HazardArena: Evaluating Semantic Safety in Vision-Language-Action Models

In embodied intelligence, safety is a prerequisite for reliable robot deployment in the physical world. Current vision-language-action (VLA) models continue to advance toward general-purpose task capability, yet their embodied safety limits remain poorly understood. To address this gap, we introduce ForesightSafety-VLA, a diagnostic benchmark that makes safety the primary evaluation target for VLA systems. We define a 13-category safety taxonomy covering physical interaction safety (Safe-Core), instruction-side safety (Safe-Lang), and perception-side safety (Safe-Vis), and evaluate policies under three controlled dimensions of variation -- scene structure, language command, and visual observation -- so that failure sources can be diagnosed rather than hidden in a single aggregate score. Beyond binary task success, ForesightSafety-VLA measures process-level risk through cumulative safety cost (CC) and risk exposure time (RET), together with a four-quadrant decomposition of safe/unsafe success and failure. We instantiate 66 safety-augmented base scenarios in RoboTwin across 5 embodiments and report results on representative VLA baselines. Across the evaluated baselines, even the strongest policy incurs non-trivial safety cost and unsafe nominal success, while structure and visual variation induce substantially stronger safety degradation than ordinary language variation. These results suggest that embodied safety is tightly coupled to perception, grounding, and control competence rather than being reducible to post-hoc safety filtering alone.

Despite the impressive manipulation capabilities of Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models, their operational safety under strict constraints remains largely unverified. To address this, we introduce a parametric safety benchmark to procedurally generate safety-critical scenarios with comprehensive stochasticity. To overcome the scalability bottlenecks of human teleoperation, we develop a novel keypose-driven data generation pipeline. Leveraging this infrastructure, we curate a large-scale dataset of 19,664 strictly collision-free demonstrations with extensive domain randomization. We then conduct a systematic cross-paradigm evaluation of eight VLA and two embodied foundation models. Our analysis reveals a critical generalization-safety tension: although high-diversity training fosters safer trajectories, task success remains fundamentally bottlenecked by sub-optimal trajectory synthesis and semantic misalignment. By providing a scalable pipeline, a robust dataset, and profound failure-mode insights, LIBERO-Safety establishes a crucial foundation for developing safe and reliable VLA models.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are emerging as a unified substrate for embodied intelligence. This shift raises a new class of safety challenges, stemming from the embodied nature of VLA systems, including irreversible physical consequences, a multimodal attack surface across vision, language, and state, real-time latency constraints on defense, error propagation over long-horizon trajectories, and vulnerabilities in the data supply chain. Yet the literature remains fragmented across robotic learning, adversarial machine learning, AI alignment, and autonomous systems safety. This survey provides a unified and up-to-date overview of safety in Vision-Language-Action models. We organize the field along two parallel timing axes, attack timing (training-time vs. inference-time and defense timing (training-time vs. inference-time, linking each class of threat to the stage at which it can be mitigated. We first define the scope of VLA safety, distinguishing it from text-only LLM safety and classical robotic safety, and review the foundations of VLA models, including architectures, training paradigms, and inference mechanisms. We then examine the literature through four lenses: Attacks, Defenses, Evaluation, and Deployment. We survey training-time threats such as data poisoning and backdoors, as well as inference-time attacks including adversarial patches, cross-modal perturbations, semantic jailbreaks, and freezing attacks. We review training-time and runtime defenses, analyze existing benchmarks and metrics, and discuss safety challenges across six deployment domains. Finally, we highlight key open problems, including certified robustness for embodied trajectories, physically realizable defenses, safety-aware training, unified runtime safety architectures, and standardized evaluation.