Failures and Successes to Learn a Core Conceptual Distinction from the Statistics of Language

How do learners acquire knowledge of what is unacceptable without negative evidence? Construction Grammar proposes statistical preemption: exposure to a conventional form (e.g., "donated the books to the library") preempts structurally possible but unattested alternatives ("*donated the library the books"). We present a computational study that, for the first time, directly dissociates statistical preemption from the competing entrenchment hypothesis in large language models within a single converging design. Across four experiments spanning 120 English verb-construction pairings (dative, causative, locative), we show that (1) LLM surprisal patterns correlate strongly with human acceptability judgments ($r = 0.79$), validated against three independent behavioral datasets; (2) these patterns are driven by competing-form frequency rather than overall verb frequency, confirmed by non-circular partial correlations; (3) preemption sensitivity scales as a power law with model size; and (4) a controlled fine-tuning intervention causally demonstrates that manipulating competing-form frequencies shifts preemption behavior in the predicted direction, with reverse-direction controls ruling out frequency-sensitivity confounds. These results provide converging evidence that neural language models acquire negative linguistic knowledge through distributional competition, the core mechanism posited by Construction Grammar.

Whether idiosyncratic, item-specific knowledge is learned before abstract class-level generalizations, or vice versa, is a central question in language learning, with exemplar and abstraction-based theories making opposite predictions. Recent methods have claimed to show that, at least for large language models, abstract knowledge is learned first. We show that these methods fall short: pure memorizer models with no abstract representations can appear, by the same criteria, to learn either item-specific or class-level knowledge first, depending on their sensitivity to individual observations, with the transition point governed by the distributional properties of the input. We further argue that the distinction between item-specific and abstract knowledge may be ill-defined for distributed representations, as a word's class-level properties may not be separable from its item-specific properties.

Grammaticality and likelihood are distinct notions in human language. Pretrained language models (LMs), which are probabilistic models of language fitted to maximize corpus likelihood, generate grammatically well-formed text and discriminate well between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences in tightly controlled minimal pairs. However, their string probabilities do not sharply discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences overall. But do LMs implicitly acquire a grammaticality distinction distinct from string probability? We explore this question through studying internal representations of LMs, by training a linear probe on a dataset of grammatical and (synthetic) ungrammatical sentences obtained by applying perturbations to a naturalistic text corpus. We find that this simple grammaticality probe generalizes to human-curated grammaticality judgment benchmarks and outperforms LM probability-based grammaticality judgments. When applied to semantic plausibility benchmarks, in which both members of a minimal pair are grammatical and differ in only plausibility, the probe however performs worse than string probability. The English-trained probe also exhibits nontrivial cross-lingual generalization, outperforming string probabilities on grammaticality benchmarks in numerous other languages. Additionally, probe scores correlate only weakly with string probabilities. These results collectively suggest that LMs acquire to some extent an implicit grammaticality distinction within their hidden layers.