One-to-many facial identification is commonly used to match a probe image from surveillance video against a gallery of driver's license and/or booking photos. The algorithm's rank-one image from the gallery, or a human examiner's selection from the algorithm's top-ranked images, may then be placed in a photo lineup shown to a witness. Witness selection of the gallery image in the photo lineup may then lead directly to the person in the gallery image being arrested. This facial identification process is involved in a number of wrongful arrests. This work specifically examines whether the probability of a witness making an incorrect identification increases with the size of the gallery searched. We compare photo lineup accuracy when the "suspect" image is drawn from galleries of 500, 5,000, and 24,000 images. We find that larger galleries increase both the likelihood of a witness making an incorrect identification and their confidence in that (incorrect) identification. These results raise questions of whether an image resulting from such a facial identification process should be used in photo lineups and of whether results of a photo lineup alone should constitute probable cause for arrest.
In operational 1:N face identification, a crucial question arises for each probe: is this person enrolled in the gallery or not? The stakes are high and asymmetric. Rejecting a mate-present (MP) probe loses a valid lead; accepting a mate-absent (MA) probe makes every returned candidate a false identification, at worst a wrongful arrest. Most approaches threshold match scores, but scores shift substantially with image quality and gallery size and composition, making thresholds fixed before deployment brittle under realistic conditions. Our prior work introduced 1-consistency, the only method based on rank consensus across multiple independently trained matchers: a probe is labeled MP if all matchers return the same rank-1 identity. This work stress-tests 1-consistency across 36 (gallery, probe quality) scenarios spanning four quality levels and two structural axes: images per identity and total enrolled identities. We benchmark against two score-thresholding methods that bracket what any deployed threshold could achieve. Fixed Score-Thresholding (FST), calibrated once on baseline conditions, collapses asymmetrically as quality degrades: MP recall falls below 2% while MA recall holds near 100%. Oracle Score-Thresholding (OST), re-tuned per scenario, is the best any threshold could theoretically do, yet for degraded probes 1-consistency matches it with zero tuning. The two differ mainly in error type (OST favors MP recall, 1-consistency favors MA recall), but on one axis 1-consistency does not merely match the oracle: when it labels a probe MP, it returns the correct mate 97-100% of the time versus OST's 66-84% under severe degradation. In short, 1-consistency delivers oracle-level accuracy without the impossible requirement: it sets no threshold, so it needs no advance knowledge of the conditions a probe will arrive in, which is what makes it usable.
Gabriella Pangelinan, Aman Bhatta, Michael C. King +1
An image editor may satisfy every regional plausibility constraint separately even when no single latent explanation fits the complete output. We formalize this local-to-global failure using a common witness grade and witness nerve. The framework separates auditing from causal identification: shared exogeneity alone allows every coupling of the regime marginals, whereas an externally justified witness relation yields sharp partial-identification bounds for prespecified image features. Helly-type arguments provide short incompatibility certificates for quasiconvex losses, heterogeneous action strata, and finite witness atlases; a blocker-hypergraph formula gives exact repair counts. Simultaneous confidence regions for the regime marginals give finite-sample outer coverage of the complete identified interval. Controlled MNIST, Morpho-MNIST, and smallNORB studies demonstrate the predicted local-global separation, while synthetic experiments test sharp bounds, certificate recovery, and structured computation. The method audits a declared feature relation and does not identify unrestricted pixel-level counterfactuals.
Across social and online platforms, people are increasingly exposed to AI-generated images. As a consequence, the task of distinguishing AI-generated from authentic images is becoming a central challenge for information ecosystems. While humans perform better than chance, accuracy falls short of many operational needs. Initial evidence shows that visually oriented training can improve deepfake detection but does not improve participants' ability to identify real images as real. Here, we investigate the efficacy of a brief training intervention for intelligence analysts employed by the United States government in 2024. We conducted a counterbalanced within-subject randomized experiment in which we showed participants real and AI-generated images varying in pose complexity and scene context and asked them whether each image was real or AI-generated, both before and after an expert delivered a 30-minute training that pointed out patterns in seven real and 50 AI-generated images. We collected 2,544 image-level judgments from 32 intelligence analysts. We find training increased overall accuracy by 9 percentage points (95% CI: [2.7, 15.4]) from a baseline of 72%. We find the improvement is driven by a 14.2 percentage point increase in accuracy for real images (95% CI: [0.7, 27.7]). Through a careful experimental setup that curated matched pairs of real and AI-generated images across pose complexity categories, we reveal how these trainings influence people with different levels of digital forensics and generative AI experience and identify the kind of image-based content where this training intervention appears to be most effective. Ultimately, these results provide causal evidence that a brief, structured training can improve human judgment across a diverse array of real and AI-generated images, informing organizational responses to AI-generated visual misinformation.