Towards trustworthy agentic AI: a comprehensive survey of safety, robustness, privacy, and system security

Benchmark scores alone provide an incomplete basis for assessing the trustworthiness of modern artificial intelligence systems. Large language models (LLMs), agentic systems, and multimodal models (MLLMs) require different forms of assessment, yet their evaluation evidence must remain interpretable for development and oversight. We propose a unified framework that connects output-level, trajectory-level, and cross-modal assessment through eight trustworthiness dimensions: capability, robustness, safety, fairness, transparency, governance, oversight, and efficiency. The framework preserves system-specific metrics while mapping native measurements to common performance bands, accompanied by uncertainty estimates and traceable evidence. A meta-evaluation layer examines the validity, reliability, and reproducibility of the evaluation itself. Multidimensional profiles expose strengths and weaknesses, while safety-critical overrides prevent aggregate scores from masking critical failures. Mappings to governance frameworks, international standards, and European Union regulatory requirements connect technical assessment with oversight needs. The framework provides a structured basis for assessing both system performance and the credibility of the evidence supporting it, with empirical validation across deployment contexts remaining an essential next step.

Autonomous agents are increasingly used to execute consequential tasks in environments governed by operational constraints, organizational policies, regulatory requirements, and technical standards. Their safety is therefore determined not by the correctness of individual actions, but by whether their overall behavior remains consistent with the rules and invariants of the systems in which they operate. As large language model (LLM)-based agents become more autonomous and increasingly delegate tasks across organizational boundaries, securing them evolves from a single challenge into a broad and interconnected landscape spanning the entire agentic stack. At the single-agent level, untrusted inputs through prompts, memory, retrieved knowledge, and tool interfaces create attack surfaces. In multi-agent settings, delegation and communication introduce challenges related to identity, trust, capability control, and decision transparency, while the underlying model routing and execution control plane remains vulnerable to manipulation and to unverified model provenance. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is behavioral containment: sequences of individually permissible actions may collectively violate system-level constraints and safety invariants. At the broader level, supply-chain integrity, provenance, accountability, and end-to-end observability remain largely open problems. A common principle unifies these directions: security must become a verifiable property of the architectures, protocols, and runtimes that govern agent behavior, rather than an optional layer of guidance. Charting these challenges provides a roadmap toward trustworthy autonomous agent deployment.

Agentic artificial intelligence systems, capable of autonomous perception, planning, tool use, and multi-step action, are increasingly proposed for critical engineering domains where decisions carry physical, operational, or economic consequences. This survey addresses a gap in current literature by treating trustworthiness, whether agentic behavior can be verified, audited, and trusted under the constraints that engineering practice actually requires, as a first-class engineering property, rather than evaluating agentic AI by task capability alone. The study adopts a trustworthiness model organized around five cross-cutting dimensions: safety and constraint satisfaction; robustness and reliability; transparency and interpretability; accountability and auditability; and privacy and security. This is mapped onto an agentic assurance workflow spanning perception through audit. Building on this foundation, agentic systems architectures, threats, concrete trust mechanisms, and quantitative metrics are surveyed for direct application in agentic systems development and evaluation. These principles are then examined across four constraint-bound engineering domains: power systems, autonomous vehicles/robotics/UAVs, high-performance computing, and communication networks, identifying recurring design patterns, shared failure modes, and domain-specific gaps. Synthesizing across those domains, agentic AI trustworthiness is shown to be a single problem, with a path outlined toward a reusable, cross-domain assurance framework analogous to the graded certification regimes used by mature safety-critical engineering fields.