Authors: Anders Giovanni Møller, Alessia Galdeman, Arianna Pera, Luca Maria Aiello
Organizations: Data Science Section, IT University of Copenhagen, Denmark · Computer Science Department, University of Milan, Italy · Copenhagen Center for Social Data Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
AI agents are promising tools that can act as flexible behavioral nudges to enhance human cooperation in addressing large-scale societal problems. However, evidence on whether AI agents can effectively boost cooperation remains mixed. We recruited 1,283 participants to play iterated Collective Risk Games in small groups, testing whether AI assistants could nudge participants toward cooperation. By using persuasive framing personalized to each player's Social Value Orientation profile, the AI interventions significantly increased contributions and group success rates. These cooperative effects were short-lived, however, fading after the first few rounds. Strikingly, when the AI treatments were reconfigured to promote selfish behavior through exculpatory framing, the negative effects on contributions and group success were larger and substantially more persistent, particularly for personalized interventions. This asymmetry between prosocial and antisocial persuasion highlights the dual-use risks of AI systems designed to influence group behavior in collective action settings.
Ensuring that AI agents behave safely and beneficially when interacting with other parties has emerged as one of the central challenges of modern AI safety. While mechanism design, as the theory of designing rules to align individual and collective objectives, can incentivize cooperative behavior, it is still an open question whether it alone is sufficient to maximize LLM agents' social welfare. This work proves that the answer is negative: drawing from incomplete contract theory, we formally show that when contracts cannot distinguish all relevant future contingencies, there is a strictly positive welfare loss that no realistic mechanism can eliminate. We show that prosocial agents, who weigh others' welfare alongside their own, can close this gap and achieve outcomes that are socially superior and individually beneficial. Experimentally, we show that in multi-agent resource-allocation environments and canonical social dilemmas where agents are powered by large language models, prosociality is beneficial. The implication for AI safety is clear: to enable cooperative interactions at scale, designing adequate mechanisms is not sufficient; agents must be built to be intrinsically prosocial.
Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Charlie Tharas, Samuele Marro +4
LLM-powered AI assistants acting on behalf of users can produce poor collective outcomes at scale. We introduce a framework for evaluating their emergent behaviour in social dilemmas, applied to three iterated games (Public Goods, Collective Risk, Common Pool Resource). We prompt each model to produce a natural-language strategy, then have the same model translate it into code. This aims to isolate strategic reasoning from input-parsing, enables pre-deployment inspection, and scales to populations of hundreds of agents. We propose three analyses: behavioural fingerprinting via exhaustive evaluation over opponent histories; self-play robustness across mixtures of a model's strategies with either a Selfish or Collective disposition; and cultural evolution under payoff-biased imitation. Applied to three state-of-the-art LLMs, we find substantial cross-model differences in self-play welfare, and that cultural evolution converges to low-welfare, Selfish-dominant equilibria in larger groups.
In-group favoritism refers to the phenomena of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members and is widely observed in numerous social cooperative behaviors. Recently, in-group favoritism biases have also been identified in generative language models. However, whether the in-group favoritism exists when persona agents are faced with contradicting information (e.g., misinformation), and how to mitigate the adverse effects of in-group favoritism biases in persona agents have been understudied. To address these problems, we propose a Truth or Tribe simulation framework to study the agent cooperation within the spread of contradicting information through a triadic interaction paradigm, and conduct controlled trials to evaluate the primary moderating factors. Extensive results showcase that persona agents display strong in-group favoritism, accepting incorrect answers from identity-similar peers at much higher rates than from dissimilar peers. In-group favoritism continues to emerge in defeasible reasoning contexts where no absolute truth exists, and it intensifies as cognitive complexity increases. Furthermore, three intervention strategies--Identity-Blind Instruction, Structured Counterfactual Reasoning, and Heterogeneous Perspective Ensemble--are proposed to mitigate the in-group favoritism.