Organizations: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University · College of Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
Multi-agent systems are increasingly used for forecasting future events, as deliberation among multiple LLMs is believed to improve reasoning and calibration. Yet existing approaches overlook a critical design choice: what information each agent receives. When all agents are given identical evidence, deliberation collapses into herding rather than genuine belief revision, leaving multi-agent systems little better than a single agent. We identify this as a fundamental gap and propose designed information asymmetry to close it: by partitioning evidence into shared public and disjoint private subsets, each agent holds exclusive knowledge that can only reach others through deliberation. We theoretically show that this decomposition reduces inter-agent error correlation, and instantiate it in InfoDelphi, a framework combining relevance-aware evidence routing, rationale-based iterative deliberation, and confidence-weighted aggregation. On PolyGym, a benchmark of 375 binary forecasting questions derived from real-world prediction markets, InfoDelphi outperforms the strongest single-agent and multi-agent baselines by 12--18% in Brier score and 4--8 percentage points in accuracy. More detailed experiments confirm that removing information asymmetry eliminates most deliberation gains, establishing diversity of input as the key enabler of effective multi-agent reasoning.
Multi-agent LLM systems often treat consensus as evidence of successful interaction. For deliberative problems, however, reliability depends on whether agents preserve the facts and viewpoints needed to interpret an issue. We identify the deliberative illusion: discussion produces (1) factual attrition, the progressive loss of issue-critical facts, alongside (2) stance homogenization, the collapse of diverse positions toward consensus. To measure this process, we introduce DelibTrace, a framework that decomposes each issue into atomic facts, labels issue-critical ones, distributes them across agents, and tracks their survival across discussion rounds. Across ethical and news-based deliberation with three representative LLM families, multi-agent discussion erases up to 72% of issue-critical facts. This loss is consequential: retained evidence can reconstruct the issue misleadingly, final stances remain anchored in base-model priors, and a single malicious agent can inject misinformation into the shrinking shared context. These results reveal a sharper risk: agents can agree more while knowing less. We call for evaluations that measure which facts, uncertainties, and legitimate disagreements survive interaction.
The effectiveness of multi-agent LLM deliberation depends not only on the agents' individual predictions, but also on how they communicate and collaborate. We study this mechanism through the lens of Friedkin-Johnsen (FJ) opinion dynamics, a tractable model for analyzing stubbornness, influence, and opinion change in multi-agent systems that captures empirically observed deliberation patterns. We show that the FJ parameters are input-dependent, turning multi-agent deliberation into a mixture of experts. This perspective implies that multi-agent systems can outperform single agents and static ensembles when routing reflects agent competence. Since competence is latent in practice, we analyze how influence is established through observable proxies: agents' self-assessed confidence, their perceived confidence, and initial alignment with other agents' views.
The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has motivated research on decision-making in multi-agent systems, where multiple agents collaborate to achieve shared objectives. Existing aggregation approaches, such as voting and debate, are largely ad-hoc and lack formal guarantees regarding the informativeness of the resulting decisions. In this paper, we provide a principled approach to analyse decisions made in the multi-LLM setting using Blackwell's informativeness framework. Within the Blackwell information-structure abstraction, we show that voting and debate induce information structures that are no more informative than the pooled private information of all agents. This result identifies Bayesian pooled posterior maximisation as an information-theoretic upper-bound decision rule under the Blackwell ordering. Motivated by this theoretical analysis, we introduce a practical method for LLM-based question-answering (QA) tasks that estimates each agent's posterior and approximates the pooled posterior using a product-of-posteriors estimator. Extensive experiments on six QA benchmarks demonstrate that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art multi-LLM debate and voting methods.