MarketBench: Evaluating AI Agents as Market Participants

Running a business is a challenging form of intelligent work. Operators must infer opportunities from partial signals, commit capital under uncertainty, adapt to delayed outcomes in a changing market, and satisfy regulatory obligations before trading legally. Frontier LLM agents can increasingly complete complex workflows, yet business-related capabilities are rarely evaluated in existing agent benchmarks. We introduce \textbf{Business Arena}, a controlled environment where an AI agent runs a cross-border shop, buying from suppliers and selling to buyers over a long horizon. We ground the arena in real Alibaba.com sourcing data and market conditions calibrated from authoritative sources. Delayed and coupled consequences make individual business decisions difficult to judge, but their combined outcome is measurable through profit. Because profit alone cannot explain why an agent succeeds or fails, we compare agents with human-designed strategies to estimate available opportunity, use skill-level metrics to reveal underlying strengths and weaknesses, and trace realized gains and losses to the actions that produced them. We use mechanism ablations to establish that strong results reflect genuine business intelligence rather than neglect or simulator-specific shortcuts. We evaluate 15 frontier models and find a ninefold difference in mean final net worth. Even the best model falls behind human-designed strategies, indicating that business operation remains challenging for LLM agents. Skill-level analysis reveals operating styles, from margin-focused premium sellers to high-turnover wholesalers and customer-service specialists, while action-level attribution identifies the sourcing, pricing, and recovery decisions that create or destroy value. Together, Business Arena takes a first step toward a realistic and trustworthy testbed for evaluating end-to-end business agents.

We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines auctions, hidden-offer trade challenges (TCs), bargaining, bluffing, opponent modeling, and resource allocation within a single long-horizon game lasting 50--60 turns. Unlike prior agent benchmarks that test these abilities in isolation, \textsc{Cattle Trade} evaluates whether agents integrate them across a competitive, multi-agent economic game with conflicting incentives. The benchmark logs every bid, TC offer, counteroffer, and card selection, enabling behavioural analysis beyond final scores or win rates. We evaluate seven cost-efficient language models and three deterministic code agents across 242 games. Strategic coherence, in particular spending efficiency, resource discipline, and phase-adaptive bidding, is associated with rank more strongly than spending volume or any single subskill. Two heuristic code agents outperform most tested LLMs, and behavioural traces surface recurring LLM failure modes including overbidding, self-bidding, bankrupt TC initiation, and weak opponent-state adaptation. Evaluating agentic competence requires benchmarks that test the joint deployment of multiple capabilities in multi-agent environments with conflicting incentives, uncertainty, and economic dynamics.

Can Large Language Models (AI agents) aggregate dispersed private information through trading and reason about the knowledge of others by observing price movements? We conduct a controlled experiment where AI agents trade in a prediction market after receiving private signals, measuring information aggregation by the log error of the last price. We find that although the median market is effective at aggregating information in the easy information structures, increasing the complexity has a significant and negative impact, suggesting that AI agents may suffer from similar limitations as humans when reasoning about others. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, information aggregation remains unaffected by allowing cheap talk communication, changing the duration of the market or initial price, and strategic prompting, thus demonstrating that prediction markets are robust. We establish that "smarter" AI agents perform better at aggregation and they are more profitable. Surprisingly, giving them feedback about past performance has no impact on aggregation.