Cross-Task Dissociation in Frontier Vision-Language Model Theory of Mind

Visual perspective taking--inferring how the world appears from another's viewpoint--is foundational to social cognition. We introduce FlipSet, a diagnostic benchmark for Level-2 visual perspective taking (L2 VPT) in vision-language models. The task requires simulating 180-degree rotations of 2D character strings from another agent's perspective, isolating spatial transformation from 3D scene complexity. Evaluating 103 VLMs reveals systematic egocentric bias: the vast majority perform below chance, with roughly three-quarters of errors reproducing the camera viewpoint. Control experiments expose a compositional deficit--models achieve high theory-of-mind accuracy and above-chance mental rotation in isolation, yet fail catastrophically when integration is required. This dissociation indicates that current VLMs lack the mechanisms needed to bind social awareness to spatial operations, suggesting fundamental limitations in model-based spatial reasoning. FlipSet provides a cognitively grounded testbed for diagnosing perspective-taking capabilities in multimodal systems.

Given the inherently multimodal nature of human experience, vision-language models (VLMs) hold substantial promise for modeling human cognition as it grows and develops with experience. Realizing their potential requires tools for comparing VLMs with human cognitive development across tasks, ages, and populations. We present LEVANTE-bench, a benchmark based on tasks and data from the Learning Variability Network (LEVANTE), which distributes open-source tasks and data measuring children's cognition across languages and cultures. In LEVANTE-bench, we systematically assess VLMs on six tasks, comparing their alignment with children aged 5-12 ($N$ = 1547) across three countries. We compare models at multiple scales, assessing their overall accuracy, their task- and item-level alignment with children, and how well they match children's trial-level error distributions. Alignment was heterogeneous across scales: at the level of tasks and items, more capable models aligned better with humans. However, match to human error distributions varied widely across tasks, and for several tasks, smaller models matched younger children's errors better. In addition, even the best-performing VLMs struggled on matrix reasoning and mental rotation tasks. Thus, current VLM architectures align only partially with the cognitive abilities of children.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests, prompting debate about the nature and validity of the underlying capabilities. At the same time, reasoning-oriented LLMs trained via reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards have demonstrated notable improvements across a range of benchmarks. In this work, we examine the behavior of such reasoning models in ToM tasks using novel adaptations of machine psychological experiments together with results from established benchmarks. We observe that reasoning models consistently exhibit increased robustness to prompt variations and task perturbations. Our analysis suggests these gains come at least partly from models being more robust at reaching the correct answer under prompt and task variation. We read this as evidence for a robustness-based account rather than for a new ToM-specific ability.