stat.MLJun 10, 2026

Epistemic Uncertainty Is Not the Reducible Kind

Authors: Robin Young

Abstract

The standard taxonomy of predictive uncertainty defines epistemic uncertainty as the part removable by collecting more data, while the standard measure identifies it with a mutual-information term. We prove the definition and the measure are extensionally inconsistent. On an explicit construction, the measure assigns all uncertainty to the epistemic class, yet no quantity of training data reduces it. Reducibility is instead a property of the pair (uncertainty, acquisition class), and the dichotomy resolves into three parts: aleatoric, sample-reducible epistemic, and mechanism-reducible epistemic uncertainty. An exact identity for the value of an observation shows that in-distribution data never reduces mechanism-irreducible uncertainty and generically increases it. Ensemble disagreement, the deployed epistemic estimate, tracks the training procedure rather than the epistemic term. It collapses to zero beneath a positive truth under consistent training, and equals hyperparameter-scaled initialization noise under interpolation. A finite-sample falsification test and seed-swept experiments confirm the theory.

Explore similar work

Jul 16, 2026cs.LG

Evaluating Epistemic Uncertainty: Beyond OOD Detection and Active Learning

Current evaluation of epistemic uncertainty relies on tasks such as out-ofdistribution detection and active learning. However, the Bayes-optimal decision strategies for these tasks do not coincide with the scores commonly used to quantify epistemic uncertainty. Building on the epistemic reject-option framework, we evaluate epistemic uncertainty using its ability to identify regret, the reducible error. Formulating selective prediction as a constrained optimization over coverage, expected risk, and regret, we prove the optimal selector is a thresholded convex combination of the ground-truth aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. This theoretical unification exposes a weakness in recent uncertainty disentanglement literature: we demonstrate that standard correlation metrics between learned components do not necessarily predict their actual operational utility. We instead propose to evaluate the achievable risk, regret, coverage surface of the decomposition as a diagnostic for joint disentanglement and utility. Benchmarking standard methods on datasets with dense human annotations reveals that decision-theoretic rankings can disagree substantially with proxy-task rankings, including pairwise rank inversions between methods that are top-ranked on one criterion and bottom-ranked on other.
Jakub Paplhám, Willem Waegeman, Eyke Hüllermeier +1
Jun 9, 2026cs.LG

Can we trust our models? Epistemic calibration in second-order classification

Uncertainty estimation is critical for deploying machine learning models in high-stakes settings. However, classical calibration only assesses the reliability of predicted probabilities and does not evaluate whether epistemic uncertainty estimates are themselves trustworthy. This limitation is particularly relevant for second-order classification models. We introduce epistemic calibration, a principled criterion that measures whether reported epistemic uncertainty faithfully reflects the dispersion of model predictions around the ground truth. We show that epistemic calibration is a strictly stronger notion than classical calibration and captures failure modes invisible to standard metrics. We relate this work to the existing literature through an impossibility theorem that holds under the epistemic calibration hypothesis. To operationalize this concept, we propose the Expected Epistemic Calibration Error (EECE), which we prove to be a consistent estimator of a True Epistemic Calibration Error (TECE). Experiments across a broad range of uncertainty quantification methods show that epistemic calibration is a coherent and meaningful criterion and reveal substantial differences across methods, despite similar predictive performance.
Arthur Hoarau
Aug 6, 2026cs.LG

A Unified Risk View of Uncertainty: Posterior Risk for Disentanglement and Evaluation Beyond Proxies

Reliable uncertainty estimates are critical in safety-sensitive applications, where understanding the sources of predictive uncertainty is essential. This often requires disentangling epistemic uncertainty from aleatoric uncertainty, yet these uncertainty types are not defined consistently across the literature, making it difficult to assess whether a method produces accurate uncertainty estimates. Evaluation is further complicated by the fact that ground-truth epistemic uncertainty is typically unavailable. Existing benchmarks therefore mostly rely on proxy tasks such as out-of-distribution detection, which do not provide complete ground-truth uncertainty targets and offer limited insight into the structure and quality of uncertainty estimates. We propose a unified definition of uncertainty as pointwise posterior risk, the expected loss of a predictor under the distribution of plausible ground-truth functions given the data. This view combines Bayesian uncertainty over functions with estimator-dependent deviations from the posterior mean, capturing effects such as misspecification and optimization error. This formulation constitutes the foundation of a theory-backed benchmark that enables direct computation of oracle epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty using semi-synthetic datasets with real covariates and known generative processes. By avoiding proxy evaluations, the benchmark enables fine-grained analysis of uncertainty estimates. Empirically, we find that accurate prediction does not guarantee reliable uncertainty disentanglement. The benchmark reveals practically useful differences between methods, identifying approaches with meaningful alignment to oracle uncertainty targets while exposing sensitivity to datasets and modeling choices.
Frieder Wizgall, Georg Tirpitz, Moritz Seiler +2