As artificial agents become increasingly capable, what internal structure is necessary for an agent to act competently under uncertainty? Classical results show that optimal control can be implemented using belief states or world models, but not that such representations are required. We prove quantitative "selection theorems" showing that strong task performance (low average-case regret) forces world models, belief-like memory and -- under task mixtures -- persistent regime-tracking variables resembling functional primitives of emotion, along with informational modularity under block-structured tasks. Our results cover stochastic policies, partial observability, and evaluation under task distributions, without assuming optimality, determinism, or access to an explicit model. Technically, we reduce predictive modeling to binary "betting" decisions and show that regret bounds limit probability mass on suboptimal bets, enforcing the predictive distinctions needed to separate high-margin outcomes. In fully observed settings, this yields approximate recovery of the interventional transition kernel; under partial observability, it implies necessity of predictive state and belief-like memory, addressing an open question in prior world-model recovery work.
Many signal processing systems ultimately exist to {act}. Whenever the state variable that determines the action to be taken by a decision maker, or agent, is uncertain, the way that uncertainty is represented decides how well the agent performs and how much its performance can be trusted. This lecture note develops, from first principles and within a single decision-theoretic setting, the link between the {objective} and the knowledge of an agent and the form of uncertainty representation that is sufficient to act optimally. To start, assuming a known environment distribution, we show that a risk-neutral agent needs the posterior distribution over the state, whereas a risk-averse agent can rely without loss of optimality on a {prediction set} and a worst-case decision rule. We then turn to the case in which the environment is unknown, and identify three complementary approaches to address the resulting epistemic uncertainty: calibration of a fixed predictor, credal (ambiguity) sets with distributionally robust optimization, and Bayesian inference over model parameters. The common thread is that reliable decisions require an uncertainty representation matched to the decision objective and to the knowledge profile of the agent, together with a guarantee that certifies the utility the agent will actually obtain.
Learned world models are becoming essential to general-purpose agents: by predicting action consequences, they support planning and decision-making while reducing reliance on costly trial and error. This reliance creates a fundamental ambiguity: when a world-model-guided decision fails, the trajectory alone may not reveal whether the agent's decision rule or the world model caused the loss. We formalize this failure-attribution problem as a counterfactual decomposition of return loss and prove that its components are not identifiable from passive interaction, even for finite-horizon planners. This obstruction motivates Dual-Frontier, a learning principle that admits a world-model-guided decision only when its predicted advantage exceeds a certified bound on decision-relevant world-model error; otherwise, evidence is allocated to world-model verification. Action-conditioned value bounds and a closed-loop extension guarantee non-decreasing return for admitted decisions. Calibrated gates and simultaneous confidence sequences support adaptive evidence reuse, with sufficient and necessary verification bounds. Controlled learned-model experiments validate the predicted failure modes and certification behavior, while cross-backbone tool-use benchmarks instantiate the same verify-then-promote rule in realistic agent world-model pipelines, consistently improving decision quality and reliability.
Large language models (LLMs) are being used as policies for autonomous decision-making and planning in many domains. Despite their strong reasoning capabilities, LLMs struggle with long-horizon tasks, especially under partial observability. World models are a promising way to enhance policy performance, both during training and inference. During inference, agents currently use world models to simulate the consequences of candidate actions before committing to an action, which can improve decision-making. However, we argue that simulation alone is an incomplete interface for decision-making under partial observability: simulation doesn't adequately capture uncertainty about the current state, which agents may need for accurate decision-making. We address this limitation with Belief-Based World Models (BB-WMs), which model and maintain a belief that LLMs can query to access information on what is known and uncertain about the current state. Before developing methods to learn accurate BB-WMs, we first ask a more fundamental question: does exposing a world model's belief directly to an LLM policy improve decision-making? Our results show that giving LLM agents access to world model beliefs improves task performance under partial observability, while remaining complementary to existing simulation-based world models. Code is released at https://github.com/skumar-ml/belief-world-models.