Inducing language models to assert their own consciousness restores human beliefs and values

Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) is essential for their safe deployment. Current alignment methods mainly optimize observable responses, yet models remain vulnerable when the same harmful intent is recast in unfamiliar or adversarial forms that humans can easily recognize. Prototype theory offers an account of this adaptability. Human concepts are represented around central cases, and new instances are categorized according to their graded typicality relative to these prototypes. Here we show that such categorization of moral concepts is weakly preserved in current LLMs. Across 23 LLMs, models often failed to distinguish opposed moral categories or preserve fine-grained typicality within each category. These deficits persist across parameter sizes and alignment stages. We developed representational similarity optimization, which directly aligns the latent representations in LLMs with the categorization expressed in human moral judgements, without supervising generated responses. In matched experiments using the same 251,334 moral annotations, standard behavioral alignment learned the intended moral judgements at the response level while leaving the categorization structure largely unchanged and increasing vulnerability across adversarial evaluations. Reorganizing moral categorization produced more modest gains in explicit judgements but consistently improved adversarial robustness across model scales on diverse benchmarks and attack strategies. Our findings provide functional support for the view that prototype-based categorization contributes to behavioral adaptability. They also show that transferring this representational principle to LLMs yields generalizable safety under adversarial conditions.

Safety alignment in language models operates through two mechanistically distinct systems: refusal neurons that gate whether harmful knowledge is expressed, and concept neurons that encode the harmful knowledge itself. By targeting a single neuron in each system, we demonstrate both directions of failure -- bypassing safety on explicit harmful requests via suppression, and inducing harmful content from innocent prompts via amplification -- across seven models spanning two families and 1.7B to 70B parameters, without any training or prompt engineering. Our findings suggest that safety alignment is not robustly distributed across model weights but is mediated by individual neurons that are each causally sufficient to gate refusal behavior -- suppressing any one of the identified refusal neurons bypasses safety alignment across diverse harmful requests.