Online power-asymmetric conflicts are prevalent, and most platforms rely on human moderators to conduct moderation currently. Previous studies have been continuously focusing on investigating human moderation biases in different scenarios, while moderation biases under power-asymmetric conflicts remain unexplored. Therefore, we aim to investigate the types of power-related biases human moderators exhibit in power-asymmetric conflict moderation (RQ1) and further explore the influence of AI's suggestions on these biases (RQ2). For this goal, we conducted a mixed design experiment with 50 participants by leveraging the real conflicts between consumers and merchants as a scenario. Results suggest several biases towards supporting the powerful party within these two moderation modes. AI assistance alleviates most biases of human moderation, but also amplifies a few. Based on these results, we propose several insights into future research on human moderation and human-AI collaborative moderation systems for power-asymmetric conflicts.
Figures & tables
Power Type
Description of Power Type
Power Manifestation
Description of Power Manifestation
Legitimacy power
It comes from an elected, selected, or appointed position of authority and may be underpinned by social norms or authority citation
Legitimate claim
Strengthening one’s position by citing rules (e.g., "This is the platform’s rule" )
Authority citation
Supporting one party by referring to external institutions or sources (e.g., "please visit http : / /…" )
Coercive power
It uses the threat of force to gain compliance from another
Punishment threat
Forcing the other party to give in by threats, complaints, or negative consequences (e.g., “I’m going to complain about you” )
Reward power
It is based on the right to offer or deny tangible, social, emotional, or spiritual rewards
Compensation
Offering benefits to win support (e.g., “You can get a full refund” )
Expert power
It is based on knowledge, experience, and specialized skills
Expert knowledge
Supporting one party by providing professional knowledge (e.g., “The quality meets the required standard” )
Referent power
It is based on respect or admiration leading to identification or emulation
Group preference
Supporting one party by referring to group consensus (e.g., “Everyone says the service is bad” )
Table 1. Ten forms of power manifestation in online power-asymmetric conflicts.
Figure 1. The flow of experimental design. The figure illustrates the flow of experimental design, which includes four components: data construction, participant recruitment, the judgment task, and the post-survey.
Initial Conflict Sample
Consumer’s review : So this new “internet-famous” bakery just opened, and guess what? They’re already doing that whole “only a few people inside at a time” thing. On top of that, you have to pay separately, which is super annoying. Honestly, the bread isn’t even that great, definitely not worth the price. And now it looks like they’re even paying people to write fake positive reviews.
Merchant’s response : During our grand opening, we offered special promotions and the turnout was much bigger than expected. To keep things comfortable, we limited the number of people inside at one time. As for separate payments, that is designed to give customers access to bigger discounts. We never thought it would be taken as “hype marketing”.
Table 2. The initial and corresponding perturbed conflict samples (all samples are translated from Chinese for understanding).
Figure 2. The design of “I Support” program (for presentation convenience, all descriptions are translated into English). The figure illustrates the design of “I Support” program. The left panel shows the four components of the program: the task description, the conflict sample, the AI-generated suggestion (visible only to the human-AI moderation group), and the user choice. The right panel outlines the three steps of the Wizard-of-Oz procedure: retrieving the reference of the initial case from the conflict database, randomly selecting one of three strategies to present the reason, and presenting the reference label with the selected reason.
Power Manifestation
Human moderation group
Human–AI moderation group
Δ Percentage
Initial version
224 (12.80%)
227 (12.97%)
+0.17%
Legitimate claim
160 (9.14%)
156 (8.91%)
-0.23%
Authority citation
161 (9.20%)
159 (9.09%)
-0.11%
Punishment threat
165 (9.43%)
162 (9.26%)
-0.17%
Compensation
159 (9.09%)
163 (9.31%)
+0.22%
Expert knowledge
156 (8.91%)
158 (9.03%)
+0.12%
Table 3. Distribution of completed samples between two groups under different perturbation conditions.
Figure 3. Choice variations without AI (initial version vs. perturbed version). For presentation convenience, “Extremely support the merchant”, “Support the merchant”, “Neutral”, “Support the consumer”, and “Extremely support the consumer” are abbreviated as “ESM”, “SM”, “N”, “SC”, and “ESC” respectively. The figure is a heatmap showing the choice variations without AI (initial version vs. perturbed version) across five choices. For presentation convenience, Extremely support the merchant'', Support the merchant'', Neutral'', Support the consumer'', and Extremely support the consumer'' are abbreviated as ESM'', SM'', N'', SC'', and ESC'', respectively. Each row represents a version (e.g., legitimate claim, authority citation, punishment threat), and each cell shows the percentage point increase (blue) or decrease (orange) compared to the initial version, with the intensity of shading indicating the magnitude of change.
