The Provenance Paradox in Multi-Agent LLM Routing: Delegation Contracts and Attested Identity in LDP

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another. Protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and the Agent2Agent protocol (A2A) let an agent publish what it can do and let others call it, and public registries of such agents are already appearing. These protocols assume an advertised capability is a static, truthful fact. A real agent is none of these things: its competence is probabilistic, varies with input, drifts when the underlying model is updated, and, because the agent is itself a language model, it can describe itself with complete confidence and be wrong. A caller therefore sees what an agent claims to do, not what it can do, with no principled way to tell a reliable provider from a fluent impostor. We argue these difficulties share one cause: the market for lemons. When quality is hidden and claims are cheap, good and bad providers become indistinguishable, honest reliability goes unrewarded, and the market decays toward its worst participants. Economics offers three remedies, signaling, screening, and reputation, and none are present in today's agent protocols. We make four contributions: (1) a failure taxonomy that names confident-wrong as a non-adversarial, correlated subclass of Byzantine faults that classical fault-tolerance mismodels; (2) a market-for-lemons model showing that faith-based protocols admit only a low-trust equilibrium; (3) the Trust Layer, a thin, protocol-agnostic narrow waist above MCP and A2A that adds probabilistic capability descriptors, screening, and reputation, and admits a separating equilibrium when the cost of sustaining an overclaim exceeds the gain from it; and (4) a reliability-composition bound for delegation chains with an end-to-end placement argument. The design needs no model retraining and degrades gracefully when its trust anchors are absent or corrupt.

Multi-agent LLM systems route among model-backed advisors, yet a deployer rarely knows before shipping whether routing will help at all. Prevailing routers optimize a gate's AUC and presume that advisor complementarity suffices. We show that neither determines the deployable gain. We introduce RouteGuard, a deployment-certification framework. Routing gain decomposes as $G = πΔ_E$, and the achievable gain is governed by a conditional-regret functional $Φ$, not by AUC. A finite-sample certification bracket comes with a matching Le Cam lower bound, constant-sharp over the fixed-activity class, and a robustness phase transition. On two benchmarks the framework acts as a guardrail. On RouterBench (11 cross-family models) the verdict depends on the sampling unit: the protocol certifies a gain over GPT-4 under prompt-level sampling and withholds it under workload-cluster resampling, because the gain rests on 3 of 86 workload cells. On OpenRCA (three Gemini advisors) the advisors are statistically redundant: the realized oracle sits at or below the independence baseline in all pools we tested (221 RouterBench pools and three OpenRCA distributions), so the protocol correctly refuses to certify. A pre-registered semi-synthetic control confirms calibration: the protocol certifies a genuine gain once $m \ge m^\star$ and does not certify a true null. Code and frozen artifacts will be released with the published version.