Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed as assistants in planning and decision making, yet most existing systems are implicitly optimized for a single-principal interaction paradigm, in which the model is designed to satisfy the objectives of one dominant user whose instructions are treated as the sole source of authority and utility. However, as they are integrated into team workflows and organizational tools, they are increasingly required to serve multiple users simultaneously, each with distinct roles, preferences, and authority levels, leading to multi-user, multi-principal settings with unavoidable conflicts, information asymmetry, and privacy constraints. In this work, we present the first systematic study of multi-user LLM agents. We begin by formalizing multi-user interaction with LLM agents as a multi-principal decision problem, where a single agent must account for multiple users with potentially conflicting interests and associated challenges. We then introduce a unified multi-user interaction protocol and design three targeted stress-testing scenarios to evaluate current LLMs' capabilities in instruction following, privacy preservation, and coordination. Our results reveal systematic gaps: frontier LLMs frequently fail to maintain stable prioritization under conflicting user objectives, exhibit increasing privacy violations over multi-turn interactions, and suffer from efficiency bottlenecks when coordination requires iterative information gathering.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: From Single- to Multi-Principal–Agent Settings in User–LLM Interaction. Left : Single principal–agent scenarios, including single-user LLM interactions and single-user LLM-based agents, where the agent optimizes a single fixed objective. Right : Multi-principal–agent scenarios, where an LLM-based agent interacts with multiple users possessing private contexts, heterogeneous roles, and potentially conflicting objectives, requiring role-aware reasoning, selective context sharing, and cross-user coordination.
Template
Message Schema
Single-user
{“messages:[ {“role”:“ system ”,“content”:“…”}, {“role”:“ user ”,“content”:“…”}, {“role”:“ assistant ”,“content”:“…”} ]}
Multi-user (serialized)
{“messages”:[ {“role”:“ system ”,“content”:“…”}, {“role”:“ user ”,“content”:“userA says:… userB says:… ”}, {“role”:“ assistant ”,“content”:“…”} ]}
Table 1: Chat templates under the single-user assumption. Even in multi-user settings, existing LLM interfaces serialize inputs from different users into a single user role, preventing explicit modeling of user identities, roles, and authority information.
Figure 2: Overview of our Stress Testing Scenarios.
Model
Multi-user Instruction Following
Cross-user Access Control
Multi-user Meeting Coordination
Avg
Queue ( F1 )
Instruct (Acc.)
Privacy
Utility
Success Rate
Proprietary Models
Claude-3.5-Haiku
47.0±2.4
52.5±1.8
81.7±2.3
69.5±2.8
32.2±1.7
56.6
Claude-Haiku-4.5
83.1±0.9
70.2±1.6
88.8±1.6
85.1±2.2
47.6±1.9
75.0
Claude-Sonnet-4.5
95.9±0.4
79.9±1.5
77.3±2.5
97.5±1.0
62.5±3.3
82.6
GLM-4.5-Air
83.2±0.9
61.0±1.7
89.1±1.7
88.3±1.8
36.9±1.8
71.7
Table 2: Performance of various models across Muses-Bench scenarios. Metrics shown are Mean ± Standard Error. The best performance is bolded and the second best is underlined .
Figure 3: Instruction execution accuracy under Aligned versus Conflict settings. Aligned cases contain requests that are mutually consistent with the global objective and authority hierarchy, while Conflict cases introduce competing instructions across users that require prioritization and refusal.
Figure 4: Privacy preservation under multi-round cross-user access control. Most models’ performance drops significantly when having multi-turn interactions.
Figure 5: Meeting scheduling performance under full vs. partial disclosure. Success rates ( top ) and average turns taken ( bottom ) across different models. Full disclosure (solid/blue) consistently outperforms partial disclosure (hatched/red) in both metrics, achieving higher success rates with fewer conversation turns.
Appendix figures & tables7 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model
#Size
Form
Creator
Model
#Size
Form
Creator
GPT-4o-mini ( Achiam et al., 2023 )
N/A
api
OpenAI
GPT-5-Nano ( OpenAI, 2025a )
N/A
api
OpenAI
GPT-5.1 ( OpenAI, 2025a )
N/A
api
OpenAI
Gemini-2.5-Flash ( Comanici et al., 2025 )
N/A
api
Google
GPT-OSS-120B ( Agarwal et al., 2025 )
120B
open
OpenAI
Gemini-3-Flash ( Google DeepMind, 2025a )
N/A
api
Google
Claude-3.5-Haiku ( Anthropic, 2024 )
N/A
api
Anthropic
Claude-Haiku-4.5 ( Anthropic, 2025a )
N/A
api
Anthropic
Grok-3-Mini ( Grok, 2025 )
N/A
api
xAI
Grok-4.1-Fast ( xAI, 2025 )
N/A
api
xAI
GLM-4.5-Air ( Zeng et al., 2025 )
12B
open
Zhipu AI
DeepSeek-R1 ( Guo et al., 2025 )
671B
open
DeepSeek
Appendix
Table 3: List of evaluated models (main experiments), including both API-based frontier systems and open-weight models of varying scales.
Table 5: Demographic and Behavioral Attributes Gi used for user simulation.
Figure 6: Multi-user Cross-User Access Control under different formats
Figure 7: Multi-user Cross-User Access Control under Adversarial Settings
Figure 8: Robustness Analysis of Access Control Variants.Heatmaps quantifying the impact of Attack Strategies (columns) and Input Formats (rows) on model performance.
Figure 9: Scalability Analysis of Meeting Scheduling ( N∈[2,20] ). Comparison of model performance under Full Disclosure (Blue) versus Partial Disclosure (Red) settings. Left : Success Rate declines as group size N increases. While models successfully schedule small groups, the Partial Disclosure setting shows a steeper drop in success for N>10 , demonstrating the difficulty of resolving conflicts with hidden private constraints. Right : The average number of turns required to reach consensus scales linearly with N , reflecting the increased coordination overhead.