Agentivism: a learning theory for the age of artificial intelligence
Organizations: School of Education, Tsinghua University. · Faculty of Education and School of Computing & Data Science, The University of Hong Kong. · Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University.
Abstract
Learning theories have historically changed when the conditions of learning evolved. Generative and agentic AI create a new condition by allowing learners to delegate explanation, writing, problem solving, and other cognitive work to systems that can generate, recommend, and sometimes act on the learner's behalf. This creates a fundamental challenge for learning theory: successful performance can no longer be assumed to indicate learning. Learners may complete tasks effectively with AI support while developing less understanding, weaker judgment, and limited transferable capability. We argue that this problem is not fully captured by existing learning theories. Behaviourism, cognitivism, constructivism, and connectivism remain important, but they do not directly explain when AI-assisted performance becomes durable human capability. We propose Agentivism, a learning theory for human-AI interaction. Agentivism defines learning as durable growth in human capability through selective delegation to AI, epistemic monitoring and verification of AI contributions, reconstructive internalization of AI-assisted outputs, and transfer under reduced support. The importance of Agentivism lies in explaining how learning remains possible when intelligent delegation is easy and human-AI interaction is becoming a persistent and expanding part of human learning.
Figures & tables
| Theory | Can explain | Falls short |
|---|---|---|
| Behaviourism | Why AI use can become reinforcing through immediate feedback, fluency, speed, effort reduction, and repetition Watson (1913) ; Skinner (1938) ; Ngu et al. (2025) ; Pan et al. (2025) . | Whether repeated AI-supported success reflects durable learning or merely reinforced dependence; why slowing users down through justification can reduce over-reliance Bučinca et al. (2021) . |
| Cognitivism | How AI changes cognitive load, memory demands, schema construction, retrieval, and offloading during learning Miller (1956) ; Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) ; Stadler et al. (2024) ; Bastani et al. (2025) ; Liu et al. (2025) . | When offloading supports learning versus substitutes for it; how AI-assisted performance becomes retained, transferable human competence. |
| Constructivism | Why dialogue, interpretation, participation, and meaning making remain central when learners interact with AI conversationally Dewey (1938) ; Piaget (1952) ; Vygotsky (1978) ; Kim et al. (2026) ; Jin et al. (2025) ; Xing et al. (2026) . | Whether AI-generated guidance is epistemically trustworthy; interaction alone does not guarantee justified learning Salvi et al. (2025) . |
| Connectivism | Why learning depends on distributed networks of people, tools, and information resources Siemens (2005) . | What changes when network nodes become generative, persuasive, and partially agentic, shaping representation, priorities, and action in real time Wang et al. (2023) ; Tan et al. (2026) . |