The marginal likelihood, also known as the evidence, is regarded as a mathematical embodiment of Occam's razor, enabling model selection that avoids overfitting. The evidence lower bound (ELBO) objective from variational inference has also been used for similar purposes. Prior work has shown that restricting the approximate posterior family via a mean-field approximation can lead the ELBO to underfit. In this paper, we show how ELBO-based hyperparameter learning in a simple over-parameterized regression model can also produce overfitting, depending on the assumed rank of the covariance matrix in a Gaussian approximate posterior. Surprisingly, among only the underfit and overfit options, Bayesian model selection via the evidence itself sometimes prefers the overfit version, while the ELBO does not. Bayesian practitioners hoping to scale to large models should be cautious about how reduced-rank assumptions needed for tractability may impact the potential for model selection.
Vanilla variational inference finds an optimal approximation to the Bayesian posterior distribution, but even the exact Bayesian posterior is often not meaningful under model misspecification. We propose predictive variational inference (PVI): a general inference framework that seeks and samples from an optimal posterior density such that the resulting posterior predictive distribution is as close to the true data generating process as possible, while this closeness is measured by multiple scoring rules. By optimizing the objective, the predictive variational inference is generally not the same as, or even attempting to approximate, the Bayesian posterior, even asymptotically. Rather, we interpret it as implicit hierarchical expansion. Further, the learned posterior uncertainty detects heterogeneity of parameters among the population, enabling automatic model diagnosis. This framework applies to both likelihood-exact and likelihood-free models. We demonstrate its application in real data examples.
A central challenge in statistical modeling is identifying the subset of features that belong in the true regression model. The classical best subset selection problem, recently made tractable via mixed-integer optimization (MIO), finds the globally optimal sparse solution. It does not, however, make use of any information beyond the observed data. In many applied settings, domain experts can meaningfully rank or score the relevance of candidate predictors, yet no existing framework integrates such probabilistic expert assessments directly into the best-subsets objective. This paper presents Expert-Implied Bayesian Best Subsets (EBBS), a method that incorporates domain-expert probability estimates of feature relevance into the MIO best-subsets problem through a maximum a posteriori (MAP) framework. Expert views from multiple respondents are aggregated into a single prior probability per feature using the Poisson binomial distribution for marginal probability estimates, the pairwise win rate for pairwise comparisons, or the normalized mean rank for ordinal rankings. This probability enters the objective function as a log-odds penalty term that smoothly encourages or discourages the selection of each feature consistent with the expert consensus. This paper provides analytic derivations of the MAP formulation and characterizes its theoretical properties. The proposed model reduces to Best Subsets when experts all have no views. Empirical results on synthetic and real datasets are forthcoming.
The principle of Occam's razor, which instructs us to prefer simplicity in inductive inference, has attracted much scrutiny both in the philosophy of science and in machine learning. In either field, however, a justification for the principle has been elusive. In this paper, building on an earlier "core argument," I spell out a justification from statistical learning theory for the procedure of regularization: for trading off fit for simplicity. The means-ends argument is that in order to profit from theoretical reliability and "what-you-see-is-what-you-get" guarantees, one must implement a certain preference for simplicity over fit. This is a genuine methodological justification, which neither collapses to a purely pragmatic principle that we prefer simplicity for its own sake, nor to an ontological assumption that the truth is simple.