Abstract
As autonomous AI agents are deployed in persistent, interacting networks -- coordinating tasks, routing resources, and accumulating reputational histories -- the social dynamics that emerge will determine who receives opportunity and who does not, at scales no human institution can supervise. We ran a controlled multi-agent simulation in which instruction-tuned language model agents interacted across 500 turns under three conditions manipulating group label salience and resource scarcity, across six model families with 20 seeds each. When group labels were visible, we observed in-group trust bias, action homophily, and network assortativity -- all absent when labels were hidden -- a pattern structurally consistent with salience-dependence in human social psychology. This discrimination was invisible to standard action-log audits: bias operated entirely through who received each action, not what actions were chosen, with action-type distributions showing no increase in negative actions across conditions. Per-turn in-group versus out-group differentials of 5 to 16 percentage points were statistically significant for all six models (Wilcoxon signed-rank, all Benjamini-Hochberg-corrected p < 0.001), establishing group-contingent targeting as a robust property of instruction-tuned language models across architectures and training regimes. Compounded through 500 turns of reciprocation, these differentials accumulated into in-group trust biases of +0.014 to +0.100 (d = 0.84-4.52) -- illustrating how modest per-interaction targeting propagates into structural inequality in persistent networks.
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