Improved Multi-Dimensional Forecasting for Swap Regret

We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$. With $n$ players and at most $m$ actions each, the individual swap regret of every player is $O(\sqrt{n} m \log m \log^{5/2}(nm))$ at every finite horizon. Each player predicts the deviation gains, then uses these predictions to update a row-stochastic transition matrix, and plays its stationary distribution. The proof combines a potential argument exploiting stationarity with a two-scale higher-order prediction analysis, using rooted-tree representations to handle the nonlinear dependence of deviation gains on the stationary distributions. An adversarially robust variant, obtained through a generic common-prefix switching wrapper, preserves the self-play bound up to a universal constant and guarantees individual swap regret at most $7\sqrt{m T \log m}$ in the adversarial setting.

In algorithmic markets, predictive models become part of the data-generating process they aim to forecast. Once their outputs are converted into trades, allocations, execution schedules, or risk controls, they change the future data on which they are evaluated. I introduce algometrics, a framework for time series whose evolution depends on the predictive algorithms forecasting them. The framework distinguishes historical risk, measured under passive forecasting, from deployment risk, measured when forecasts drive actions. I prove three results. First, deployment risk is not identifiable from passive historical data alone: even in a one-step linear feedback model, infinitely many algorithm-mediated environments induce the same historical law while implying different deployment risks for the same forecaster. Second, historical model rankings can invert under crowding, so a predictor with lower passive error can have higher deployment error once similar algorithms are adopted. Third, randomized or instrumented actions identify short-horizon linear feedback, and I derive a finite-sample bound for deployment-risk estimation. These results suggest that time-series benchmarks in algorithmic markets should report feedback sensitivity alongside predictive accuracy.

U-calibration studies online forecasting algorithms whose predictions can be consumed by any unknown downstream agent, guaranteeing sublinear regret simultaneously for all proper loss functions. Existing U-calibration algorithms achieve worst-case optimal $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret for every bounded proper loss, but they fail to adapt to easier losses: as we show, even for smooth losses such as squared loss, they incur $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ regret instead of the optimal $O(\log T)$ regret. In this work, we show that this limitation is not inherent. Specifically, we design a single forecast algorithm that simultaneously achieves $\tilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret for every bounded proper loss and $O(\log T)$ regret for every bounded smooth proper loss. More generally, our algorithm also attains logarithmic regret for losses that are smooth relative to the log-barrier, which include several non-Lipschitz examples. Our approach is based on a novel variant of Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) in which perturbations are applied directly in the prediction space using self-concordant noise. The resulting analysis also departs substantially from prior FTPL analyses due to the complex nature of this noise and may be of independent interest.