Algorithmic Constitutionalism

Frontier AI systems function as \emph{constitutional institutions}: each deployed model encodes an implicit ranking among safety, helpfulness, honesty, autonomy, and equity. We ask whether the supply of frontier constitutional types covers human demand. Combining a paraphrase-controlled audit of the as-shipped default constitutions of $23$ frontier LLM archetypes with a pairwise-tradeoff study of $1{,}649$ US participants on the same instrument, we report three facts. \emph{Demand is broad}: it spans all five values, with the largest constituency under one-third. \emph{Supply is narrow and drifting}: the $23$-archetype hull occupies ${\sim}2\%$ of the demand hull under conservative noise-matched estimation ($0.10\%$ at full audit precision), no archetype puts helpfulness or autonomy first ($37\%$ of users are constitutionally homeless), and across six model families autonomy decreases in $5/6$, equity increases in $5/6$, and safety increases in $4/6$, with monotone within-family version trends (order-permutation $p = 0.013$) and the autonomy decline concentrated in scenarios where safety is not at stake. The drift's importance is directional: \emph{away} from a value already undercovered, mechanically worsening the welfare floor for the least-served users. \emph{The fix is sparse}: a $2$-vertex menu $\{e_{\mathrm{HON}}, e_{\mathrm{AUT}}\}$ beats the full $23$-archetype frontier by $47\%$ on mean regret (CI $[43\%, 52\%]$); three vertex additions cut mean/worst-group regret by up to $81\%$/$64\%$. We formalize these findings as a budgeted-pluralism trilemma, show the binding regime is empirically realized, and verify the conclusions are robust to distance-based welfare and to degraded routing. The instrument and audit harness are described in full in the appendices.

Computational social choice and algorithmic decision theory offer rich aggregation theory but no end-to-end process for egalitarian self-governance: aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus are each considered in isolation, with key metric-space aggregators being NP-hard. Here, we propose \emph{constitutional governance in metric spaces}, integrating these stages into a protocol for constitutional governance. A community's \emph{legal corpus} comprises its \emph{laws} together with a \emph{constitution}, each being a point in a metric space, with the constitution specifying the supermajority threshold required to amend it. Members vote to amend the legal corpus by proposing their ideal points, followed by rounds of submitting \emph{public proposals} carrying \emph{supermajority public support}; a polynomial-time \emph{aggregation rule} scores each proposal, and a supported proposal whose score is positive and maximal for two rounds is adopted; if none is found the status quo is retained. Public proposals can be sourced from deliberation, vote aggregation, or AI mediation. With Constitutional Consensus, a community can run the constitutional governance protocol on members' personal computing devices (e.g., smartphones), achieving digital sovereignty. By drawing on metric-space aggregation, reality-aware social choice, supermajority amendment, constitutional consensus, deliberative coalition formation, and AI mediation, we provide a comprehensive framework for the constitutional governance of digital communities and organisations.

Machine learning systems increasingly make life-changing decisions about individuals, such as loan approvals, hiring, and cheating detection, raising a pressing question: how can individuals respond to negative decisions made by these opaque systems? While explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) has largely focused on algorithmic recourse -- helping individuals change their features to obtain a desired outcome -- the parallel problem of algorithmic contestability -- helping individuals review and correct erroneous algorithmic decisions -- has received far less attention, despite its central ethical and legal importance. We trace this neglect to the absence of clear formal definitions and a systematic operationalization of contestability as an algorithmic problem. To address it, we propose an operational definition of contestability as a natural complement to recourse: contestability starts from the presumption that a decision may be incorrect and focuses on identifying evidence to challenge and potentially overturn it, whereas recourse assumes the decision is valid and instead provides pathways for changing it. We show that standard XAI explanations, such as counterfactuals, LIME, or Anchors, even when combined with human intuitions about decision continuity or monotonicity, reveal only errors in the neighborhood of the individual, but provide insufficient grounds for overturning the decision at hand. Going thus beyond traditional XAI, we identify three types of evidence warranting reversal according to the decision maker's own ethical standards: predictive multiplicity, incorrect feature values, and neglected overruling evidence. We argue that these render decisions normatively indefensible and thus successfully contestable. Finally, we analyze how existing EU legislation connects to our framework and argue that individuals already hold some legal rights to these forms of evidence.