cs.CLJul 23, 2026

Surprisal Theory is Tautological (without Rational Grounding)

Authors: Ryan Cotterell

Abstract

Surprisal theory holds that the human processing difficulty of a linguistic unit in context is an affine function of its surprisal under some language model. I argue this claim is a tautology without further constraint: for any non-negative difficulty measure over units in context, there exists a language model whose surprisal is an affine function of it under mild technical conditions. Therefore, because any pattern of difficulty is consistent with some language model, without an additional constraint on the language model, surprisal theory makes no falsifiable predictions. The tautology was long obscured by an assumption implicit in two decades of psycholinguistic work---that the relevant language model is the distribution that generated the training corpus, so that improving corpus fit improves predictions of human behavior. Recent empirical work has undermined this assumption, demonstrating that better corpus models can be worse predictors of processing difficulty. I conclude that breaking the tautology requires a rationalist intervention, i.e., the relevant language model must be derived from a non-empirically motivated model of the comprehender, which could be based on, for instance, memory constraints or processing goals, and that, thus, does not depend on the behavioral data surprisal theory is meant to explain.

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Surprisal theory posits that the processing difficulty of a word is determined by its predictability in context, offering a potential link between human sentence processing and next-word predictions from language models. While language model (LM) surprisals successfully predict reading times in naturalistic text, they systematically underpredict the magnitude of difficulty observed in controlled studies of syntactic ambiguity, particularly in garden path sentences. This mismatch might arise from differences in the computational constraints between humans and LMs. Here we test one such hypothesis, specifically, that LMs may be able to simultaneously consider a greater number of distinct sentence interpretations at once, compared to humans. Using Recurrent Neural Network Grammars (RNNGs) with word-synchronous beam search, we systematically vary the number of simultaneous parses used to compute word surprisal, and then use these surprisals to predict human reading times. Reducing the number of simultaneous active parses indeed increases the magnitude of predicted garden path effects, but not nearly enough to capture the full magnitude of the effects in humans. This suggests that differences in the number of simultaneous parses available to LMs and humans cannot reconcile LM-based surprisal with human sentence processing.
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