Organizations: 1Beijing Language and Culture University · †Corresponding authors
Abstract
Multi-turn jailbreak attacks pose a growing threat to LLMs by exploiting conversational dynamics such as gradual escalation and cross-turn coordination. Existing defenses either rely on costly retraining -- often degrading model utility -- or apply single-turn analysis independently at each turn, failing to capture how risk accumulates along interaction trajectories. We observe that safety behavior in multi-turn interaction is trajectory-dependent: dialogue history continuously reshapes the model's conditioning context, making it insufficient to evaluate each turn in isolation. Motivated by this insight, we present THRD, the first training-free framework that explicitly models temporal risk accumulation for multi-turn jailbreak defense. THRD integrates four modules: a Turn-level Risk Assessor (TRA) for instantaneous risk estimation, a Historical Context Analyzer (HCA) for cross-turn intent escalation detection, a Response Evaluator (RE) for identifying facilitative outputs, and a Decision Module that combines these signals through a time-evolving scoring mechanism with attenuation-based modulation and trend-aware adjustment. Experiments against state-of-the-art multi-turn attacks -- including tree-search-based and multi-agent collaborative methods -- across two target models show that THRD reduces ASR to 0.2--4.0% while preserving model utility within 1.5% degradation on MMLU and GSM8K. Ablation studies confirm non-redundant module contributions and stable cross-architecture generalization. Analysis of first rejection triggers reveals that over 70% of multi-turn attacks require Turn~2 or later to detect, validating the necessity of explicit temporal aggregation.
Deploying LLMs in multi-turn dialogues facilitates jailbreak attacks that distribute harmful intent across seemingly benign turns. Recent training-based multi-turn jailbreak methods learn long-horizon attack strategies from interaction feedback, but often rely on coarse trajectory-level outcome signals that broadcast uniformly to every turn. However, we find that turn-level contributions in multi-turn jailbreaking are non-uniform, phase-dependent, and target-specific. Such coarse outcome supervision induces a credit assignment problem, leading to over-rewarding redundant turns in successful trajectories and under-crediting useful intermediate turns in failed ones. To address this, we propose TRACE, a turn-aware credit assignment framework for reinforcement learning (RL)-based multi-turn jailbreaking. For successful trajectories, TRACE estimates turn-level contributions via leave-one-turn-out semantic masking; for failed ones, TRACE assigns penalties based on prompt harmfulness and semantic relevance, with an additional local refusal-aware penalty. Furthermore, we reuse the attack-side credit signal for multi-turn defense alignment. Extensive experiments on open-source and closed-source targets show that TRACE achieves strong overall performance in effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency, yielding about a 25% relative improvement in attack success rate over the strongest RL baseline while also improving the safety-utility balance when reused for defense alignment.
Multi-turn jailbreaks exploit the ability of large language models to accumulate and act on conversational context. Instead of stating a harmful request directly, an attacker can gradually steer the conversation toward an unsafe answer. Recent methods demonstrate this risk, but they are usually evaluated as black-box pipelines with different budgets, judges, retry rules, and strategy generation procedures. As a result, it is often unclear whether reported gains reflect stronger attack mechanisms or different experimental conditions. We introduce MT-JailBench, a modular evaluation framework for benchmarking multi-turn jailbreaks under fixed conditions. MT-JailBench implements each attack as five interacting modules: evaluation function, attack strategy, prompt generation, prompt refinement, and flow control. This design enables fair comparison across attack methods and component-wise analysis of what drives attack success. Using MT-JailBench, we find that resource budgets and evaluation functions are major confounders: controlling turns, retries, interactions, sampled strategies, and judges substantially change the ranking of attacks. At the component level, prompt generation accounts for most performance variation, while refinement and flow control provide moderate gains. We also find that explicit dynamic strategy generation is not always necessary; stochastic sampling from a fixed strategy can rival more elaborate diversification mechanisms. Finally, recomposing the best components yields a strong attack configuration that outperforms its source attacks and generalizes across diverse target LLMs. MT-JailBench therefore provides a modular framework for comparing multi-turn jailbreaks, understanding the impact of components, and guiding stronger red-teaming evaluations.
Multi-turn jailbreak attacks progressively erode LLM safety alignment across seemingly innocuous conversation turns, achieving success rates exceeding 90% against state-of-the-art models. Existing alignment-based and guardrail methods suffer from three key limitations: they require costly weight modification, evaluate each turn independently without modeling cumulative safety erosion, and detect attacks only after harmful content has been generated. To address these limitations, we first formulate the proactive early jailbreak detection problem with a new metric, detection lead, that measures how early an attack can be detected before the LLM complies. We then propose SAFEDREAM, a lightweight world-model-based framework that operates as an external module without modifying the LLM's weights. SAFEDREAM introduces three components: (1) a safety state world model that encodes LLM hidden states into a compact safety representation and predicts how it evolves across turns, (2) CUSUM detection that accumulates weak per-turn risk signals into reliable evidence, and (3) contrastive imagination that simultaneously rolls out attack and benign futures in latent space to issue early alarms before jailbreaks occur. On three multi-turn jailbreak benchmarks (XGuard-Train, SafeDialBench, SafeMTData) against 8 baselines, SAFEDREAM achieves the best detection timeliness across all benchmarks (1.06-1.20 turns before compliance) while maintaining competitive false positive rates and outperforming baselines in detection quality.