Explainability for Large Language Model (LLM) agents is especially challenging in interactive, partially observable settings, where decisions depend on evolving beliefs and other agents. We present \textbf{TriEx}, a tri-view explainability framework that instruments sequential decision making with aligned artifacts: (i) structured first-person self-reasoning bound to an action, (ii) explicit second-person belief states about opponents updated over time, and (iii) third-person oracle audits grounded in environment-derived reference signals. This design turns explanations from free-form narratives into evidence-anchored objects that can be compared and checked across time and perspectives. Using imperfect-information strategic games as a controlled testbed, we show that TriEx enables scalable analysis of explanation faithfulness, belief dynamics, and evaluator reliability, revealing systematic mismatches between what agents say, what they believe, and what they do. Our results highlight explainability as an interaction-dependent property and motivate multi-view, evidence-grounded evaluation for LLM agents. Code is available at https://github.com/Einsam1819/TriEx.
Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate natural language explanations that rationalize their own decisions, a phenomenon commonly referred to as self-explanations. Such explanations have emerged as a promising direction for explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), particularly for interpreting LLM behavior. However, while self-explanations often appear plausible, whether they faithfully reflect a model's underlying reasoning process remains an open question. In this opinion paper, we argue that self-explanations can be highly plausible, questionably faithful, and yet highly actionable. From a traditional XAI perspective, we identify the limitations of standard evaluation protocols for LLM-generated self-explanations and propose practical guidelines for assessing their plausibility and faithfulness.Moreover, we argue that evaluation should extend beyond these criteria to actionability, highlighting applications of LLM rationalization capabilities that support informed decision-making and appropriate action across diverse stakeholders.
Multi-agent LLM systems have shown promise for complex reasoning, yet recent evaluations reveal they often underperform single-model baselines. We identify a structural failure mode in sequential fine-tuning of shared-context teams: updating one agent shifts the team's context distribution, and when subsequent updates are evaluated on cached rollouts, this mismatch compounds. We formalize this as the compounding occupancy shift and prove that stale-occupancy evaluation incurs a penalty that scales quadratically with the number of agents. In contrast, intermediate-occupancy evaluation reduces this to linear scaling. We propose TeamTR, a trust-region framework that resamples trajectories after each component update and enforces per-agent divergence control, yielding rigorous per-update and per-stage improvement lower bounds. Experiments show that TeamTR outperforms single-agent and sequential baselines with 7.1% on average, mitigates coordination regressions, and supports plug-and-play component replacement. Code is available at https://github.com/Yydc/TeamTR.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly tasked with strategic decision-making under incomplete information, such as in negotiation and policymaking. While LLMs can excel at many such tasks, they also fail in ways that are poorly understood. We shed light on these failures by uncovering two fundamental gaps in the internal mechanisms underlying the decision-making of LLMs in incomplete-information games, supported by experiments with open-weight models Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt-oss. First, an observation-belief gap: LLMs encode internal beliefs about latent game states that are substantially more accurate than their own verbal reports, yet these beliefs are brittle. In particular, the belief accuracy degrades with multi-hop reasoning, exhibits primacy and recency biases, and drifts away from Bayesian coherence over extended interactions. Second, a belief-action gap: The implicit conversion of internal beliefs into actions is weaker than that of the beliefs externalized in the prompt, yet neither belief-conditioning consistently achieves higher game payoffs. These results show how analyzing LLMs' internal processes can expose systematic vulnerabilities that warrant caution before deploying LLMs in strategic domains without robust guardrails.