Human-AI Teaming Through the Lens of Calibration

Human-AI teams play a pivotal role in improving overall system performance when neither the human nor the model can achieve such performance on their own. With the advent of powerful and accessible Generative AI models, several mundane tasks have morphed into Human-AI team tasks. From writing essays to developing advanced algorithms, humans have found that using AI assistance has led to an accelerated work pace like never before. In classification tasks, where the final output is a single hard label, it is crucial to address the combination of human and model output. Prior work elegantly solves this problem using Bayes rule, using the assumption that human and model output are conditionally independent given the ground truth. Specifically, it discusses a combination method to combine a single deterministic labeler (the human) and a probabilistic labeler (the classifier model) using the model's instance-level and the human's class-level calibrated probabilities.

Human-AI teams fail to outperform their best member in 70% of studies, yet no theory specifies when complementarity is achievable. We derive tight bounds for the broad class of confidence-based aggregation rules by integrating signal detection theory with information-theoretic analysis, yielding four results: (1) a complementarity theorem (teams outperform individuals iff error correlation $ρ_{HM} < ρ^*$, with $ρ^* \approx a$ in the symmetric near-chance regime); (2) minimax bounds showing gains scale as $Θ(\sqrt{Δd})$ with metacognitive sensitivity difference; (3) an impossibility result proving no confidence-based aggregation rule achieves complementarity when $ρ_{HM} \geq ρ^*$; and (4) multi-class generalization $ρ^*_K \approx ρ^*/\sqrt{K-1}$. Predictions match observed team accuracy ($R = 0.94$ on ImageNet-16H, $R = 0.91$ on CIFAR-10H) and the multi-class threshold scaling holds on human data ($R = 0.93$, $K = 16$), with robustness under non-Gaussian distributions. The framework explains why complementarity is rare and provides actionable design formulas; results apply to aggregation, not to interactive deliberation that generates novel answers.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.