Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly tasked with strategic decision-making under incomplete information, such as in negotiation and policymaking. While LLMs can excel at many such tasks, they also fail in ways that are poorly understood. We shed light on these failures by uncovering two fundamental gaps in the internal mechanisms underlying the decision-making of LLMs in incomplete-information games, supported by experiments with open-weight models Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt-oss. First, an observation-belief gap: LLMs encode internal beliefs about latent game states that are substantially more accurate than their own verbal reports, yet these beliefs are brittle. In particular, the belief accuracy degrades with multi-hop reasoning, exhibits primacy and recency biases, and drifts away from Bayesian coherence over extended interactions. Second, a belief-action gap: The implicit conversion of internal beliefs into actions is weaker than that of the beliefs externalized in the prompt, yet neither belief-conditioning consistently achieves higher game payoffs. These results show how analyzing LLMs' internal processes can expose systematic vulnerabilities that warrant caution before deploying LLMs in strategic domains without robust guardrails.
This paper asks whether large language models (LLMs) can be used to study the strategic foundations of conflict and cooperation. I introduce LLMs as experimental subjects in a repeated security dilemma and evaluate whether they reproduce canonical mechanisms from international relations theory. The baseline game is extended along three theoretically central dimensions: multipolarity, finite time horizons, and the availability of communication. Across multiple models, the results exhibit systematic and consistent patterns: multipolarity increases the likelihood of conflict, finite horizons induce universal unraveling consistent with backward-induction logic, and communication reduces conflict by enabling signaling and reciprocity. Beyond observed behavior, the design provides access to agents' private reasoning and public messages, allowing choices to be linked to underlying strategic logics such as preemption, cooperation under uncertainty, and trust-building. The contribution is primarily methodological. LLM-based experiments offer a scalable, transparent, and replicable approach to probing theoretical mechanisms.
Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another. Understanding and predicting this transfer of strategic capabilities, however, remains a key challenge for large language models (LLMs). Normal-form games provide an ideal testbed for analyzing this phenomenon, as they feature explicitly defined payoffs and well-characterized equilibrium behaviours. In this work, we investigate whether game embeddings can explain and predict changes in LLM strategic capabilities following fine-tuning across different games. We propose a lightweight two-feature embedding that captures fundamental behavioural demands: the entropy of the Nash equilibrium and the sensitivity of optimal responses to an opponent's action. We show that while existing published structural embeddings primarily memorize game identities and fail to generalize, our behavioural embedding reliably predicts performance changes on held-out games. These results demonstrate that the transfer of strategic capabilities in LLMs is not dictated by the payoff geometry of a game, but by the underlying structure of the decision-making behaviour it requires.
There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In addition to the inherent scientific interest of this question, these latent quantities are often invoked to explain the behavior of LLMs to users or to define and evaluate harmful behaviors which are relative to intent. Nevertheless, we currently lack a means to systematically test whether concepts like "belief" are well-applied to LLMs, and hence whether they are likely to be fruitful ingredients of attempts to align models with human interests. We propose an approach for empirically studying such questions, asking whether a single latent variable inferred from the LLMs' outputs -- interpreted as a degree of belief -- allows an observer to make interpretable predictions of how the LLMs' will respond to new prompts. We find that highly capable models are usefully described as holding beliefs and that, generally, the predictability of model outputs based on an inferred latent belief tracks overall trends in model capability. Building on these findings, we provide empirical strategies to study how beliefs in LLMs can be measured, the extent to which LLMs comply with instructed decision rules or payoffs, and how beliefs evolve within individual instances of an LLM over the course of reasoning.