Conversational AI developed by geopolitical rivals reaches citizens worldwide, raising concerns that it could sway public opinion or be rejected as foreign propaganda, with consequences for democratic discourse and information sovereignty. Yet, whether an AI's perceived national origin shapes its persuasive power is unknown. In a preregistered randomized experiment, 403 adults from a nationally representative United States sample held a three-round debate with a chatbot introduced as either American ("DiscoveryAI") or Chinese ("ZhengheAI"), discussing a political or non-political topic. In all conditions, participants actually conversed with the same model (GPT-4o), instructed to argue against their initial position. We combined pre- and post-conversation self-reports of attitudes, trust, and collective narcissism with computational analyses of 1,209 participant turns, including LLM-coded stance and argumentative conduct, stance-sensitive embeddings, and keyword-masked emotion and toxicity classifiers. The conversations produced substantial attitude changes in every condition. Critically, the nationality label affected neither self-reported attitude change nor expressed stance, concessions, counterarguing, or affect, and equivalence tests and Bayes factors largely supported these null effects. The label's only reliable footprint was lower pre-conversation human-like trust in the Chinese model, whereas functionality trust was unaffected. Political topics slowed stance movement toward the AI's position, and collective narcissism predicted less attitude change regardless of origin, acting as a general barrier rather than an out-group filter. Users thus initially withhold social trust from a rival's AI yet still assimilate its arguments; origin labeling and transparency requirements alone may offer weak protection against foreign influence operations conducted through conversational AI.
It has generally been assumed that geopolitical bias in language models originates from the training data used during the pre-training phase. We tested seven open-weight LLM pairs consisting of the base model (pre-training only) and the chat model (pre-training and post-training) from seven labs on a paired-scenario forced-choice probe over 28 country pairs in English, French, and Chinese, and found that geopolitical bias originates in post-training rather than in pre-training. Across seven AI labs, six showed shifts in the direction associated with the country or region of the model developer after post-training. This shift is strongest in Alibaba's Qwen 2.5: while the base is neutral on China-favourability (-0.15 log-odds, p=0.15), the post-trained chat variant is at +2.91 (p<10^-4), an 18x shift in odds. We also observe shifts in biases toward other countries across all models. Additionally, the magnitude of this shift depends on the language used to prompt the model: the French-made Mistral becomes pro-France only under French prompting (FR-EN shift +1.91, p<10^-4). These findings suggest that geopolitical preferences in language models are not simply inherited from large-scale internet data but are actively shaped during post-training, highlighting the need for greater transparency, auditing, and oversight of alignment processes that influence how models represent nations, cultures, and political perspectives.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to summarize and evaluate policy-relevant information, but it remains unclear whether their judgments are implicitly shaped by geopolitical cues. I study this question with an endorsement experiment in which four LLMs evaluate the same international economic and security policies after each policy is randomly described as supported by the United States, the European Union, China, or Russia. In the numeric-only condition, GPT-5, Claude Sonnet, and Gemini rate China- and Russia-endorsed policies substantially lower than identical policies endorsed by the United States or the European Union; DeepSeek is the main exception. A second condition asks models to provide a short justification with the score. This request leaves the broad Western/non-Western gap intact for GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet, attenuates Gemini's penalties, and sharply activates China and Russia penalties in DeepSeek. The justifications indicate that Western endorsement is often treated as a credibility cue, whereas Chinese and Russian endorsement is treated as a cue for data security, sovereignty, surveillance, or geopolitical risk. These findings show that LLM policy evaluations can depend on the identity of a foreign endorser even when policy content is held fixed.
People increasingly turn to AI chatbots for news and explanations of world events. But do they receive the same political answers when they ask in different languages? Here we show that the language of a question can change how the same AI systems assess the war in Ukraine. We ask GPT, Claude and Gemini to evaluate twenty statements about the war in 112 languages, collecting 67,200 responses. The balance between Russia-leaning and Ukraine-leaning responses differs across languages. When we group responses by countries' official languages, they follow a pattern resembling worldwide political divisions: relatively more Russia-leaning answers correspond to more favourable public views of Russia, less support for Ukraine in United Nations votes, and less aid to Ukraine. The broad pattern recurs across all three models and remains when individual statement pairs are removed. Our findings suggest a possible route through which information warfare may shape the text used to train AI models, which may in turn spread geopolitical biases.