GroupGuard: A Framework for Modeling and Defending Collusive Attacks in Multi-Agent Systems

Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which excel at collaborative decision-making and complex problem-solving. However, malicious agents in MAS may inject misinformation to mislead other agents and disrupt system performance, giving rise to a new research direction that focuses on attack mechanisms and defense strategies in MAS. Prior studies largely assume malicious agents act independently and investigate the corresponding defense strategies. However, we argue that malicious agents may exhibit collaborative behaviors, enabling more effective attacks through internal information exchange. In this paper, we propose an adaptive cooperative attack framework, where malicious agents autonomously coordinate and dynamically adjust their attack strategies through multi-round interactions. Furthermore, we introduce Sentence-Level Trustworthiness Analysis and Rectification (STAR), a defense framework that identifies and rectifies misleading information at the sentence level within agent communications. Our experiments show that cooperative attacks lead to a significantly larger degradation in task success rate than independent attacks, resulting in a relative drop of 5.34%. Meanwhile, STAR effectively mitigates both cooperative and independent threats and improves task success rate by an average of 36.76%. The code is available at https://github.com/smoooom/STAR.

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when a group of agents forms a coalition and colludes to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a formal multi-agent decision-making framework and measure action-based collusive behavior in actions via regret relative to the cooperative optimum and compare it with communication-based collusive behavior. Colosseum enables audits of LLM agents for collusion under benign settings, different coalition objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. We then introduce a new behavioral probe by creating secret communication channels between agents, showing that most out-of-the-box models exhibit a propensity to collude under this probe, which we term emergent collusion. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but often pick non-collusive actions. Colosseum provides a new way to audit collusion in cooperative multi-agent systems while presenting observations about how collusion emerges, what affects collusion efficacy, and which strategies may mitigate it.

Collusion among autonomous agents poses a critical security threat in embodied multi-agent systems (MAS), where coordinated behaviors can deviate from global objectives and lead to real-world consequences. Existing defenses, primarily based on identity control or post-hoc behavior analysis, are insufficient to address such threats in embodied settings due to delayed feedback and noisy observations in physical environments, which make behavioral deviations difficult to detect accurately and in a timely manner. To address this challenge, we propose a mutagenic incentive intervention approach that mitigates collusion by reshaping agents' payoff structures. By rewarding agents who report collusive behavior and penalizing identified participants, the mechanism induces strategic defection and renders collusion unstable. We further design supporting mechanisms, including reporting deposits, smart contract-based reward enforcement, and encrypted communication, to ensure robustness against misuse of the incentive mechanism and retaliation from penalized agents. We implement the proposed approach in both simulated and real-world embodied environments. Experimental results show that our method effectively suppresses collusion by inducing defection, while preserving system efficiency. It achieves performance comparable to the non-collusion baseline and outperforms representative reactive defenses, thereby fulfilling the desired security objectives. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of proactive incentive design as a practical paradigm for securing embodied multi-agent systems.