Abstract
Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind. We hypothesize that a central missing ingredient is not more capability but dimensional completeness. We propose that the believability of an artificial interlocutor -- the degree to which a user attributes an inner life to it, which we call perceived mind -- is governed by whether the agent expresses a small set of first-person stances that humans use as evidence of mind, and that this is separable from task intelligence. We name four such dimensions -- time, truth, entropy, and love -- each defined as a behavioral stance rather than a benchmark competency, each with a human analog and a concrete emulation path; the time dimension already has an author-reported prototype. We identify an observable behavior layer -- initiative (unprompted action) and cadence (the shape and timing of turns) -- through which the stances surface in conversation, both partially realized as deployed features in a production companion application. We state six falsifiable predictions that a later pre-registered study will test, separating those that are pre-registrable now from those that remain conjectures pending operationalization. This is a conceptual framework: it reports no human-subjects data, and its central comparative claims are predictions, not findings. Throughout we hold a firm boundary -- the object is inferrable interiority, not interiority; this is perception engineering, not a theory of machine consciousness -- and we treat the resulting attachment and manipulation risks as load-bearing rather than incidental.
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Ziqin Yuan, Jaymari Chua
Jun 30, 2026cs.CL
Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM). NCP-ToM is likely to be essential for many agent use-cases, including within user-assistant interactions and pedagogical contexts, but may also present manipulation or misinformation risks. Using a novel framework, NCP-ExploreToM, we subvert the conventional task structure by providing models with a set of belief state goals and requiring them to move objects or direct characters into rooms to achieve their goals. We evaluated six frontier models, including GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro and the Claude 4 series, and a cohort of human participants, across 600 task instances. GPT-5 was successful on approximately 80% of tasks in the agentic setting, and was the only model to outperform human participants on our task, but was still less robust than humans across contexts. We additionally found that all models, like humans, performed better on tasks inducing true belief states than false belief states, which is a positive signal for alignment efforts. These findings highlight emerging social-reasoning capabilities in LLMs for non-conversational task completion and underscore the necessity of agentic evaluations for understanding the safety and alignment of autonomous social agents.
Ben Slater, Matteo G. Mecattaf, Lucy G. Cheke +2
Sep 22, 2026cs.CL
Conversational agents often express answers in a uniformly confident register. We test whether expressed uncertainty, provenance-aware assertion, and explicit belief revision can be implemented as a behavior layer over a fixed language model; we do not test believability or trust. The layer combines three epistemic states, per-claim confidence and typed provenance, a provenance-gated expression rule, and a persistent revision store with auditable acknowledgments and partial resistance to false corrections. We evaluate it on a constructed, mechanically scored multi-session benchmark using a synthetic model and Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct. The synthetic instrument passes all five checks. On the real model, acknowledgment soundness, a by-construction guarantee, holds in 100% of cases, and true corrections are accepted more often than false ones (0.44 vs. 0.15 on held beliefs; 0.875 vs. 0.420 including rule-accepted corrections of unheld facts), but the pre-specified expression-fidelity, contradiction-separation, and provenance margins fail. A disclosed post hoc analysis shows that expression gated on mean answer-token probability ranks correctness below chance end to end (AUC 0.41, conversation-clustered), whereas gating on sampling consistency discriminates (AUC 0.66). A consistency-gated configuration selected from this finding and evaluated under a separately committed protocol meets the conversation-level manipulation and capability-equivalence criteria and replicates on a redrawn conversation set. The manipulation result is selection-dependent, and both criteria remain unresolved when uncertainty is clustered over the 60 facts. The supported conclusions are limited to the by-construction audit guarantee, store-dependent partial correction discrimination, and a benchmark- and model-specific failure of token-probability gating; scaling the fact base is required before human evaluation.
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