Understanding Cognition-Induced Risks in Agentic AI Systems

Agentic large language model (LLM) systems are commonly implemented as an LLM in a loop with Planning, Memory, Tools, and Control Flow. This application-focused view connects agentic LLM research with deployable systems and leaves open how such systems should be evaluated beyond end-to-end task success. Building on this view, we define agentic cognitive depth as a trajectory-level profile across five operational criteria. The profile contains context sensitivity ($C$), temporal continuity ($T$), multimodal coordination ($M$), adaptive interaction ($A$), and metacognitive monitoring ($Mc$). The first four criteria measure how well Control Flow, Memory, Tools, and Planning are used across a trajectory. The fifth measures whether the system monitors and regulates the full run. For each criterion, we give operational proxies and a perturbation procedure, then connect the profile to the agent's world model. We provide the structure needed to extend benchmarks such as GAIA, SWE-bench, WebArena, and TRIP-Bench with per-criterion diagnostics. Symbolic verifiers, structured memory, planner coupling, and tool constraints provide practical ways to build and test these capacities.

Agentic AI systems act autonomously, use tools, adapt to context, and operate in complex real-world environments. However, these same characteristics can create or exacerbate product risks. We studied how industry developers (n=35) perceive, prioritize, and address the risks in their agentic AI products. We found that developers' perceptions of risk were closely tied to the qualities that made the product agentic, such as autonomy, tool use, and usage in a real-world context. Developers prioritized product and business risks before considering downstream societal risks like job displacement and end-user privacy. This prioritization also impacted developers' ability and motivation to mitigate agentic risks. Finally, developers lacked mature controls for containing agentic risks, often relying on constraining the same characteristics that make agents useful: e.g., autonomy and goal complexity. These findings reveal a capability vs. risk control tension in agentic AI development: developers need to address risks that emerge from agentic capabilities, yet they currently have limited support for doing so without constraining agentic functionality.

What is an agent? What constitutes agency? With the rise of Large Language Model (LLM) systems marketed as coding agents'', AI co-scientists'', and other agentic" tools that promise to drive up productivity, and at the same time, existential" concerns such as AI escaping human control with destructive power under a speculative machine agency" against humans, it has become essential to clarify where automation ends and agency begins, both for building capable systems and for understanding whether and what to fear. Drawing on Descartes' grounding of agency in independent thought, and on portrayals of autonomous beings in science fiction, we survey the current landscape of AI agents, and analyze agent architectures along five dimensions: goal, identity, decision-making, self-regulation, and learning. Specifically, we argue that genuine agency requires these structures to be *internalized within the system itself* rather than assembled through external scaffolding. This distinction between *agentic* systems, whose competence resides in engineered workflows, and *agentive* systems, whose capabilities (including social interaction) arise endogenously, defines the boundary between systems designed for prescribed tasks, and those capable of operating in the open world with true autonomy. Building on this analysis, we propose the Goal-Identity-Configurator (GIC) architecture for a general-purpose agent model, combining hierarchical goal decomposition, identity evolution, simulative reasoning grounded in a separately trained world model, learned self-regulation, and self-directed learning from both real and simulated experience. Furthermore, we share insight on the auditability, controllability, and safety of agentive systems that possess greater autonomy and agency", but remain under human oversight.