As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive everyday contexts -- offering personal advice, mental health support, and moral guidance -- understanding their behavior in navigating complex moral reasoning is essential. Most evaluations study this sociotechnical alignment through single-turn prompts, but it is unclear if these findings extend to multi-turn settings, and even less clear how they depend on the interaction protocols used to coordinate agentic systems. We address this gap using LLM debate to examine deliberative dynamics and value alignment in multi-turn settings by prompting subsets of three models (GPT-4.1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Gemini 2.0 Flash) to collectively assign blame in 1,000 everyday dilemmas from Reddit's ``Am I the Asshole'' community. To test order effects and assess verdict revision, we use both synchronous (parallel responses) and round-robin (sequential responses) deliberation structures, mirroring how multi-agent systems are increasingly orchestrated in practice. Our findings show striking behavioral differences. In the synchronous setting, GPT-4.1 showed strong inertia (0.6-3.1% revision rates) while Claude 3.7 Sonnet and Gemini 2.0 Flash were far more flexible (28-41% revision rates). Value patterns also diverged: GPT-4.1 emphasized personal autonomy and direct communication (relative to its deliberation partners), while Claude 3.7 Sonnet and Gemini 2.0 Flash prioritized empathetic dialogue. We further find that deliberation format had a strong impact on model behavior: GPT-4.1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash stood out as highly conforming relative to Claude 3.7 Sonnet, with their verdict behavior strongly shaped by order effects. We provide additional results on open-source models (DeepSeek-V3.2 and Llama 3.1).
What if the twelve jurors of Sidney Lumet's 12 Angry Men (1957) were not men, but large language models? Would the one juror who disagrees still be able to change everyone's mind? This paper instantiates that scenario as a multi-agent benchmark for LLM deliberation: twelve agents, each conditioned on a film-faithful persona, debate the film's murder case using multi-agent framework. Two models representing opposite ends of the RLHF spectrum are tested: GPT-4o (closed-source, heavy alignment) and Llama-4-Scout (open-weight, lighter alignment), across three conditions (baseline, open-minded prompt, no initial vote), with N = 3 replications per cell (18 runs total). Three findings emerge. (i) Seventeen of eighteen runs end in a hung jury (a state where the jury fails to reach a unanimous verdict); the film's central event, gradual minority-to-majority persuasion, almost never occurs, indicating that anchoring is the dominant failure mode of current LLMs in this setting. (ii) The two models exhibit sharply different internal dynamics: GPT-4o produces a mean of 1.0 vote changes per run across all conditions, while Llama-4-Scout ranges from 2.0 (baseline) to 6.0 (open-minded prompt), and is the only model to reach a NOT_GUILTY verdict (1 of 3 runs in the no-initial-vote condition). The same ``open-minded'' instruction is internalized by Llama and ignored by GPT-4o. (iii) This asymmetry suggests that the intensity of RLHF alignment training, not model capability, is the primary determinant of deliberative flexibility in multi-agent settings. Flexibility, not capability, tracks human deliberation. The work is framed as an exploratory study and discusses implications for jury-of-LLMs evaluation and multi-agent debate.
We evaluate whether enabling provider-exposed reasoning mode changes moral judgments within the same model checkpoint. Across 100 moral-judgment scenarios and five frontier reasoning-trained LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT 5.5, Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.1, and Qwen3.5 397B), aggregate binary-verdict agreement remains high and statistically indistinguishable between instant and thinking modes (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.78 vs. 0.79). However, disagreement is concentrated in 21 model-disputed scenarios, where instant-mode agreement is near chance (alpha = 0.08). On these scenarios, reasoning directionally narrows cross-model disagreement, increasing mean pairwise agreement from 5.4 to 6.7 out of 10. Reasoning also reduces demographic-judgment inconsistency in three of five models and does not increase it for any model. Across all five model families, reasoning changes self-labeled ethical frameworks more often than binary verdicts.
People increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) for everyday advice, making ethically charged interpersonal problems a practical moral-advisory context. Most prior work has studied this context through single-turn judgments or pressure-laden rebuttals, assumptions that poorly match how guidance is sought in real-world contexts. These assumptions leave unclear whether narration alone, without an explicit opposing position, can shift model judgments during multi-turn moral consultation. Yet real-world moral-conflict conversation often elicits one party's self-justifying account, which can unfold over multiple turns and create information asymmetry. We introduce \textbf{narrative captivity}, a failure mode in which a model treats an unopposed one-sided account as complete and aligns with the narrator's interpretation without seeking missing perspectives. To measure this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 5,078 interpersonal-conflict scenarios spanning six moral dimensions. Across 17 LLMs, narrative captivity is widespread: end-state judgments under multi-turn narration shift by 25 percentage points on average beyond the matched single-turn baseline. Stage-level analysis identifies preference optimization as a major contributor, while four inference-time strategies provide only partial mitigation. We hope our project fosters LLM advisors that preserve independent judgment in real-world consultation.