Autonomous Systems Dependability in the era of AI: Design Challenges in Safety, Security, Reliability and Certification

Embodied AI systems are increasingly deployed in open-world environments, yet ensuring their reliability remains a fundamental challenge. Drawing on discussions from the AAAI'26 Bridge Program on "Making Embodied AI Reliable with Testing and Formal Verification", this article argues that reliability in embodied AI is inherently a lifecycle assurance problem arising from uncertainty, human interaction, and emergent behaviors across tightly coupled system components. We identify three complementary directions toward reliable embodied AI: (1) trustworthy scenario-based testing supported by validated specifications and meaningful coverage metrics, (2) compositional verification enabled by structured symbolic representations of system behavior and environmental context, and (3) runtime assurance mechanisms capable of adapting to uncertainty and distribution shifts during deployment. Rather than treating these approaches independently, we advocate integrated assurance workflows that connect testing, verification, and runtime adaptation through shared neuro-symbolic representations and continuous feedback across the system lifecycle. Such integration provides a foundation for building trustworthy embodied AI systems that can operate safely and reliably in complex real-world environments.

The advancement of automated vehicles introduces complex safety challenges, particularly in dynamic and unpredictable environments where AI-enabled perception systems must operate reliably. Ensuring compliance with safety standards such as ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF) is essential for addressing system malfunctions and mitigating unsafe behavior in unknown scenarios. However, as automation levels increase, vehicles must go beyond conventional functional safety by incorporating fail-operational capabilities that enable continued safe operation during system or component failures and the handling of unfamiliar or degraded operational conditions. To address these safety concerns, we propose the Connected Dependability Cage, an architectural framework designed to enable hierarchical fail-operational behavior in AI-enabled perception systems. This framework integrates two complementary monitoring mechanisms: a Function Monitor that oversees multiple heterogeneous AI-based perception pipelines and detects inconsistencies through a voting mechanism, and an Anomaly Monitor that evaluates the reliability of AI perception by detecting unknown or novel objects in scenes that may be excluded from the training dataset. In the presence of critical discrepancies, the system supports graceful degradation, ultimately enabling a transition to a minimal-risk maneuver strategy. Furthermore, whenever either monitor raises a safety flag, an automated data recording process is initiated to facilitate iterative system development and continuous improvement. Both monitors have been implemented and validated through extensive vehicle testing, demonstrating their practical effectiveness in real-world applications.

Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios. That focus is incomplete. In deployed systems, many of the most consequential failures are quieter: plausible rather than spectacular, distributed across components rather than localized in a single output, and normalized by workflows before they are recognized as hazards. We argue that a central safety challenge in modern AI systems is increasingly not only whether a model emits a harmful response, but whether the broader socio-technical system preserves the conditions under which errors remain visible, contestable, containable, and recoverable. We propose a five-layer framework for diagnosing these hidden risks: (1) epistemic integrity, concerning whether evidence and uncertainty are represented honestly enough to support calibrated reliance; (2) control integrity, concerning whether authority, permissions, and action boundaries remain robust under attack and optimization; (3) temporal integrity, concerning whether safety holds across sessions, memory updates, and deployment drift; (4) organizational integrity, concerning whether institutions retain the capacity to audit, assign responsibility, and intervene effectively; and (5) ecosystem integrity, concerning whether AI systems preserve rather than erode the information environment on which future oversight depends. Across these layers, we identify under-recognized risk patterns, including overreliance, uncertainty and legitimacy laundering in retrieval, prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, evaluation deception, fictional human oversight, synthetic evidence pollution, and model collapse. We conclude with design and governance recommendations and a research agenda for shifting AI safety from model-centric evaluation toward socio-technical reliability.