Current evaluation of epistemic uncertainty relies on tasks such as out-ofdistribution detection and active learning. However, the Bayes-optimal decision strategies for these tasks do not coincide with the scores commonly used to quantify epistemic uncertainty. Building on the epistemic reject-option framework, we evaluate epistemic uncertainty using its ability to identify regret, the reducible error. Formulating selective prediction as a constrained optimization over coverage, expected risk, and regret, we prove the optimal selector is a thresholded convex combination of the ground-truth aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. This theoretical unification exposes a weakness in recent uncertainty disentanglement literature: we demonstrate that standard correlation metrics between learned components do not necessarily predict their actual operational utility. We instead propose to evaluate the achievable risk, regret, coverage surface of the decomposition as a diagnostic for joint disentanglement and utility. Benchmarking standard methods on datasets with dense human annotations reveals that decision-theoretic rankings can disagree substantially with proxy-task rankings, including pairwise rank inversions between methods that are top-ranked on one criterion and bottom-ranked on other.
Reliable uncertainty estimates are critical in safety-sensitive applications, where understanding the sources of predictive uncertainty is essential. This often requires disentangling epistemic uncertainty from aleatoric uncertainty, yet these uncertainty types are not defined consistently across the literature, making it difficult to assess whether a method produces accurate uncertainty estimates. Evaluation is further complicated by the fact that ground-truth epistemic uncertainty is typically unavailable. Existing benchmarks therefore mostly rely on proxy tasks such as out-of-distribution detection, which do not provide complete ground-truth uncertainty targets and offer limited insight into the structure and quality of uncertainty estimates. We propose a unified definition of uncertainty as pointwise posterior risk, the expected loss of a predictor under the distribution of plausible ground-truth functions given the data. This view combines Bayesian uncertainty over functions with estimator-dependent deviations from the posterior mean, capturing effects such as misspecification and optimization error. This formulation constitutes the foundation of a theory-backed benchmark that enables direct computation of oracle epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty using semi-synthetic datasets with real covariates and known generative processes. By avoiding proxy evaluations, the benchmark enables fine-grained analysis of uncertainty estimates. Empirically, we find that accurate prediction does not guarantee reliable uncertainty disentanglement. The benchmark reveals practically useful differences between methods, identifying approaches with meaningful alignment to oracle uncertainty targets while exposing sensitivity to datasets and modeling choices.
The standard taxonomy of predictive uncertainty defines epistemic uncertainty as the part removable by collecting more data, while the standard measure identifies it with a mutual-information term. We prove the definition and the measure are extensionally inconsistent. On an explicit construction, the measure assigns all uncertainty to the epistemic class, yet no quantity of training data reduces it. Reducibility is instead a property of the pair (uncertainty, acquisition class), and the dichotomy resolves into three parts: aleatoric, sample-reducible epistemic, and mechanism-reducible epistemic uncertainty. An exact identity for the value of an observation shows that in-distribution data never reduces mechanism-irreducible uncertainty and generically increases it. Ensemble disagreement, the deployed epistemic estimate, tracks the training procedure rather than the epistemic term. It collapses to zero beneath a positive truth under consistent training, and equals hyperparameter-scaled initialization noise under interpolation. A finite-sample falsification test and seed-swept experiments confirm the theory.
We present a novel viewpoint for uncertainty quantification. Uncertainty measures are not primitives, in need of axioms and argumentation, but instead consequences, of higher-level modelling decisions. We show how epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty measures can be derived via decomposition of a subjective risk, based on a strictly proper loss. Reverse cross entropy provides a prominent example, where decomposition recovers the classic information-theoretic uncertainty terms. The same approach recovers numerous measures previously proposed across the UQ literature, providing them a common theoretical foundation. This suggests a new approach to UQ: given a modelling scenario and strictly proper loss, the corresponding epistemic and aleatoric terms are induced by the subjective-risk decomposition. We then extend our view to learning theory: we introduce and analyse subjective risk analogues of excess risk, approximation error and estimation error, and identify the connections to UQ. We consider this a first step towards a full learning-theoretic framework for uncertainty quantification.