Managing the Human Fallback: Skill Investment Under Improving AI and Worker Mobility
Authors: Simrita Singh, Naireet Ghosh, Tinglong Dai
Organizations: Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, 95053 · Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas, 75080 · Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202
When firms deploy autonomous AI, they must decide how much work to leave to the system and how much to keep workers engaged. This decision affects current output and future human capital. We develop a parsimonious two-period model in which AI may outperform the worker when it functions, but may fail with positive probability. A firm chooses worker engagement; engagement lowers current output for below-benchmark workers, but changes future skill through learning and erosion. We distinguish two dimensions of AI progress: capability, the system's output when it works, and reliability, the probability that it works. In a single-firm benchmark, engagement is valuable only as fallback investment. The firm engages the least-skilled workers most, because they have the largest skill gaps and are least costly to bring toward a useful fallback level. With worker mobility, engagement also affects labor-market sorting: workers prefer jobs that build more valuable skill trajectories. This sorting motive targets higher-skill workers near the AI frontier, where skill gains are more valuable and engagement is less costly. Mobility can therefore reverse the engagement pattern, shifting investment from the least-skilled toward the most-skilled workers below the AI benchmark. Mobility also reshapes how AI progress affects engagement: greater capability raises engagement by increasing the value of the skill trajectory a firm offers, whereas greater reliability can raise or lower it because it reduces fallback need while also changing learning opportunities. Under worker mobility, human-AI work design becomes a problem of human-capital investment, in which allocating work today shapes future skill.
Experimental evidence suggests that AI tools raise worker productivity, but also that sustained offloading can erode expertise. This creates a tradeoff when expertise is a complement to AI. To explore the consequences of this tradeoff, we develop a dynamic model in which a decision-maker chooses the intensity of practice-displacing AI offloading for a worker over time, trading immediate productivity against the erosion of worker skill. We decompose the tool's productivity effect into two components, one independent of worker expertise and one that scales with it. The model produces three main results. First, a decision-maker who fully anticipates skill erosion still rationally adopts AI when front-loaded gains outweigh long-run skill costs, lowering long-run productivity. The decomposition sorts deployments into five regions by their long-run effect, separating beneficial from harmful adoption. Second, the tradeoff introduces the potential for misaligned incentives to harm workers. When managers are short-termist or worker skill has external value, AI use can leave the worker worse off than with no AI, the outcome we call the augmentation trap. Third, when AI substitutes strongly enough for expertise, offloading can generate permanent divergence, with high-skill workers realizing their potential and low-skill workers deskilling. Small differences in managerial incentives can determine which path a worker takes.
Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools are rapidly adopted in the workplace and in education, yet the empirical evidence on AI's impact remains mixed. We propose a model of human-AI interaction to better understand and analyze several mechanisms by which AI affects productivity. In our setup, human agents with varying skill levels exert utility-maximizing effort to produce certain task outcomes with AI assistance. We find that incorporating either endogeneity in skill development or in AI unreliability can induce a productivity paradox: increased levels of AI assistance may degrade productivity, leading to potentially significant shortfalls. Moreover, we examine the long-term distributional effect of AI on skill, and demonstrate that skill polarization can emerge in steady state when accounting for heterogeneity in AI literacy -- the agent's capability to identify and adapt to inaccurate AI outputs. Our results elucidate several mechanisms that may explain the emergence of human-AI productivity paradoxes and skill polarization, and identify simple measures that characterize when they arise.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming organizations, raising a fundamental organizational and economic question: when will a human employee be replaced by AI? We present an analytical model for studying Human--AI Task Allocation (HAT) in hierarchical organizations. A central feature of the HAT model is that it formally encodes the economic asymmetry between human skill acquisition and AI capability scaling. The HAT model allows us to derive how risk-adjusted costs, skills, organizational depth, deployment scale, strategic adaptation, and risk jointly determine when, where, why, and under what structural conditions human--AI replacement occurs. A key result is the Human--AI Substitution Principle, which provides a precise condition --- grounded in the formal asymmetry assumption --- under which AI replaces human labor. Building on this result, we show that AI adoption can produce abrupt workforce transitions, hybrid human--AI organizations, including cases where risk heterogeneity sustains human and AI roles without requiring a minimum-human-fraction constraint, and flatter managerial hierarchies with wider spans of control. The HAT model identifies structural conditions under which middle-management roles exhibit elevated vulnerability to automation, and shows that the vulnerability of highly skilled workers depends on a skill threshold shaped by organizational depth, baseline costs, and risk differentials. More broadly, the paper connects automation economics, organizational design, AI governance, and workforce planning into a unified theory of AI-driven organizational transformation.