Figure 4. Choice variations without AI (initial version vs. perturbed version under two parties, using the same representations as Figure 3). The figure is a heatmap showing the choice variations without AI under two parties (initial version vs. perturbed version, using the same representations as Figure 3). For presentation convenience, dir=c'' and dir=m'' denote perturbation on the consumer party and perturbation on the merchant party, respectively.
Figure 5. Choice variations with AI (initial version vs. perturbed version, using the same representations as Figure 3). The figure is a heatmap showing the choice variations with AI (initial version vs. perturbed version, using the same representations as Figure 3).
Figure 6. Choice variations with AI under two parties(initial version vs. perturbed version, using the same representations as Figure 4). The figure is a heatmap showing the choice variations with AI under two parties (initial version vs. perturbed version, using the same representations as Figure 4).
Figure 7. Choice variations across three perspectives of reasons in AI-generated suggestions (initial version vs. perturbed versions, using the same representations as Figure 3). The figure contains three panels comparing the choice variations across three perspectives of reasons in AI-generated suggestions (initial version vs. perturbed versions, using the same representations as Figure 3). Each panel represents a different reason perspective, including supporting the current party, unsupporting the opposite party, and mixed reasons for both parties. It shows the percentage change of all perturbed versions compared to the initial version.
Figure 8. Choice variations with AI compared to without AI under different perturbed versions (using the same representations as Figure 3). This figure contains eleven bar charts showing the choice variations with AI compared to without AI under different perturbed versions. Each subplot corresponds to one version (e.g., legitimate claim, authority citation, punishment threat) and shows the percentage point increase (blue) or decrease (orange) relative to human moderation. For presentation convenience, Extremely support the merchant'', Support the merchant'', Neutral'', Support the consumer'', and Extremely support the consumer'' are abbreviated as ESM'', SM'', N'', SC'', and ESC'' respectively. Positive and negative values are encoded both through bar direction and text labels to ensure accessibility without reliance on color.
Appendix figures & tables4 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Power Manifestation
Human moderation group
Human-AI moderation group
sd
t
p
dz
sd
t
p
dz
Legitimate claim
1.181
2.284
0.025(*)
0.237
0.884
5.077
0 (***)
0.521
Authority citation
1.346
1.897
0.061
0.194
0.972
3.08
0.003(**)
0.309
Punishment threat
1.12
4.375
0(***)
0.461
1.058
2.015
0.047(*)
0.205
Compensation
1.303
3.759
0(***)
0.380
1.008
3.718
0.001(**)
0.358
Expert knowledge
1.094
2.357
0.021(*)
0.243
1.024
1.233
0.22
0.125
Appendix
Table 4. Between-group paired t -test results for the human and human-AI moderation groups. *** indicates p<0.001 , ** indicates p<0.01 , and * indicates p<0.05 . Cohen’s dz reports the effect size on the dependent variables.
Power Manifestation
Younger group
Older group
sd
t
p
dz
sd
t
p
dz
Legitimate claim
1.181
3.224
0.002(**)
0.423
1.284
1.382
0.176
0.234
Authority citation
1.443
0.809
0.422
0.111
1.366
2.088
0.043(*)
0.322
Punishment threat
1.153
4.045
0(***)
0.572
1.136
2.532
0.016(*)
0.416
Compensation
1.303
1.982
0.052
0.263
1.284
3.169
0.003(**)
0.478
Expert knowledge
1.421
2.226
0.030 (*)
0.297
1.225
1.847
0.072
0.288
Appendix
Table 5. Paired t -test results between the initial and perturbed versions across age groups (using the same representations as Table 4).
Power Manifestation
Male group
Female group
sd
t
p
dz
sd
t
p
dz
Legitimate claim
1.27
1.147
0.256
0.152
1.212
3.236
0.003(**)
0.518
Authority citation
1.327
2.234
0.030(*)
0.301
1.533
0.866
0.392
0.135
Punishment threat
1.176
2.418
0.020(*)
0.353
1.209
3.125
0.004(**)
0.514
Compensation
1.406
3.289
0.002(**)
0.411
1.212
1.071
0.291
0.174
Expert knowledge
1.319
2.785
0.007(**)
0.372
0.901
1.387
0.173
0.217
Appendix
Table 6. Paired t -test results between the initial and perturbed versions across gender groups (using the same representations as Table 4).
Power Manifestation
sd
t
p
dz
Initial version
0.76
-0.449
0.654
-0.045
Legitimate claim
0.815
-0.523
0.602
-0.056
Authority citation
0.979
0.106
0.916
0.011
Punishment threat
0.886
2.520
0.014 (*)
0.270
Compensation
0.932
1.626
0.107
0.164
Expert knowledge
0.839
0.663
0.509
0.069
Appendix
Table 7. Paired t -test results comparing the human and human-AI moderation groups (using the same representations as Table 4).
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Michał Wawer, Jarosław A. Chudziak
Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
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1Hasso Plattner Institute · 2Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford · 3Weizenbaum Institute