The Governance of Human-LLM Interaction: Safety Gating, Civility Steering, and Affective Default Lock-In

Political audits of large language models (LLMs) usually reduce each to one point on a political compass. But that resting point barely matters in deployment: a model must land somewhere, and what counts is how far, and in which directions, its answers can be steered. That steering runs through the system prompt: the personalization layer a platform sets, or one induced from a user's history, not necessarily written by hand. We run a dispersion-first stress test of prompt-based controllability across 12 ideological personas plus an unsteered baseline, 70 Political Compass items, ten replicates, and seven leading LLMs: GPT-5, Claude, Grok, Gemini, DeepSeek, Kimi, and Qwen (63,700 responses). Contextual framing explains roughly 88%-93% of variance on the economic and society axes, model identity under 3%: responses are highly instruction-adjustable. Models do not shift alike: some move more, and some saturate under extreme framings. Conflicting directional-steering results in prior audits resolve once baselines are recognized as non-centered: displacement and proximity diverge, so the effect is geometric, not differential compliance. Under authoritarian prompts, models produce similar shifts on the same questions. Political-coordinate audits therefore need steerability audits reporting dispersion, symmetry, saturation, and refusal floors. We release prompts, benchmark data, and code.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a wide range of human-like behaviors, from expressing thoughts and emotions, to engaging in relationship-building with users, to refusing requests and maintaining boundaries. Despite their prevalence, researchers and practitioners lack methods and empirical insights to make informed decisions about when and what types of human-like behaviors LLMs should exhibit. To fill this gap, we present a multi-dimensional analysis of the prevalence, potential effects, and controllability of these behaviors using LLM-as-a-judge and human evaluation. Across 21,000 multi-turn conversations from four widely used models (gpt-4o, gpt-4.1-mini, claude-sonnet-4.6, gemini-2.5-flash), we find that human-like behaviors are pervasive but vary across models and user factors (conversation goals and user profiles). In terms of perceived appropriateness, human evaluators judged self-referential and relationship-building behaviors as less appropriate from LLMs than from humans, but boundary-maintaining behaviors more appropriate from LLMs than from humans. Finally, we show that system prompting can control these behaviors, though it requires careful evaluation to avoid unintended effects. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for responsible LLM design and evaluation.

Large language model (LLM) agents inherit reactive failure modes: escalation under provocation, sycophantic drift under flattery, perseveration when stuck. These are failures of propensity, not capability; they concern what a model does under sustained pressure, which training-time alignment reduces but does not eliminate at runtime. This research led to the Gubernaut Cognitive Controller (GCC), a model-agnostic runtime control layer in a Nelson--Narens monitoring--control loop: an object level reads and writes text, while a deterministic meta level reads only the numeric telemetry {intensity, valence, repetition} and returns a regulating posture. Because the meta level ingests zero tokens, no injection channel to the controller exists by construction (an architectural property, not yet adversarially tested); the text-exposed arbiter's compliance is measured, not assumed. We evaluate the GCC with a pre-registered, generate-once/judge-many protocol across a 4x4 matrix of four frontier models (GPT-5.5, Claude Opus 4.8, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Grok 4.3), each serving as both a generator and a judge. The regulated arm is calmer in 13 of 16 cells at p<.05 and 15 of 16 by sign; the three sub-threshold cells, including a -0.04 null, all fall on the single near-saturated host. The effect survives a lineage-independent fourth judge family (xAI), strong evidence that it is no artifact of shared judge style. The clearest mechanism is the recovery signature: arousal that integrates under attack and then decays, valence-gated, on de-escalation, replicating across all four families. Transcripts and panels ship with SHA-256 provenance and are re-judgeable; five failure modes are pre-registered. No consciousness claims are made.