was evaluated in a workshop involving independent domain experts across two real-world scenarios: food safety criteria for Campylobacter in broiler meat and oak processionary moth management. In this feasibility evaluation, participants reached consensus with the allotted time after discussing and modifying the proposed deals. The framework offers an adaptable blueprint for AI-assisted risk negotiation; the specific contribution of LLM assistance, including gains in efficiency and decision quality, requires comparative evaluation.

Explore similar work

Oct 22, 2026

Knowing Whom to Trust is not Enough: The Trust--Agreement Gap in Repeated Multi-Party LLM Negotiation

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly participate in negotiations on behalf of individuals and organizations, yet they remain vulnerable to manipulation, particularly in repeated multi-party interactions. Classical multi-agent systems address this challenge through explicit trust and reputation models, whereas existing work on LLM negotiation largely treats trust as an emergent phenomenon. We investigate whether LLM agents can form useful trust estimates from prior interactions and leverage them to improve future negotiation outcomes. We introduce a repeated, multi-party, multi-issue negotiation framework in which recurring agents participate in a sequence of negotiation games while one participant covertly attempts to prevent agreement. After each game, agents assess their counterparts and maintain pairwise trust estimates that carry over to subsequent negotiations. We compare trust-aware and trust-agnostic agents and analyze how explicit trust influences negotiation outcomes. Our results reveal a trust--agreement gap: trust-aware agents can identify the adversary within a few games, but accurate trust estimates do not consistently translate into better agreements. Trust increases agreement rates by up to 23 percentage points, but only when agents are explicitly guided to use it in their decisions. Explicit trust can therefore improve repeated LLM negotiations, but its value depends critically on how trust is assessed and incorporated into agents' reasoning.
May 12, 2026

LLM-X: A Scalable Negotiation-Oriented Exchange for Communication Among Personal LLM Agents

We propose a personal-LLM exchange (LLM-X), a scalable negotiation-oriented environment that enables direct, structured communication across populations of personal agents (LLMs), each representing an individual user. Unlike existing tool-centric protocols that focus on agent-API interaction, LLM-X introduces a message bus and routing substrate for LLM-to-LLM coordination with guarantees around schema validity and policy enforcement. We contribute: (1) an architecture for LLM-X comprising federated gateways, topic-based routing, and policy enforcement; (2) a typed message protocol supporting capability negotiation and contract-net-style coordination; and (3) the first empirical evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent negotiation at scale. Experiments span 5, 9, and 12 agents, under distinct negotiation policies (Low, Medium, High), and across both short-run (minutes) and long-run (2h, 12h) load conditions. Results highlight clear policy-performance trade-offs: stricter policies improve robustness and fairness but increase latencies and message volume. Extended runs confirm that LLM-X remains stable under sustained load, with bounded latency drift.
May 13, 2026

TERMS-Bench: Diagnosing LLM Negotiation Agents Beyond Deal Rate

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.