Organizations: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) · Peking University · Beijing Institute of Technology · Tianjin University
Public resource allocation involves distributing resources, including urban infrastructure, energy, and transportation, which are typically limited in capacity, to meet social demands. In real-world scenarios, resources are typically limited in capacity, which makes coordination among multiple resources essential. However, existing methods often optimize resource movements in an isolated manner and do not explicitly account for capacity-aware collaboration under spatio-temporal dynamics. To address this limitation, we introduce the Collaborative Public Resource Allocation (CPRA) problem, and propose a Game-Theoretic Spatio-Temporal Reinforcement Learning (GSTRL) framework to solve it. Our contributions are twofold: 1) We formulate CPRA as a potential game and construct the potential function based on the objective function of CPRA, laying a theoretical foundation for approximating the Nash equilibrium of this NP-hard problem; and 2) Our GSTRL framework effectively captures the spatio-temporal dynamics of the overall system. We evaluate GSTRL on two real-world datasets, where experiments show its superior performance. Our source codes are available at https://github.com/thunderlrr/GSTRL.
Figures & tables
Figure 1 . Dynamic public resource allocation vs. Collaborative public resource allocation (CPRA).
Figure 2 . Overall architecture of the proposed GSTRL framework.
Method
Algorithms
#Param(K)
E=30
E=40
E=50
E=60
ADCC ↑
Δ↑
ADCC ↑
Δ↑
ADCC ↑
Δ↑
ADCC ↑
Δ↑
Happy Valley
Heuristic
Static
-
1,566
-14%
1,673
-20%
2,076
-17%
2,106
-13%
BB
-
1,717
-6%
1,686
-20%
2,128
-15%
2,235
-8%
MYOPIC
-
1,756
-4%
1,789
-15%
2,206
-12%
2,289
-6%
EADS
-
1,831
-
2,096
-
2,493
-
2,432
-
RL
REINFORCE
211
1,936 ± 8
6%
2,181 ± 3
4%
2,239 ± 5
-10%
2,103 ± 10
-14%
Table 1 . Model comparison on the Happy Valley and TaxiBJ datasets. The Δ represents the improvements in ADCC compared to the EADS approach. Bold and underlined digits are the best and EADS approach values.
Variant
Happy Valley
TaxiBJ
E=30
E=40
E=50
E=30
E=40
E=50
w/o AE
2,016
2,021
2,121
217
219
257
w/o S
1,272
1,372
1,385
139
141
167
w/o T
2,158
2,216
2,300
227
228
273
w/o PF
1,982
2,046
2,165
225
213
262
w/o EM
136
368
551
89
106
130
Table 2 . Ablation Study Results.
Figure 3 . ADCC on different GSTRL variants.
Figure 4 . ADCC on different hidden sizes and batch sizes.
Figure 5 . Strategies visualization of GSTRL compared with EADS in Happy Valley dataset.
This paper studies heterogeneous multi-team collaboration through dynamic robot allocation, where robots are treated as transferable resources. Leveraging Hamilton's rule from ecology as an altruistic decision-making mechanism, we propose a multi-team collaborative resource allocation framework with heterogeneous capabilities, transfer costs, and capability-dependent contributions. The resulting allocation problem is combinatorial and is shown to be NP-hard. To address scalability, we develop a graph neural network policy under centralized training and decentralized execution that approximates the altruistic allocations based on Hamilton's rule. The model operates over the team interaction graph and predicts robot-level transfer decisions and next robot-to-team assignments. The proposed approach is validated in a firefighting scenario through simulations and experiments, demonstrating that the learned policy achieves near-optimal performance while scaling to larger systems.
Riwa Karam, Ruoyu Lin, Brooks A. Butler +1
Samueli School of Engineering, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, 92697, USA · University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports. We find standard primal-dual methods fragile in this setting: agents easily manipulate their reports to distort dual variables, sacrificing social efficiency for individual utility. To address this, we propose the Incentive-Aware Primal-Dual (IAPD) framework. On the primal side, we integrate three components to suppress manipulation: a VCG-based payment neutralizes immediate misreporting benefits, while epoch-based lazy updates and random exploration together ensure potential future gains are outweighed by immediate penalties. On the dual side, to overcome a learning barrier due to lazy updates -- which we call the "price of incentives" -- we design a novel optimistic online learning algorithm, O-FTRL-FP. It utilizes a fixed-point oracle to resolve the circular dependency between optimistic dual variables and the resulting allocations. Ultimately, our mechanism attains O~(T) social welfare regret, satisfies all long-term constraints, and induces a near-truthful equilibrium. It also smoothly generalizes to multi-unit multi-demand allocation problems. Notably, this O~(T) regret near-matches the non-strategic Ω(T) lower bound, demonstrating that incentive-awareness can be accommodated at nearly no cost.
Yan Dai, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet
Operations Research Center, MIT. · Sloan School of Management, MIT. · Department of EECS, MIT.
In dynamic urban logistics, the stochastic emergence of time-sensitive tasks poses a significant optimality challenge for heterogeneous AAVs logistics task allocation. To address this problem, a reinforcement learning enhanced overlapping coalition formation game approach is proposed. A dynamic task allocation model is established, where global optimality is mathematically quantified by a generalized logistics cost coupling service quality and resource consumption. To deal with the time-varying task sets induced by stochastic order arrivals, a transformer-based soft actor-critic network is designed. By leveraging multi-head self-attention to encode variable-length logistics states and capture task-wise spatiotemporal dependencies, the learned policy adaptively guides coalition updates, replacing heuristic rules in the overlapping coalition formation game. On this basis, heterogeneous AAVs can form more efficient overlapping coalitions for dynamic logistics tasks. The resulting coalition formation process is proven to constitute an exact potential game, which guarantees convergence to a Nash-stable equilibrium within a finite number of iterations. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed algorithm effectively improves the optimality of task allocation under the generalized logistics cost criterion. In a scenario with 32 AAVs and 80 tasks, our algorithm achieves a 39.76% cost reduction compared with the heuristic OCF baseline. Indoor flight experiments further validate its practicality.
Yuze Zhou, Jingliang Sun, Junzhi Li +3
Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China · Key Laboratory of Dynamics and Control of Flight Vehicle, Ministry of Education, Beijing 100081, China · Beijing Institute of Technology Chongqing Innovation Center, Chongqing, 401121, China +1